work_id,theme,provenance,created_at,text,reviewed_on,id,comments,metaphor,dictionary,updated_at,context
3953,"",Ad Fontes: Digital Library of Classic Protestant Texts,2003-08-25 00:00:00 UTC,"We come now to Examine, what they set up against any Signs or Figures under the Gospel, from another Topic; and that is, That the Gospel is all Substance, and therefore that there must be no Sign or Figure at all in it.
Answ. By Substance here they mean that which is Inward, or Spiritual, that every thing in the Gospel is Spiritual.
But this will overthrow all Outward, or Bodily Worship. For that is distinguished from Spiritual, or Inward Worship.
And, in one sense, all Bodily Worship is a Sign or Figure of the Inward, or Spiritual; which is the Principal and Substantial Worship. Thus Bowing the Knee, or Uncovering the Head at Prayer, are Signs or Figures of the Inward Reverence and Devotion of the Heart.
And this the Quakers practise; therefore, by their own Argument, they have Signs and Figures as well as others; only they throw off those of Christ's Institution, and make new ones of their own.
It is impossible to be without Signs and Figures. For this whole World is a Figure of that which is to come. We our selves are Figures of God, being Images of him: And what is an Image but the Figure or Sign of a Thing? Christ is a Figure of God, being the Express Image of his Person, Heb. i. 3. And we now have the Knowledge of God in the Face of Jesus Christ. God is a Light inaccessible to Angels, as well as unto Men, without some Medium: His Essence cannot be seen or known Immediately, by any but Himself. All Creatures partake of him in Signs and Figures of him; each in their several Degrees; there are Higher and more Noble Figures; but all are Figures. And God has, in all Ages, through the World, Dispensed himself to Mankind in Signs and Figures; we could not otherwise apprehend Him. Christ is the most Noble and Lively Figure of God: Therefore his Dispensation is far beyond all others that went before him. Yet even now, We see through a Glass darkly, 1 Cor. xiii. 12. or, in a Riddle; as our Margent reads it, ?? ?????????, in a Figure.
What is the Bible that we read, what are Words but the Signatures, the Signs or Figures of Things? We can see the Essence of no one thing in the World, more than of God. And what are all those Accidents of Colour, Quantity and Quality, by which we distinguish Things, but so many Figures or Signs of them?
So very wild is that Notion, that there must be no Signs or Figures under the Gospel!
It would be much Truer, if they had said, That there are nothing else but Signs and Figures: There is nothing else without a Figure but God! For all Creatures are Figures of Him, Christ, the Highest.
(p. 95-6)",2009-03-23,10279,•Great bits on literal and figurative. INTEREST. REVISIT.,"""We our selves are Figures of God, being Images of him: And what is an Image but the Figure or Sign of a Thing?""","",2009-09-14 19:34:51 UTC,"On Quakers and figuration. Leslie continues and shows that the Quakers do indeed have ""figures"""
3953,Personal Identity,Ad Fontes: Digital Library of Classic Protestant Texts,2003-08-25 00:00:00 UTC,"We acknowledge a Great and Sublime Mystery in the Holy Trinity of GOD: That is a Mystery to us, which exceeds our Understanding. And many such Mysteries there are, to us, in the Nature of God which we all acknowledge; A First Cause without a Beginning! A Being which neither made it self, nor was made by any other! Infinite without Extension! In every place, yet circumscribed in no place! Eternal and Perpetually Existing, without any Succession! a Present, without Past, or Future! and many other such un-explainable, un-intelligible, Incomprehensible Mysteries; which yet hinder not our Belief of a God. And therefore not being able fully and clearly to explain the Trinity, which is the most hidden and secret Attribute of the Nature of God, can be no Reason for us to reject such Revelation which God has given us of Himself. Yet do we not want several Shadows and Resemblances of one Nature communicating it self to many Individuals, without either a Multiplication or Division of the Nature. We say that the Soul is all in all, and all in every part of the Body: yet that the Soul is neither Multiplied nor Divided among the several Members of the Body. It is impossible for us either to Explain this, or to Deny it; for we feel it to be so, though it is wholly unconceivable to us how it can be. Now if the Soul, which is but an Image of God, at an Infinite distance, can communicate it self to several Members, without breach of its Unity; why should it be Impossible for the Eternal and Infinite Mind to communicate it self to several Persons, without breach of its Unity; I will be bold to say, you will not find so near a Parallel in Nature whereby to conceive of God's Eternity, or his Infinity, as this, and a great many more, whereby we may conceive of His Trinity and Unity, by what we feel in our selves, and see in a thousand things that are before us. We see Extension not Divided but Distinguished into its three Dimensions; and Communicating its whole Nature to each of the Three, for Each is Extension; and yet there is but one Extension in all the Three.
