work_id,theme,provenance,created_at,text,reviewed_on,id,comments,metaphor,dictionary,updated_at,context
3866,"","Reading; found again, reading P. B. Wood, “Hume, Reid, and the Science of Mind” in Hume and Hume’s Connexions, ed. M.A. Stewart and J.P. Wright (University Park: The Pennsylvania State UP, 1994), 130.",2003-09-15 00:00:00 UTC,"Thus the Ideas, as well as Children, of our youth, often die before us: And our Minds represent to us those Tombs, to which we are approaching; where though the Brass and Marble remain, yet the Inscriptions are effaced by time, and the Imagery moulders away. The pictures drawn in our Minds, are laid in fading Colours; and if not sometimes refreshed, vanish and disappear. How much the Constitution of our Bodies, and the make of our animal Spirits, are concerned in this; and whether the Temper of the Brain make this difference, that in some it retains the Characters drawn on it like Marble, in others like Free-stone, and in others little better than Sand, I shall not here enquire, though it may seem probable, that the Constitution of the Body does sometimes influence the Memory; since we oftentimes find a Disease quite strip the Mind of all its Ideas, and the flames of a Fever, in a few days, calcine all those Images to dust and confusion, which seem'd to be as lasting, as if graved in Marble.
(II.x.5)",2012-01-28,9966,"•This is a metaphorically rich chapter! Even more entries follow this paragraph!
• Calcine and engraving? Is this a mixed metaphor? Does this make sense? Yes, it looks like it... Marble can be calcined. But then, why the as if?
•OED gives for calcine: ""1. v.t. a Reduce by roasting or burning to quicklime or a similar friable substance or powder""
","""I shall not here enquire, though it may seem probable, that the Constitution of the Body does sometimes influence the Memory; since we oftentimes find a Disease quite strip the Mind of all its Ideas, and the flames of a Fever, in a few days, calcine all those Images to dust and confusion, which seem'd to be as lasting, as if graved in Marble.""",Impressions and Writing,2012-01-30 20:00:58 UTC,II.x.5
3866,"Materialism, Microcosm","Reading. Found again in S. H. Clark's ""Locke and Metaphor Reconsidered"" in JHI 59:2 (1998) p. 254; and in Saree Makdisi's William Blake and the Impossible History of the 1790s (U of C Press, 2002), 276. See also Sean Silver, The Mind is a Collection: Case Studies in Eighteenth-Century Thought (Philadelphia: Penn Press, 2015), 28-9.",2003-09-06 00:00:00 UTC,"The Dominion of Man, in this little World of his own Understanding, being muchwhat the same, as it is in the great World of visible things: wherein his Power, however managed by Art and Skill, reaches no farther, than to compound and divide the Materials, that are made to his Hand; but can do nothing towards making the least Particle of new Matter, or destroying one Atome of what is already in Being. The same inability will every one find in himself, who shall go about to fashion in his Understanding any simple Idea, not received in by his Senses, from external Objects; or by reflection from the Operations of his own mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy any Taste, which had never affected his Palate; or frame the Idea of a Scent, he had never smelt: And when he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind Man hath Ideas of Colours, and a deaf Man true distinct Notions of Sounds.
(II.ii.2)",,9986,•II.ii.2. No ideas without experience. I've included twice: Physics and World -- Idea of Idea as Atom,"""The Dominion of Man, in this little World of his own Understanding, being muchwhat the same, as it is in the great World of visible things: wherein his Power, however managed by Art and Skill, reaches no farther, than to compound and divide the Materials, that are made to his Hand; but can do nothing towards making the least Particle of new Matter, or destroying one Atome of what is already in Being.""","",2016-07-11 19:11:04 UTC,II.ii.2. No ideas without experience
4138,"","Searching in Past Masters; found again reading Colin Murray Turbayne's ""Berkeley's Two Concepts of Mind"" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 20:1 (September, 1959): 85-92, 89. See also Peter Walmsley, The Rhetoric of Berkeley's Philosophy Cambridge Studies in Eighteenth-Century English Literature and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990), 48-9; and John Richetti, Philosophical Writing: Locke, Berkeley, Hume (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1983), 145.
