"For it was Aristotle's opinion, who compared the soul to a 'rasa tabula', that human sensations and reflections were passions: These therefore are what he finely calls, the 'passive intelligent'; which, he says, shall cease, or is corruptible."

— Warburton, William (1698-1779)


Place of Publication
London
Publisher
Printed for J. and P. Knapton
Date
1741, 1742, 1755
Metaphor
"For it was Aristotle's opinion, who compared the soul to a 'rasa tabula', that human sensations and reflections were passions: These therefore are what he finely calls, the 'passive intelligent'; which, he says, shall cease, or is corruptible."
Metaphor in Context
But then he distinguishes again concerning this Mind or intellect, and makes it two-fold; agent and Patient: The former of which, he concludes to be immortal, and the latter corruptible. The agent intellect is only immortal and eternal, but the passive is corruptible. Cudworth thinks this a very doubtful and obscure passage; and imagines Aristotle was led to write thus unintelligibly, by his [end page 211] doctrine of forms and qualities; which confounds corporeal, with incorporeal substances: But had that excellent person reflected on the general doctrine of the [GREEK CHARACTERS: TO EN], he would have seen, the passage was plain and easy; and that Aristotle, from the common principle of the human's soul being part of the Divine Substance, draws a conclusion against a future state of separate existence; which, though (as it now appears) all the philosophers embraced, yet all were not so forward to avow. The obvious meaning of the words then is this: The agent Intelligent (says he) is only immortal and eternal, but the passive, corruptible, i.e. The particular sensation of the soul (the passive intelligent) will cease after death; and the substance of it (the agent intelligent) will be resolved into the Soul of the universe. For it was Aristotle's opinion, who compared the soul to a rasa tabula, that human sensations and reflections were passions: These therefore are what he finely calls, the passive intelligent; which, he says, shall cease, or is corruptible. What he meant by the agent intelligent, we learn from his commentators; who interpret it to signify, as Cudworth here acknowledges, the DIVINE INTELLECT; which gloss Aristotle himself fully justifies, in calling it [GREEK CHARACTERS: DEION], divine. But what need many words. The Learned well know, that the intellectus agens of Aristotle was the very same with the anima mundi of Plato and Pythagoras.
(pp. 211-2 in 4th ed.; pp. 389-390 in 1st edition)
Provenance
Searching "tabula rasa" in ECCO; found in 4th edition, confirmed in 1st.
Citation
7 entries in ESTC (1738, 1742, 1765, 1766). 1st edition 1738-1741; 2nd edition 1738-1742; 3rd edition ("in nine books") in 1742; 4th edition in 1755.

See The Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated, on the Principles of a Religious Deist, from the Omission of the Doctrine of a Future State of Reward and Punishment in the Jewish Dispensation. In Six Books. By William Warburton (London: Printed for Fletcher Gyles, 1738-41). <Link to ESTC><Link to Vol. 1 in Google Books><Link to Vol. 2>

Some text from The Divine Legation of Moses. In Nine Books. The Fourth Edition, Corrected and Enlarged. By W. Warburton (London: Printed for J. and P. Knapton, 1755). <Link to ESTC>
Theme
Blank Slate
Date of Entry
10/11/2006

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.