text,updated_at,metaphor,created_at,context,theme,reviewed_on,dictionary,comments,provenance,id,work_id
"That the general Maxims, we are discoursing of, are not known to Children, Ideots, and a great part of Mankind we have already sufficiently proved: whereby it is evident, they have not an universal assent, nor are general Impressions. But there is this farther Argument in it against their being innate: That these Characters, if they were native and original Impressions, should appear fairest and clearest in those Persons, in whom yet we find no Footsteps of them: And 'tis, in my Opinion, a strong Presumption, that they are not innate; since they are not in the least known to those, in whom, if they were innate, they must needs exert themselves with most Force and Vigour. For Children, Ideots, Savages, and illiterate People, being of all others the least corrupted by Custom, or borrowed Opinions; Learning, and Education, having not cast their Native thoughts into new Moulds; nor by super-inducing foreign and studied Doctrines, confounded those fair Characters Nature had written there, one might reasonably imagine, that in their Minds these innate Notions should lie open fairly to every one's view, as 'tis certain the thoughts of Children do. It might be very well expected, that these Principles should be perfectly known to Naturals; which being stamped immediately on the Soul (as these Men suppose) can have no dependence on the Constitutions, or Organs of the Body, the only confessed difference between them and others. One would think, according to these Men's Principles, That all these native Beams of Light (were there any such) should in those, who have no Reserves, no Arts of Concealment, shine out in their full Lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of Pleasure, and abhorrence of Pain. But alas, amongst Children, Ideots, and Savages, and the grosly Illiterate, what general Maxims are to be found? What universal Principles of Knowledge? Their Notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from those Objects, they have had the most to do with, and which have made upon their Senses the frequentest and strongest Impressions.
(I.ii.27)",2011-05-26 03:39:27 UTC,"""But there is this farther Argument in it against their being innate: That these Characters, if they were native and original Impressions, should appear fairest and clearest in those Persons, in whom yet we find no Footsteps of them.""",2003-09-04 00:00:00 UTC,I.ii.27,Innate Ideas,2011-05-23,Impressions,"• There is a lot happening in this passage. You can almost see Locke's language uncoil and strike. Locke's parting shot in Book I, Chapter ii",Reading,9930,3866
"That the general Maxims, we are discoursing of, are not known to Children, Ideots, and a great part of Mankind we have already sufficiently proved: whereby it is evident, they have not an universal assent, nor are general Impressions. But there is this farther Argument in it against their being innate: That these Characters, if they were native and original Impressions, should appear fairest and clearest in those Persons, in whom yet we find no Footsteps of them: And 'tis, in my Opinion, a strong Presumption, that they are not innate; since they are not in the least known to those, in whom, if they were innate, they must needs exert themselves with most Force and Vigour. For Children, Ideots, Savages, and illiterate People, being of all others the least corrupted by Custom, or borrowed Opinions; Learning, and Education, having not cast their Native thoughts into new Moulds; nor by super-inducing foreign and studied Doctrines, confounded those fair Characters Nature had written there, one might reasonably imagine, that in their Minds these innate Notions should lie open fairly to every one's view, as 'tis certain the thoughts of Children do. It might be very well expected, that these Principles should be perfectly known to Naturals; which being stamped immediately on the Soul (as these Men suppose) can have no dependence on the Constitutions, or Organs of the Body, the only confessed difference between them and others. One would think, according to these Men's Principles, That all these native Beams of Light (were there any such) should in those, who have no Reserves, no Arts of Concealment, shine out in their full Lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of Pleasure, and abhorrence of Pain. But alas, amongst Children, Ideots, and Savages, and the grosly Illiterate, what general Maxims are to be found? What universal Principles of Knowledge? Their Notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from those Objects, they have had the most to do with, and which have made upon their Senses the frequentest and strongest Impressions.