",2004-02-18 00:00:00 UTC,"But nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in controversies and mistakes, with regard to the nature and operations of the mind, than the being used to speak of those things, in terms borrowed from sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the motion of the soul: this infuses a belief, that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of dangerous consequence in morality. All which I doubt not may be cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but philosophers be prevailed on to retire into themselves, and attentively consider their own meaning.
(Part I, §144, p. 107)",2011-09-13,10640,"•INTEREST. Berkeley here complains about metaphors of mind! Philosophers should retire into themselves and attentively consider there own meaning.
•And see STC on billiard balls, he connects the metaphor with Hobbes.","""For example, the will is termed the motion of the soul: this infuses a belief, that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by the stroke of a racket.""","",2014-03-30 20:00:31 UTC,"Part I, §144"
4610,"",Searching in Past Masters,2003-09-18 00:00:00 UTC,"This operation of the mind , which forms the belief of any matter of fact, seems hitherto to have been one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy; though no one has so much as suspected, that there was any difficulty in explaining it. For my part, I must own, that I find a considerable difficulty in the case; and that even when I think I understand the subject perfectly, I am at a loss for terms to express my meaning. I conclude, by an induction which seems to me very evident, that an opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from a fiction, not in the nature, or the order of its parts, but in the manner of its being conceived. But when I would explain this manner, I scarce find any word that fully answers the case, but am obliged to have recourse to every one's feeling, in order to give him a perfect notion of this operation of the mind . An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: and this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness.This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind , which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute about the terms. The imagination has the command over all its ideas, and can join, and mix, and vary them in all the ways possible. It may conceive objects with all the circumstances of place and time. It may set them, in a manner, before our eyes in their true colours, just as they might have existed. But as it is impossible that that faculty can ever of itself reach belief, it is evident, that belief consists not in the nature and order of our ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in their feeling to the mind . I confess, that it is impossible to explain perfectly this feeling or manner of conception. We may make use of words that express something near it. But its true and proper name is belief, which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy, we can go no further than assert, that it is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more force and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; infixes them in the mind; and renders them the governing principles of all our actions.
(I.iii.7) ",2010-09-26,12132,"•Hume, David tries to avoid figuration in talking about belief. He is aware that his terms seem ""unphilosophical."" Note how he fails and has recourse to notions borrowed from dynamics (force, weight, solidity, firmness). INTEREST.","""An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: and this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness.""","",2010-09-27 01:31:53 UTC,I.iii.7
4495,"",Reading,2011-03-31 22:02:45 UTC,"Cri. Moschon, for instance, hath proved that man and beast are really of the same nature: that consequently a man need only indulge his senses and appetites to be as happy as a brute. Gorgias hath gone further, demonstrating man to be a piece of clock-work or machine; and that thought or reason are the same thing as the impulse of one ball against another. Cimon hath made noble use of these discoveries, proving as clearly as any proposition in mathematics, that conscience is a whim, and morality a prejudice; and that a man is no more accountable for his actions than a clock is for striking. Tryphon hath written irrefragably on the usefulness of vice. Thrasenor hath confuted the foolish prejudice men had against atheism, showing that a republic of atheists might live very happily together. Demylus hath made a jest of loyalty, and convinced the world there is nothing in it: to him and another philosopher of the same stamp, this age is indebted for discovering, that public spirit is an idle enthusiasm which seizeth only on weak minds. It would be endless to recount the discoveries made by writers of this sect.
(p. 51)",,18277,"","""Gorgias hath gone further, demonstrating man to be a piece of clock-work or machine; and that thought or reason are the same thing as the impulse of one ball against another.""","",2011-03-31 22:02:45 UTC,Dialogue I
3370,"",Reading,2011-07-22 16:06:08 UTC,"To the mere novice in philosophical investigations, it will appear impossible to reduce all the variety of thinking to so simple and uniform a process; but to the same person it would also appear impossible a priori, that all the varieties of language, as spoken by all the nations in the world, mould be expressed by means of a short alphabet. Also those phenomena in nature which depend upon gravity, electricity, &c. are no less various and complex; and the more we know of nature, the more particular facts, and particular laws, we are able to reduce to simple and general laws: insomuch that now it does not appear impossible, but that, ultimately, one great comprehensive law shall be found to govern both the material and intellectual world.