The Soul is not Divided betwixt its several Faculties; they remain perfectly distinguished though not divided from one another: To understand what is present, is a quite different thing from Remembring what is Past; and to Love or Hate, is different from both of these; yet these Three Faculties, the Understanding, the Memory, and the Will, partake all equally of the same Soul.
Light and Heat are so different, that some are capable of the One, who are not of the Other; and yet they are not Divided in the Sun; but flow equally and naturally from it without any Division of its Nature.
(p. 322-4)",2009-03-23,10280,"•Leslie calls these ""parallels"": ""I say not that any of these Parallels do come up to the full explanation of the Communication of the Divine Nature to several Persons, without any Division or Multiplication of the Nature: But I am sure they take away the Contradiction alledged to be in it, while we see the same Difficulty in our own and other Natures, which we can as little Explain."" (p. 324).","""Now if the Soul, which is but an Image of God, at an Infinite distance, can communicate it self to several Members, without breach of its Unity; why should it be Impossible for the Eternal and Infinite Mind to communicate it self to several Persons, without breach of its Unity; I will be bold to say, you will not find so near a Parallel in Nature whereby to conceive of God's Eternity, or his Infinity, as this, and a great many more, whereby we may conceive of His Trinity and Unity, by what we feel in our selves, and see in a thousand things that are before us.""","",2009-09-14 19:34:51 UTC,On the trinity: the Socinians are guilty of contradiction
4132,"",Past Masters,2004-02-18 00:00:00 UTC,"I must confess, it seems to be the opinion of some ingenious men, that flat or plain figures are immediate objects of sight, though they acknowledge solids are not. And this opinion of theirs is grounded on what is observed in painting, wherein (say they) the ideas immediately imprinted on the mind are only of plains variously coloured, which by a sudden act of the judgment are changed into solids: But, with a little attention we shall find the plains here mentioned, as the immediate objects of sight, are not visible, but tangible plains. For when we say that pictures are plains: we mean thereby, that they appear to the touch smooth and uniform. But then this smoothness and uniformity, or, in other words, this plainness of the picture, is not perceived immediately by vision: For it appeareth to the eye various and multiform.
(§157, p. 234)
",,10609,•The editors use the last edition of 1732 (annexed to second edition of Alciphron).
,"Ideas may be ""immediately imprinted on the mind""",Impression,2009-09-14 19:35:07 UTC,""
4138,"",Past Masters,2004-02-18 00:00:00 UTC,"It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colours with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive, for example, hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes, and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple. Other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things; which, as they are pleasing or disagreeable, excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth.
(Part I, §1, p. 41)",,10629,•Republished in 1734 in London. Editor uses this second edition.
,"""It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses""",Impression,2009-09-14 19:35:08 UTC,""
4138,"",Past Masters,2004-02-18 00:00:00 UTC,"That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though the other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers, that the same thing bears a different denomination of number, as the mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension is one or three or thirty six, according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange to think how any one should give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say one book, one page, one line; all these are equally units, though some contain several of the others. And in each instance it is plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind.
(Part I, §12, p. 46)
",,10630,"•Republished in 1734 in London. Editor uses this second edition.
•Berkeley is fond of this expression. However, it is probably not 'metaphorical' in any important way. INTEREST.
","""That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though the other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers, that the same thing bears a different denomination of number, as the mind views it with different respects.""","",2013-09-27 20:52:46 UTC,""
4138,"",Past Masters,2004-02-18 00:00:00 UTC,"You will perhaps say that matter, though it be not perceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds. For, say you, since we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being produced. That is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not excite them in our minds, or any ways immediately affect us, as being altogether passive and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God, by whom they are perceived, as it were so many occasions to remind him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds: that so things may go on in a constant uniform manner
(Part I, §70, p. 71)
",,10634,•Republished in 1734 in London. Editor uses this second edition.
