"They compare a Wicked Man's Mind to a Vitiated Stomach; he corrupts whatever he receives, and the best Nourishment turns to the Disease. But, taking this for granted, a Wicked Man may yet be so far Oblig'd, as to pass for Ungrateful, if he does not Requite what be Receives."

— L'Estrange, Sir Roger (1616-1704)


Place of Publication
London
Publisher
Printed by Thomas Newcomb for Joseph Hindmarsh
Date
1682
Metaphor
"They compare a Wicked Man's Mind to a Vitiated Stomach; he corrupts whatever he receives, and the best Nourishment turns to the Disease. But, taking this for granted, a Wicked Man may yet be so far Oblig'd, as to pass for Ungrateful, if he does not Requite what be Receives."
Metaphor in Context
We have been Discoursing all this while, how far a Wicked Man may be Oblig'd, and the Stoicks tell us, at last, that he cannot be Oblig'd at all: For, they make him incapable of any Good, and consequently of any Benefit. But, he has this advantage, that if he cannot be Oblig'd, he cannot be Ungrateful: For, if he cannot receive, he is not bound to return. On the other side, a Good Man, and an Ungrateful, are a Contradiction: So that at this rate there's no such thing as Ingratitude in Nature. They compare a Wicked Man's Mind to a Vitiated Stomach; he corrupts whatever he receives, and the best Nourishment turns to the Disease. But, taking this for granted, a Wicked Man may yet be so far Oblig'd, as to pass for Ungrateful, if he does not Requite what be Receives. For, though it be not a perfect Benefit, yet he receives something like it. There are Goods of the Mind, the Body, and of Fortune. Of the first sort, Fools, and Wicked Men, are wholly incapable; to the rest they may be admitted. But why should I call any Man Ungrateful, you'll say, for not Restoring That which I deny to be a Benefit? I answer, That if the Receiver take it for a Benefit, and fails of a Return, 'tis Ingratitude in him; for, that which goes for an Obligation among Wicked Men, is an Obligation upon them: and, they may pay one another in their own Coin; the Mony is Current, whether it be Gold, or Leather, when it comes once to be Authoriz'd. Nay, Cleanthes carries it farther; He that is wanting, says he, to a kind Office, though it be no Benefit, would have done the fame thing if it had been one; and is as guilty, as a Thief is, that has set his Booty; and is already Arm'd, and Mounted, with a purpose to seize it, though he has not yet drawn Blood. Wickedness is form'd in the Heart; and, the matter of Fact is only the Discovery, and the Execution of it. Now, tho' a wicked Man cannot either Receive, or Bestow a Benefit, because he wants the Will of doing Good, and for that he is no longer Wicked, when Virtue has taken Possession of him; yet we commonly call it one, as we call a Man illiterate that is not Learned, and Naked, that is not well Clad; not but that the one can Read, and the other is Cover'd.
(pp. 59-60)
Provenance
Searching "mind" in Google Books
Citation
Text from Seneca's Morals by Way of Abstract. To which is added A Discourse under the Title of An After-Thought. By Sir Roger L'Estrange, Knt. 11th edition (London: Printed for Jacob Tonson, 1718). <Link to Google Books><Compare 1718 edition printed by Nicholson in ECCO>

See Seneca's Morals by Way of Abstract by R. L'Estrange (London: Printed by Thomas Newcomb for Joseph Hindmarsh, 1682). <Link to EEBO>

Printed in 1678 (part I only?), 1682 (3 parts), 1685 (3rd part), 1688 (4th edition), 1693 (5th edition), 1696, 1699 [all in EEBO], 1702 (8th edition), 1705 (9th edition), 1711 (10th edition), 1718 (11th edition). Into 16th edition by 1755. 26 entries in ECCO.
Date of Entry
09/20/2011

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.