text,updated_at,metaphor,created_at,context,theme,reviewed_on,dictionary,comments,provenance,id,work_id
"Warm'd by the summer sun's meridian ray,
As underneath a spreading oak I lay
Contemplating the mighty load of woe,
In search of bliss that mortals undergo,
Who, while they think they happiness enjoy,
Embrace a curse wrapt in delusive joy,
I reason'd thus: Since the Creator, God,
Who in eternal love makes his abode,
Hath blended with the essence of the soul
An appetite as fixed as the pole,
That's always eager in pursuit of bliss,
And always veering till it points to this,
There is some object adequate to fill
This boundless wish of our extended will.
Now, while my thought round nature's circle runs
(A bolder journey than the furious sun's)
This chief and satiating good to find
The attracting centre of the human mind,
My ears they deafen'd, to my swimming eyes
His magic wand the drowsy God applies,
Bound all my senses in a silken sleep,
While mimic fancy did her vigils keep;
Yet still methinks some condescending power
Ranged the ideas in my mind that hour.
(ll. 1-24, pp. 284-5)",2010-12-30 23:15:34 UTC,"""Now, while my thought round nature's circle runs / (A bolder journey than the furious sun's) / This chief and satiating good to find / The attracting centre of the human mind""",2003-12-01 00:00:00 UTC,"","",2010-12-30,"","•Sambrook writes, ""This poem is to a large extent a paraphrase of the letter 'An idea of Happiness"" and some poems in John Norris, Miscellanies (4th edn., 1706), pp. 317-54: see H. Drennon, 'James Thomson and John Norris', Publications of the Modern Language Association, liii (1938), 1094-101.
•Cross-reference: This metaphor also appears in Liberty. A Poem v l. 257: ""This moral Gravitation""",Searching in HDIS (Poetry),11699,4443
"This operation of the mind , which forms the belief of any matter of fact, seems hitherto to have been one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy; though no one has so much as suspected, that there was any difficulty in explaining it. For my part, I must own, that I find a considerable difficulty in the case; and that even when I think I understand the subject perfectly, I am at a loss for terms to express my meaning. I conclude, by an induction which seems to me very evident, that an opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from a fiction, not in the nature, or the order of its parts, but in the manner of its being conceived. But when I would explain this manner, I scarce find any word that fully answers the case, but am obliged to have recourse to every one's feeling, in order to give him a perfect notion of this operation of the mind . An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: and this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness.This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind , which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute about the terms. The imagination has the command over all its ideas, and can join, and mix, and vary them in all the ways possible. It may conceive objects with all the circumstances of place and time. It may set them, in a manner, before our eyes in their true colours, just as they might have existed. But as it is impossible that that faculty can ever of itself reach belief, it is evident, that belief consists not in the nature and order of our ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in their feeling to the mind . I confess, that it is impossible to explain perfectly this feeling or manner of conception. We may make use of words that express something near it. But its true and proper name is belief, which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy, we can go no further than assert, that it is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more force and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; infixes them in the mind; and renders them the governing principles of all our actions.
(I.iii.7) ",2010-09-27 01:31:53 UTC,"""An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: and this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness.""",2003-09-18 00:00:00 UTC,I.iii.7,"",2010-09-26,"","•Hume, David tries to avoid figuration in talking about belief. He is aware that his terms seem ""unphilosophical."" Note how he fails and has recourse to notions borrowed from dynamics (force, weight, solidity, firmness). INTEREST.",Searching in Past Masters,12132,4610
"Some have asserted that we feel an energy or power in our own mind; and that, having in this manner acquired the idea of power, we transfer that quality to matter, where we are not able immediately to discover it. The motions of our body, and the thoughts and sentiments of our mind (say they) obey the will; nor do we seek any further to acquire a just notion of force or power. But to convince us how fallacious this reasoning is, we need only consider, that the will being here considered as a cause has no more a discoverable connexion with its effects than any material cause has with its proper effect. So far from perceiving the connexion betwixt an act of volition and a motion of the body, it is allowed that no effect is more inexplicable from the powers and essence of thought and matter. Nor is the empire of the will over our mind more intelligible. The effect is there distinguishable and separable from the cause, and could not be foreseen without the experience of their constant conjunction. We have command over our mind to a certain degree, but beyond that lose all empire over it: and it is evidently impossible to fix any precise bounds to our authority, where we consult not experience. In short, the actions of the mind are, in this respect, the same with those of matter. We perceive only their constant conjunction; nor can we ever reason beyond it. No internal impression has an apparent energy, more than external objects have. Since, therefore, matter is confessed by philosophers to operate by an unknown force, we should in vain hope to attain an idea of force by consulting our own minds.