(I.ii.27)",2011-05-26 03:29:02 UTC,"""It might be very well expected, that these Principles should be perfectly known to Naturals; which being stamped immediately on the Soul (as these Men suppose) can have no dependence on the Constitutions, or Organs of the Body, the only confessed difference between them and others.""",2003-09-04 00:00:00 UTC,I.ii.27,Innate Ideas,,"",•There is a lot happening in this passage. You can feel Locke's language uncoil and strike. ,Reading,9932,3866
"If it has no memory of its own Thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its use, and be able to recal them upon occasion; if it cannot reflect upon what is past, and make use of its former Experiences, Reasonings, and Contemplations to what purpose does it think? They who make the Soul a thinking Thing at this rate, will not make it a much more noble Being, than those do, whom they condemn, for allowing it to be nothing but the subtilest parts of Matter. Characters drawn on Dust, that the first breath of wind effaces; or Impressions made on a heap of Atoms, or animal Spirits, are altogether as useful, and render the Subject as noble, as the Thoughts of a Soul that perish in thinking; that once out of sight, are gone for ever, and leave no memory of themselves behind them. Nature never makes excellent things, for mean or no uses: and it is hardly to be conceived, that our infinitely wise Creator, should make so admirable a Faculty, as the power of Thinking, that Faculty which comes nearest the Excellency of his own incomprehensible Being, to be so idlely and uselessly employ'd, at least 1/4 part of its time here, as to think constantly, without remembering any of those Thoughts, without doing any good to it self or others, or being any way useful to any other part of Creation.
(II.i.15)",2011-05-30 18:46:31 UTC,"""Characters drawn on Dust, that the first breath of wind effaces; or Impressions made on a heap of Atoms, or animal Spirits, are altogether as useful, and render the Subject as noble, as the Thoughts of a Soul that perish in thinking; that once out of sight, are gone for ever, and leave no memory of themselves behind them.""",2003-09-06 00:00:00 UTC,II.i.15. On the suggestion that a man may think while he sleeps but does not remember it,"",2004-06-24,Impressions,"•I've included twice: Writing and Body. (6/24/2004)
•Cross-reference: Lady Mary Wortley Montagu's poem ""Epistle [to Lord Bathurst]""
•Cross-reference: Johnson uses in his Dictionary, illustrates third entry under Thought. ",Reading,9947,3866
"Thus the Ideas, as well as Children, of our youth, often die before us: And our Minds represent to us those Tombs, to which we are approaching; where though the Brass and Marble remain, yet the Inscriptions are effaced by time, and the Imagery moulders away. The pictures drawn in our Minds, are laid in fading Colours; and if not sometimes refreshed, vanish and disappear. How much the Constitution of our Bodies, and the make of our animal Spirits, are concerned in this; and whether the Temper of the Brain make this difference, that in some it retains the Characters drawn on it like Marble, in others like Free-stone, and in others little better than Sand, I shall not here enquire, though it may seem probable, that the Constitution of the Body does sometimes influence the Memory; since we oftentimes find a Disease quite strip the Mind of all its Ideas, and the flames of a Fever, in a few days, calcine all those Images to dust and confusion, which seem'd to be as lasting, as if graved in Marble.
(II.x.5)",2012-01-30 20:00:58 UTC,"""I shall not here enquire, though it may seem probable, that the Constitution of the Body does sometimes influence the Memory; since we oftentimes find a Disease quite strip the Mind of all its Ideas, and the flames of a Fever, in a few days, calcine all those Images to dust and confusion, which seem'd to be as lasting, as if graved in Marble.""",2003-09-15 00:00:00 UTC,II.x.5,"",2012-01-28,Impressions and Writing,"•This is a metaphorically rich chapter! Even more entries follow this paragraph!
• Calcine and engraving? Is this a mixed metaphor? Does this make sense? Yes, it looks like it... Marble can be calcined. But then, why the as if?
•OED gives for calcine: ""1. v.t. a Reduce by roasting or burning to quicklime or a similar friable substance or powder""
","Reading; found again, reading P. B. Wood, “Hume, Reid, and the Science of Mind” in Hume and Hume’s Connexions, ed. M.A. Stewart and J.P. Wright (University Park: The Pennsylvania State UP, 1994), 130.",9966,3866
"Thus we should address our selves to the Work of Lord, with an intire Resignation of our selves to his Wisdom and Soveraignty. The Heart must be Tabula Rasa, white Paper to his Pen, soft Wax to his Seal: Let him write upon me what he pleaseth, and make what Impressions he pleaseth upon me. We must enter upon the Service fo God, with Joshua's Question, What saith my Lord unto his Servant? And with St. Paul's, Lord, what wilt thou have me to do? And with the implicite Faith and Obedience of the Child Samuel, Speak Lord, for thy Servant hears. I desire nothing more, but the Honour of receiving they Commands, and a Heart to comply with them.