,"Parcels of matter may be ""so many occasions to remind"" God ""when and what ideas to imprint on our minds""","",2009-09-14 19:35:08 UTC,An Occasionalist Objection
4138,"",Past Masters,2004-02-18 00:00:00 UTC,"But though it be allowed by the materialists themselves, that matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents; and the reason entirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely grounded thereon. Yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that we can scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the thing it self is indefensible, at least to retain the name; which we apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, or occasion, though without any shew or reason, at least so far as I can see. For what is there on our part, or what do we perceive amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions, which are imprinted on our minds, either by sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and on the other hand, on the part of an all-sufficient spirit, what can there be that should make us believe, or even suspect, he is directed by an inert occasion to excite ideas in our minds?
(Part I, §74, p. 73)
",,10635,•Republished in 1734 in London. Editor uses this second edition.
,"A prejudice may be ""riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that we can scarce tell how to part with it""","",2009-09-14 19:35:08 UTC,""
4138,"","Searching in Past Masters; found again reading Colin Murray Turbayne's ""Berkeley's Two Concepts of Mind"" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 20:1 (September, 1959): 85-92, 89. See also Peter Walmsley, The Rhetoric of Berkeley's Philosophy Cambridge Studies in Eighteenth-Century English Literature and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990), 48-9; and John Richetti, Philosophical Writing: Locke, Berkeley, Hume (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1983), 145.
",2004-02-18 00:00:00 UTC,"But nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in controversies and mistakes, with regard to the nature and operations of the mind, than the being used to speak of those things, in terms borrowed from sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the motion of the soul: this infuses a belief, that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of dangerous consequence in morality. All which I doubt not may be cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but philosophers be prevailed on to retire into themselves, and attentively consider their own meaning.
(Part I, §144, p. 107)",2011-09-13,10640,"•INTEREST. Berkeley here complains about metaphors of mind! Philosophers should retire into themselves and attentively consider there own meaning.
•And see STC on billiard balls, he connects the metaphor with Hobbes.","""For example, the will is termed the motion of the soul: this infuses a belief, that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by the stroke of a racket.""","",2014-03-30 20:00:31 UTC,"Part I, §144"
4178,Seat of the Soul,Past Masters,2004-02-26 00:00:00 UTC,"HYLAS. I own there is a great deal in what you say. Nor can any one be more intirely satisfied of the truth of those odd consequences, so long as I have in view the reasonings that lead to them. But when these are out of my thoughts, there seems on the other hand something so satisfactory, so natural and intelligible in the modern way of explaining things, that I profess I know not how to reject it.
PHILONOUS. I know not what way you mean.
HYLAS. I mean the way of accounting for our sensations or ideas.
PHILONOUS. How is that?
HYLAS. It is supposed the soul makes her residence in some part of the brain, from which the nerves take their rise, and are thence extended to all parts of the body: and that outward objects by the different impressions they make on the organs of sense, communicate certain vibrative motions to the nerves; and these being filled with spirits, propagate them to the brain or seat of the soul, which according to the various impressions or traces thereby made in the brain, is variously affected with ideas.
PHILONOUS. And call you this an explication of the manner whereby we are affected with ideas?
(Vol ii, pp. 208-9)",,10844,"","""And that outward objects by the different impressions they make on the organs of sense, communicate certain vibrative motions to the nerves; and these being filled with spirits, propagate them to the brain or seat of the soul, which according to the various impressions or traces thereby made in the brain, is variously affected with ideas.""",Impressions and Throne,2013-09-12 03:59:50 UTC,Second Dialogue
7872,"",Reading,2014-04-25 03:38:09 UTC,"Now what is it that strikes a judicious Tast? Not that to be sure which injures the absent, or provokes the Company, which poisons the Mind under pretence of entertaining it, proceeding from or giving Countenance to false Ideas, to dangerous and immoral Principles. Wit indeed is distinct from Judgment but it is not contrary to it; 'tis rather its Handmaid, serving to awaken and fix the Attention, that so we may Judge rightly. Whatever Charms, does so because of its Regularity and Proportion; otherwise, tho' it is extraordinary and out of the way, it will only be star'd on like a Monster, but can never be lik'd. And tho' a thought is ever so fine and new, ever so well exprest, if it suits not with decorum and good Manners, it is not just and fit, and therefore offends our Reason, and consequently has no Charms, nor should afford us any entertainment.
(p. 20)",,23798,"","""Now what is it that strikes a judicious Tast? Not that to be sure which injures the absent, or provokes the Company, which poisons the Mind under pretence of entertaining it, proceeding from or giving Countenance to false Ideas, to dangerous and immoral Principles.""","",2014-04-25 03:38:09 UTC,""