"This notion leads to universal necessity and fate, by supposing that motives have the same relation to the will of an intelligent agent, as weights have to a balance; so that of two things absolutely indifferent, and intelligent agent can no more choose either, than a balance can move itself when the weights on both sides are equal."

— Leibniz, G. W. (1646-1716) and Clarke, Samuel (1675-1729)


Place of Publication
London
Publisher
James Knapton
Date
1717
Metaphor
"This notion leads to universal necessity and fate, by supposing that motives have the same relation to the will of an intelligent agent, as weights have to a balance; so that of two things absolutely indifferent, and intelligent agent can no more choose either, than a balance can move itself when the weights on both sides are equal."
Metaphor in Context
1 and 2. This notion leads to universal necessity and fate, by supposing that motives have the same relation to the will of an intelligent agent, as weights have to a balance; so that of two things absolutely indifferent, and intelligent agent can no more choose either, than a balance can move itself when the weights on both sides are equal. But the difference lies here. A balance is no agent, but is merely passive and acted upon by the weights; so that, when the weights are equal, there is nothing to move it. But intelligent beings are agents; not passive, in being moved by the motives, as a balance is by weights; but they have active powers and do move themselves, sometimes upon the view of strong motives, sometimes upon weak ones, and sometimes where things are absolutely indifferent. In which the latter case, there may be very good reason to act, though two or more ways of acting may be absolutely indifferent. This learned writer always supposes the contrary, as a principle; but gives no proof of it, either from the nature of things, or the perfections of God.
(p. 45)
Provenance
Reading
Citation
A Collection of Papers, Which Passed Between the Late Learned Mr. Leibnitz, and Dr. Clarke, In the Years 1715 and 1716: Relating to the Principles of Natural Philosophy and Religion. With an appendix. To which are added, Letters to Dr. Clarke concerning Liberty and Necessity; from a Gentleman of the University of Cambridge: with the Doctor's Answers to Them. Also Remarks upon a book, Entituled, A Philosophical Enquiry Concerning Human Liberty (London: James Knapton, 1717). <Link to Google Books>

See also The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence: Together wiith Extracts from Newton's Principia and Opticks. Ed. H.G. Alexander (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1998).
Date of Entry
01/25/2009

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.