(p. 20)",2012-01-20 22:36:34 UTC,"""The Heart must be Tabula Rasa, white Paper to his Pen, soft Wax to his Seal: Let him write upon me what he pleaseth, and make what Impressions he pleaseth upon me.""",2006-10-09 00:00:00 UTC,"",Blank Slate,2012-01-20,Writing,"•I've included three times: Tabula Rasa, Paper, Wax","Searching ""tabula rasa"" in ECCO",10875,4195
"[...] For, whereas in the creation of the Heauens and the Earth, and the furnitures and armies of them both, the great Architect wrought them all by his thought, worde, and deede, all falling into one instant of time: when he was to make Man, he holds a Councell, Come let vs make Man according vnto our owne Image; summoning thereunto, not only himselfe and all his atributes, as his power, his wisedome, his iustice, his loue and mercy, if not to cast in some part, yet to lend some influence of their diuine Natures toward his creation, but also his Son and the blessed Spirit: as if Man were a kinde of production of the whole Deity, or as the Poet saith, Magnum Iouis incrementum; which I am the rather bolde to say, because the learned Apostle vsurpeth the very words of another Poet to the selfe-same purpose, [GREEK], wee are also of his off-spring; not that I conceiue (as some blasphemously haue done) that hee was made out of the very essence of God, but because the image of the diuine nature, is most liuely imprinted in his soule and in his body, and in the substance & qualities of them both. For the Soule, it carrieth a deepe stampe of diuinity in the simplicity, inuisibility, & immortality thereof: That it is incorporeall and diffusiue, quickning, sustaining, gouerning and moouing the whole body, and euery part thereof, euen as God supporteth and ruleth the whole world, being by a diffusiue nature, or rather infinite omni-presence, at all times, in euery place: That as the Deity is but one in essence, yet distinct in persons, according to the Relatiue qualities therein, which yet hath neither different matters, nor formes (as we say) but are all one and the same essence; so the soule of man is but one, yet that one, consisting of three essentiall and distinct Faculties or powers, intellectual, sensitiue, and vegetatiue; which yet make no difference in the substance thereof, that it should not bee one and an entire soule. Againe, in the intellectuall part or power, there are two essentiall attributes resembling their prototype or originall in God, to wit, Knowledge and Will. As for the qualities of the soule, they are either internall, or externall. The internall, carry the image of the Creator, as S. Paul interpreteth it, in heauenly wisedome, iustice, and sanctity; the externall, in maiesty, dominion, and soueraignty ouer the creatures; both which, the Poet hath excellently put together, where he speaketh of mans creation, after the rest of the creatures.