(pp. xxiv-xxv)",,18968,"","""Also those phenomena in nature which depend upon gravity, electricity, &c. are no less various and complex; and the more we know of nature, the more particular facts, and particular laws, we are able to reduce to simple and general laws: insomuch that now it does not appear impossible, but that, ultimately, one great comprehensive law shall be found to govern both the material and intellectual world.""","",2011-07-22 16:06:08 UTC,Introductory Essays
7187,"",Reading in the British Library,2012-02-08 05:12:05 UTC,"[...] But in its Advances, and final Perfection and Consummation, it discovers itself to be a Faculty, Quality, or inherent Power in the Soul, whereby it will act: without Solicitation, Motive or Direction. As a Stone in a Wall, fastened with Mortar, compressed by surrounding Stones, and involved in a Million of other Attractions, cannot fall to the Earth, nor sensibly exert its natural Gravity, no, not so much as to discover there is such a Principle in it; just so, the intelligent Soul, in this her lapsed Estate, being drowned in Sense, chained and fettered by Ignorance and Perverseness, drawn and hurried away by the Devil, the World and the Flesh, is disabled from exerting this inherent and innate Principle of Re-union, and wants sufficient Light on the Understanding, and a right Turn of the Will, to be put in a Capacity of exercising it. But in its proper Vacuity, and being freed from these Letts and Impediments, it would mount towards its Original, like an Eagle toward the Sun. Amiability, Pulchritude or Beauty, is as much the peculiar and proper Object of this Affection of the Mind, as Light or a luminous Body is of Vision; for Deformity, as such, can never be loved. And Beauty or Perfection, is, in Reality and just Philosophy, nothing but Analogy, Order, or just Proportion. From hence it necessarily follows, that in the Scale of Beings, all Objects ought to be loved in proportion to their Degree of Beauty, Symmetry or Perfection. And consequently, the highest Perfection ought to be loved with the highest Degree of Love, and the several subordinate Degrees of Perfection, with proportionate Degrees of this Affection of the Mind. And since Finite, when compared with Infinite, evanishes quite, or becomes nothing; it follows necessarily (since there is, and can be, but one Object that is Infinite, Good and Perfect, and all others are but Created, and Finite Goods; that is, in Comparison they are nothing) that, according to the eternal and immutable Laws of Analogy, the One supreme Good, endued with Infinite Perfection, ought to be loved with a Love infinitely superior to our Affections for other Things, or (which is the same Thing in other Words) that, in Comparison, our Love to the Author of our Being, ought to be infinite; and that to ourselves and other Objects, as being finite Creatures, none at all. This is the true Philosophy of this Matter, and as much a Demonstration, as any thing in Numbers or Geometry possibly can be; however it maybe received by Men of Self-Love and Carnal Minds.
(VI, pp. 163-5)",,19587,"","""As a Stone in a Wall, fastened with Mortar, compressed by surrounding Stones, and involved in a Million of other Attractions, cannot fall to the Earth, nor sensibly exert its natural Gravity, no, not so much as to discover there is such a Principle in it; just so, the intelligent Soul, in this her lapsed Estate, being drowned in Sense, chained and fettered by Ignorance and Perverseness, drawn and hurried away by the Devil, the World and the Flesh, is disabled from exerting this inherent and innate Principle of Re-union, and wants sufficient Light on the Understanding, and a right Turn of the Will, to be put in a Capacity of exercising it.""",Fetters,2012-02-08 05:12:41 UTC,Chap. VI. Of the Passions
7226,"",Searching in Google Books,2012-04-25 15:52:33 UTC,"The mind, therefore, in producing the vital and other involuntary motions, does not act as a rational, but as a sentient principle; which, without reasoning upon the matter, is as necessarily determined by an ungrateful sensation or stimulus affecting the organs, to exert its power, in bringing about these motions, as is a balance, while, from mechanical laws, it preponderates to that side where the greatest weight prevails.
(Sect XI, p. 289)",,19711,"","""The mind, therefore, in producing the vital and other involuntary motions, does not act as a rational, but as a sentient principle; which, without reasoning upon the matter, is as necessarily determined by an ungrateful sensation or stimulus affecting the organs, to exert its power, in bringing about these motions, as is a balance, while, from mechanical laws, it preponderates to that side where the greatest weight prevails.""","",2012-04-25 15:52:33 UTC,Section XI