Date: 1763 (repr. 1776); 1794 (repr. 1799)

"PHILOSOPHICAL LIBERTY consists in a prevailing disposition to act according to the dictates of reason; i. e. in such a manner, as shall, all things considered, most effectually promote our happiness. A disposition to act contrary to this is MENTAL SERVITUDE: and when the mind is equally...

— Doddridge, Philip (1702-1751)

Date: 1763 (repr. 1776); 1794 (repr. 1799)

"To the fourth argument (which is generally called choice εν αδιαφορια) 'tis answered by the opposers of natural liberty, that no such case can occur that two objects should appear entirely equal: and if there did, then a choice would be impossible; for that would imply an effect withou...

— Doddridge, Philip (1702-1751)

Date: 1763 (repr. 1776); 1794 (repr. 1799)

"But this is evidently taking the question for granted: for it will not be allowed that willing is a necessary effect, which must imply a compelling efficient cause; or the mind like a balance to be moved with weights."

— Doddridge, Philip (1702-1751)

Date: 1763 (repr. 1776); 1794 (repr. 1799)

"That perhaps this may be a state of imprisonment to the soul, as many of the philosophers thought; and that when it is set at liberty from the body, it may obtain new and noble ways of perception and action, to us at present unknown."

— Doddridge, Philip (1702-1751)