(I.iii.14) ",2010-09-27 01:34:05 UTC,"""In short, the actions of the mind are, in this respect, the same with those of matter.""",2003-09-18 00:00:00 UTC,"",Materialism,2010-09-26,"",•Mind and matter analogy.,Past Masters,12133,4610
"The great end of all human industry, is the attainment of happiness. For this were arts invented, sciences cultivated, laws ordained, and societies modelled, by the most profound wisdom of patriots and legislators. Even the lonely savage, who lies exposed to the inclemency of the elements, and the fury of wild beasts, forgets not, for a moment, this grand object of his being. Ignorant as he is of every art of life, he still keeps in view the end of all those arts, and eagerly seeks for felicity amidst that darkness with which he is environed. But as much as the wildest savage is inferior to the polished citizen, who, under the protection of laws, enjoys every convenience which industry has invented; so much is this citizen himself inferior to the man of virtue, and the true philosopher, who governs his appetites, subdues his passions, and has learned, from reason, to set a just value on every pursuit and enjoyment. For is there an art and apprenticeship necessary for every other attainment? And is there no art of life, no rule, no precepts to direct us in this principal concern? Can no particular pleasure be attained without skill; and can the whole be regulated without reflection or intelligence, by the blind guidance of appetite and instinct? Surely then no mistakes are ever committed in this affair; but every man, however dissolute and negligent, proceeds in the pursuit of happiness, with as unerring a motion, as that which the celestial bodies observe, when, conducted by the hand of the Almighty, they roll along the ethereal plains. But if mistakes be often, be inevitably committed, let us register these mistakes; let us consider their causes; let us weigh their importance; let us enquire for their remedies. When from this we have fixed all the rules of conduct, we are philosophers: When we have reduced these rules to practice, we are sages.
(pp. 148-9)",2011-02-20 21:43:26 UTC,"""Surely then no mistakes are ever committed in this affair; but every man, however dissolute and negligent, proceeds in the pursuit of happiness, with as unerring a motion, as that which the celestial bodies observe, when, conducted by the hand of the Almighty, they roll along the ethereal plains.""",2011-02-20 21:43:26 UTC,"","",,"",Hume's Newtonian metaphors... Here's another.,Reading,18145,6797
"'Tis evident to common sense, as well as philosophy, that there is no natural nor essential difference betwixt high and low, and that this distinction arises only from the gravitation of matter, which produces a motion from the one to the other. The very same direction, which in this part of the globe is called ascent, is denominated descent in our antipodes; which can proceed from nothing but the contrary tendency of bodies. Now it is certain that the tendency of bodies, continually operating upon our senses, must produce, from custom, a like tendency in the fancy; and that when we consider any object situated in an ascent, the idea of its weight gives us a propensity to transport it from the place in which it is situated to the place immediately below it, and so on till we come to the ground, which equally stops the body and our imagination. For a like reason we feel a difficulty in mounting, and pass not without a kind of reluctance from the inferior to that which is situated above it; as if our ideas acquired a kind of gravity from their objects. As a proof of this, do we not find that the facility, which is so much studied in music and poetry, is called the fall or cadency of the harmony or period; the idea of facility communicating to us that of descent, in the same manner as descent produces a facility?