(I, p. 2)
",2011-09-27 21:10:30 UTC,"""[W]e are also of [Adam's] off-spring; not that I conceive (as some blasphemously have done) that he was made out of the very essence of God, but because the image of the divine nature, is most lively imprinted in his soul and in his body, and in the substance & qualities of them both. For the Soul, it carrieth a deep stamp of divinity in the simplicity, invisibility, & immortality thereof.""",2011-09-27 21:10:30 UTC,"Book I, Preface","",,Impressions,"",Reading in EEBO,19211,3535
"43 First then, 'tis so certainly known, that Similitudes do not use quadrare per omnia, or, (as they say,) run on four Feet, that it is grown Proverbial; which lays a great prejudice upon that Way in common. 2. Similitudes drawn from Material Things, to Immaterial, are particularly liable to this Defect. They may, indeed, oft times, serve to illustrate some Truth, as fit Metaphors to sute with our Fancy; but then they presuppose the Truth, which they are to illustrate, to be known some other Way. Whence, unless this be done first, all they can do is to explicate we know not what, which destroys the nature of an Explication; for, Explications are not intended to put the Truth of the Point, but suppose it. 3. All the Actions of our Soul are, or ought to be Rational; and have a Dependence on one another, by the way of Reason gathering Subsequent Truths from those which preceded. Now, I think, 'tis impossible to be contested by any Man who has read Cartesius's Meditations, but that his Discourses which anteceded his finding out this First Principle of his, are reducible to this Enthymem; [For these and these Reasons, there can no Certainty be had, as to Speculative Knowledges, by any Information had from Outward Objects affecting the Senses; therefore, it ought to be sought for in some Interiour Act of our Mind, which is most Comprehensive and Peculiar to it,] which he concieved was Cogitation; and thence he laid this First Principle: [Cogito ergo sum] Which being so, it follows necessarily, that the Laying this for his First Principle, depended on the Goodness of the Reasons he had, why our Senses were not to be trusted, nor could give us our First Notions; whence, by reflecting on their Metaphysical Verity, we might have those Self-evident, and First Truths, of ours. This, I say, was evidently the Tenour of his Discourse; because, did not those Reasons of his, against the Sufficiency of our Senses to give us this Information, conclude; but that, notwithstanding all those Reasons could prove, the Senses might still imprint on our Mind those First Notions, his Consequent would not have follow'd: Nor, could he have had any Ground for recurring to the Interiour Act of Cogitation, for his First Principle, in regard it had been given to his Hand by means of the Senses, as was now declar'd. 4. It being then evident, that the Substance of those antecedent Discourses was summ'd up in the Enthymem now mention'd, 'tis manifest, that this Explication of yours falters in the main Particular, in which it ought to sute, and resemble. For, in case those Impressions on our Mind could have been made by means of the Senses, as aforesaid; then those Impressions, or Notions, being the Immediate Foundation, on which is built all our Knowledge, could not be call'd, or resembl'd to Rubbish; nor compar'd to a Hole, to lay the Foundation; for, the Holes were already made in those Inlets, our Senses; which were Pervious to the Effluviums affecting the Seat of Knowledge; and thence, the Soul. So that your Similitude is, in effect, the Begging the whole Question; and can have no Force at all, but by our Granting it; which, I see plainly, we shall never have Reason to do. Rather, unless this Petitio Principii (which is tacitly involv'd in this Parallel) be yielded by us, or prov'd by you, it makes against your selves. For, by Denying all such certain Information from the Senses, you will be found, not to remove the Rubbish, in order to lay the Foundation; but, to stop up the Way to the laying any; and, to damm up all the Holes, by which the Materials could come into our Minds, where only such a Foundation could have been laid. At least, you see, your Explication amounts to nothing; and, that your Similitude is lame in all its Legs, and has not one Sure Foot to stand on. Which will, I hope, sufficiently inform others, that this Way of Explicating, so mightily affected by Cartesius, and his Followers, is utterly Insignificant. I shall hope too, that this Paper will light into the hands of some Readers, who are so Intelligent, as to discern, that this Explicative Way is taken up, to avoid the Way of Rigorous Proof; which is so Unfriendly to a Doctrine that wants Principles.
(pp. 94-8)",2013-04-02 02:50:10 UTC,"""For, in case those Impressions on our Mind could have been made by means of the Senses, as aforesaid; then those Impressions, or Notions, being the Immediate Foundation, on which is built all our Knowledge, could not be call'd, or resembl'd to Rubbish; nor compar'd to a Hole, to lay the Foundation; for, the Holes were already made in those Inlets, our Senses; which were Pervious to the Effluviums affecting the Seat of Knowledge; and thence, the Soul.""",2013-04-02 02:50:10 UTC,"","",,Throne,INTEREST. REVISIT. META-METAPHORICAL.,Reading,20091,7370
"From the Natural, we pass to the Animal Functions: That the Brain and Nervous System are the Common Medium of Sense and Motion is uncontested; but the manner how the Impressions are convey'd from the External Organs to the Sedes Animae, and Vice-versa from thence to the Organ, and how a Material Substance can affect and be affected by an Immaterial, is Obscure and scarce to be conceiv'd. Wherefore waving all Precarious Hypotheses, I shall confine my self to the Description of such Phaenomena as are Matters of Fact, and undeniable, and leave the Reader at Liberty to erect what System he pleases. The Seat of Sense is the Brain, whose Nervous Dispensations are the Intermediate Bodies between it and the Organs, on which the External Objects act. When the Impression is made by the Object, and receiv'd into the Organ of Sense, it is convey'd from thence with the same Type or Character, by an Agitation of its Nervous Expansions and their continued Trunks, to the common Sensory: This is common to Men and Brutes, and is by Des Cartes made the First Degree of Sensation: The Second is the Perception of the Soul attending that Motion, which immediately follows the former Degree, by reason of the intimate Connexion of the Soul to the Sensorium Commune. The Third comprehends all those Judgments which we form by the Occasion of those Motions: Hence it follows, all Corporeal Objects are only Perceivable by us, in as much as they affect the Nerves expanded, in such and such Organs. This is the general Idea of Sensation so far as can be explain'd without Engaging in particular Schemes.
