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"Thus we talk metaphorically, when we speak of a warm imagination, a sound judgement, a tenacious memory, an enlarged understanding; these epithets being originally and properly expressive of the qualities of matter."

— Beattie, James (1735-1803)

Author

Beattie, James (1735-1803)

Work Title

An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism

Place of Publication

Edinburgh

Publisher

Printed for A. Kincaid & J. Bell. Sold, at London, by E. & C. Dilly

Date

1770

Metaphor

"Thus we talk metaphorically, when we speak of a warm imagination, a sound judgement, a tenacious memory, an enlarged understanding; these epithets being originally and properly expressive of the qualities of matter."

Metaphor in Context

[...] For it is easy to write plausibly on any subject, and in vindication of any doctrine, when either the indolence of the reader, or the nature of the composition, gives the writer an opportunity to avail himself of the ambiguity of language. It is not often that men attend to the operations of the mind; and when they do, it is perhaps with some metaphysical book in their hands, which they read with a resolution to admire or despise, according as the fashion or their humour directs them. In this situation, or even when they are disposed to judge impartially of the writer, their attention to what passes in their own mind is but superficial, and is very apt to be swayed by a secret bias in favour of some theory. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a natural feeling and a prejudice of education; our deference to the opinion of a favourite author makes us think it more difficult than it really is, and very often leads us to mistake the one for the other. Nay, the very act of studying, discomposes our minds a little, and prevents that free play of our faculties from which alone we can judge with accuracy of their real nature. Besides, language, being originally intended to answer the obvious exigencies of life, and express the qualities of matter, becomes metaphorical when applied to the operations of mind. Thus we talk metaphorically, when we speak of a warm imagination, a sound judgement, a tenacious memory, an enlarged understanding; these epithets being originally and properly expressive of the qualities of matter. This circumstance, however obvious, is not always attended to; and hence we are apt to mistake verbal analogies for real ones, and to apply the laws of matter to the operations of mind; and thus, by the mere delusion of words, are led into error before we are aware, and while our premises seem to be altogether unexceptionable. It is a favourite maxim with Mr LOCKE, as it was with some ancient philosophers, that the human soul, previous to education, is like a piece of white paper, or tabula rasa, and this simile, harmless as it may appear, betrays our great modern into several important mistakes. It is indeed one of the most unlucky allusions that could have been chosen. The human soul, when it begins to think, is not extended, nor inert, nor of a white colour, nor incapable of energy, nor wholly unfurnished with ideas, (for if it think at all, it must have some ideas, according to Mr LOCKE's definition of the word), nor as susceptible of any one impression or character as of any other. In what respect then does the human soul resemble a piece of white paper? To this philosophical conundrum I confess I can give no serious answer.--Even when the terms we use are not metaphorical, the natural abstruseness of the subject makes them appear somewhat mysterious; and we are apt to consider them as of more significancy than they really are. Had Mr HUME told the world in plain terms, that virtue is a species of vice, darkness a species of light, and existence a species of non-existence, I know not what metaphysicians might have thought of this discovery; but sure I am, no reader of tolerable understanding would have paid him any compliments on the occasion.
(I.ii.9, pp. 156-59)