(II.iii.8.8, p. 278)",2011-03-07 17:56:13 UTC,"""For a like reason we feel a difficulty in mounting, and pass not without a kind of reluctance from the inferior to that which is situated above it; as if our ideas acquired a kind of gravity from their objects.""",2011-03-07 17:56:13 UTC,"Book II. Part iii, Section 8","",,"","",Searching at Past Masters,18222,4610
"Since reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition, I infer, that the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion. This consequence is necessary. It is impossible reason could have the latter effect of preventing volition, but by giving an impulse in a contrary direction to our passions; and that impulse, had it operated alone, would have been able to produce volition. Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse; and if this contrary impulse ever arises from reason, that latter faculty must have an original influence on the will, and must be able to cause, as well as hinder, any act of volition. But if reason has no original influence, it is impossible it can withstand any principle which has such an efficacy, or ever keep the mind in suspense a moment. Thus, it appears, that the principle which opposes our passion cannot be the same with reason, and is only called so in an improper sense. We speak not strictly and philosophically, when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. As this opinion may appear somewhat extraordinary, it may not be improper to confirm it by some other considerations.
(II.iii.3.4, p. 266)",2011-03-07 20:10:50 UTC,"""Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse; and if this contrary impulse ever arises from reason, that latter faculty must have an original influence on the will, and must be able to cause, as well as hinder, any act of volition.""",2011-03-07 20:10:50 UTC,"Book II, Part iii, Section 3.","",,"","",Reading,18225,4610
"What may at first occur on this head is, that as nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a reference to it, and as the judgments of our understanding only have this reference, it must follow that passions can be contrary to reason only, so far as they are accompany'd with some judgment or opinion. According to this principle, which is so obvious and natural, it is only in two senses that any affection can be call'd unreasonable. First, When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposition of the existence of objects, which really do not exist. Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we choose means insufficient for the designed end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects. Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chooses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. 'Tis is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis is not contrary to reason for me to choose my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian, or person wholly unknown to me. 'Tis is as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledged lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter. A trivial good may, from certain circumstances, produce a desire superior to what arises from the greatest and most valuable enjoyment; nor is there any thing more extraordinary in this, than in mechanics to see one pound weight raise up a hundred by the advantage of its situation. In short, a passion must be accompanied with some false judgment, in order to its being unreasonable; and even then it is not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment.
(II.iii.3.6, p. 267)",2011-03-07 20:21:16 UTC,"""A trivial good may, from certain circumstances, produce a desire superior to what arises from the greatest and most valuable enjoyment; nor is there any thing more extraordinary in this, than in mechanics to see one pound weight raise up a hundred by the advantage of its situation.""",2011-03-07 20:21:16 UTC,"Book III, Part iii, Section 3.","",,"","",Reading,18228,4610
"All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call impressions and ideas. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions; and, under this name, I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas, I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion. I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction. Every one of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking. The common degrees of these are easily distinguished; though it is not impossible but, in particular instances, they may very nearly approach to each other. Thus, in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions: as, on the other hand, it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas. But, notwithstanding this near resemblance in a few instances, they are in general so very different, that no one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads, and assign to each a peculiar name to mark the difference.
(I.i.1)",2013-10-12 02:20:27 UTC,"""Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions; and, under this name, I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul.""",2012-01-30 18:33:47 UTC,"Book I, Section i","",,Impressions,"",Reading,19551,4610
"Prop IV. As in Bodies there is a Principle of Gravity or Attraction, whereby in Vacuo, they tend to one another, and would unite, according to certain Laws and Limitations established by the Author of Nature: So there is an Analogous Principle in Spirits, whereby they would as certainly, in their proper Vacuity, be attracted by, tend to, and unite with one another, and their first Author, Centre, and the Rock out of which they were hewn (to use a Scripture Phrase) as the Planets would to one another, and to the Sun. And this is nothing else but what in Scripture is called CHARITY.