(The Introduction)",2013-09-22 20:25:47 UTC,"""When the Impression is made by the Object, and receiv'd into the Organ of Sense, it is convey'd from thence with the same Type or Character, by an Agitation of its Nervous Expansions and their continued Trunks, to the common Sensory.""",2013-09-22 20:25:47 UTC,"","",,Impressions,"REVISIT. USE IN ENTRY: note, INTEREST and META-METAPHORICAL: ""This is the general Idea of Sensation so far as can be explain'd without Engaging in particular Schemes.""",Searching in EEBO,22811,7685
"The Heart of the tender Youth, by forbearance of Instruction, grows opinionated, and obstinately embraces the Follies he has been indulg'd in, not being easily convinc'd of the criminal Quality of what he has been so long allow'd the Practice of by his negligent Parents; and this renders late Instruction fruitless: THEN as to Correction, the Heart being hardned, as before, by Opinion and Practice, and especially in a Belief that he ought not to be corrected, the Rod of Correction has a different Effect; for as the Blow of a Stripe makes an Impression on the Heart of a Child, as stamping a Seal does upon the soft Wax, the Reproof even of Words on the same Heart when grown up, and made hard, is like striking upon Steel, which instead of making an Impression on the Metal, darts back sparks of Fire in your Face.
(pp. 68-9)",2014-03-12 21:07:31 UTC,"""THEN as to Correction, the Heart being hardned, as before, by Opinion and Practice, and especially in a Belief that he ought not to be corrected, the Rod of Correction has a different Effect; for as the Blow of a Stripe makes an Impression on the Heart of a Child, as stamping a Seal does upon the soft Wax, the Reproof even of Words on the same Heart when grown up, and made hard, is like striking upon Steel, which instead of making an Impression on the Metal, darts back sparks of Fire in your Face.""",2014-03-12 21:07:11 UTC,"","",,Impressions and Metal,INTEREST. USE IN ENTRY. ,"Searching ""steel"" and ""heart"" in ECCO-TCP",23681,7846
"§. 5. The Understanding seems to me, not to have the least glimmering of any Ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two: Eternal Objects furnish the Mind with the Ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produced in us: And the Mind furnishes the Vnderstanding with Ideas of its own Operations. These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, and the Compositions made out of them, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of Ideas; and that we have nothing in our Minds, which did not come in, one of these two ways. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and throughly search into his Understanding, and then let him tell me, Whether all the original Ideas he has there, are any other than of the Objects of his Senses, or of the Operations of his Mind, considered as Objects of his Reflection: and how great a mass of Knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any Idea in his Mind, but what one of those two have imprinted; though, perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged, by the Understanding, as we shall see hereafter.
(II.i.5, p. 38)",2014-07-28 15:15:54 UTC,"""Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and throughly search into his Understanding, and then let him tell me, Whether all the original Ideas he has there, are any other than of the Objects of his Senses, or of the Operations of his Mind, considered as Objects of his Reflection: and how great a mass of Knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any Idea in his Mind, but what one of those two have imprinted; though, perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged, by the Understanding, as we shall see hereafter.""",2014-07-28 15:15:41 UTC,"","",,Impressions,"",Searching in EEBO-TCP,24314,3866