(p. 149)",2012-02-08 04:37:06 UTC,"""As in Bodies there is a Principle of Gravity or Attraction, whereby in Vacuo, they tend to one another, and would unite, according to certain Laws and Limitations established by the Author of Nature: So there is an Analogous Principle in Spirits, whereby they would as certainly, in their proper Vacuity, be attracted by, tend to, and unite with one another, and their first Author, Centre, and the Rock out of which they were hewn (to use a Scripture Phrase) as the Planets would to one another, and to the Sun.""",2012-02-08 04:35:42 UTC,Chap. VI. Of the Passions,"",,"","","Reading in the British Library; found again reading Mark Loveridge, Laurence Sterne & The Argument from Design (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble Books, 1982), 84.",19582,7187
"[...] But in its Advances, and final Perfection and Consummation, it discovers itself to be a Faculty, Quality, or inherent Power in the Soul, whereby it will act: without Solicitation, Motive or Direction. As a Stone in a Wall, fastened with Mortar, compressed by surrounding Stones, and involved in a Million of other Attractions, cannot fall to the Earth, nor sensibly exert its natural Gravity, no, not so much as to discover there is such a Principle in it; just so, the intelligent Soul, in this her lapsed Estate, being drowned in Sense, chained and fettered by Ignorance and Perverseness, drawn and hurried away by the Devil, the World and the Flesh, is disabled from exerting this inherent and innate Principle of Re-union, and wants sufficient Light on the Understanding, and a right Turn of the Will, to be put in a Capacity of exercising it. But in its proper Vacuity, and being freed from these Letts and Impediments, it would mount towards its Original, like an Eagle toward the Sun. Amiability, Pulchritude or Beauty, is as much the peculiar and proper Object of this Affection of the Mind, as Light or a luminous Body is of Vision; for Deformity, as such, can never be loved. And Beauty or Perfection, is, in Reality and just Philosophy, nothing but Analogy, Order, or just Proportion. From hence it necessarily follows, that in the Scale of Beings, all Objects ought to be loved in proportion to their Degree of Beauty, Symmetry or Perfection. And consequently, the highest Perfection ought to be loved with the highest Degree of Love, and the several subordinate Degrees of Perfection, with proportionate Degrees of this Affection of the Mind. And since Finite, when compared with Infinite, evanishes quite, or becomes nothing; it follows necessarily (since there is, and can be, but one Object that is Infinite, Good and Perfect, and all others are but Created, and Finite Goods; that is, in Comparison they are nothing) that, according to the eternal and immutable Laws of Analogy, the One supreme Good, endued with Infinite Perfection, ought to be loved with a Love infinitely superior to our Affections for other Things, or (which is the same Thing in other Words) that, in Comparison, our Love to the Author of our Being, ought to be infinite; and that to ourselves and other Objects, as being finite Creatures, none at all. This is the true Philosophy of this Matter, and as much a Demonstration, as any thing in Numbers or Geometry possibly can be; however it maybe received by Men of Self-Love and Carnal Minds.
(VI, pp. 163-5)",2012-02-08 05:12:41 UTC,"""As a Stone in a Wall, fastened with Mortar, compressed by surrounding Stones, and involved in a Million of other Attractions, cannot fall to the Earth, nor sensibly exert its natural Gravity, no, not so much as to discover there is such a Principle in it; just so, the intelligent Soul, in this her lapsed Estate, being drowned in Sense, chained and fettered by Ignorance and Perverseness, drawn and hurried away by the Devil, the World and the Flesh, is disabled from exerting this inherent and innate Principle of Re-union, and wants sufficient Light on the Understanding, and a right Turn of the Will, to be put in a Capacity of exercising it.""",2012-02-08 05:12:05 UTC,Chap. VI. Of the Passions,"",,Fetters,"",Reading in the British Library,19587,7187