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"In this, therefore, I am forced to differ from that great Philosopher and Master of Reason, Mr. Locke, who denies and argues against all innate Ideas in general, and of every Kind: He supposes the Soul originally to be as a rasa Tabula, or Blank without any Impression, or distinguishing Character at all, which would be either nothing, or nothing that we can conceive or form any Notion or Idea of."

— Morgan, Thomas (d. 1743)

Author

Morgan, Thomas (d. 1743)

Work Title

Physico-theology: or, a philosophico-moral disquisition concerning human nature, free agency, moral government, and divine providence. By T. Morgan, M.D.

Place of Publication

London

Publisher

Printed for T. Cox

Date

1741

Metaphor

"In this, therefore, I am forced to differ from that great Philosopher and Master of Reason, Mr. Locke, who denies and argues against all innate Ideas in general, and of every Kind: He supposes the Soul originally to be as a rasa Tabula, or Blank without any Impression, or distinguishing Character at all, which would be either nothing, or nothing that we can conceive or form any Notion or Idea of."

Metaphor in Context

5. These animal Sensations, Appetites, and Instincts therefore, as they are natural and necessary, must be innate, or co-eval and co-existent with the Animal or sensitive Creature itself, since one cannot conceive of an Animal, or any animal Life and Motion, without them. In this, therefore, I am forced to differ from that great Philosopher and Master of Reason, Mr. Locke, who denies and argues against all innate Ideas in general, and of every Kind: He supposes the Soul originally to be as a rasa Tabula, or Blank without any Impression, or distinguishing Character at all, which would be either nothing, or nothing that we can conceive or form any Notion or Idea of; but a Man or his Penetration, and Strength of Judgment, could not but see some Defect in his Reasoning, and that the Word Idea here was too general; and therefore, in prosecuting the Argument, he silently changes the Term Idea for Principle, and then proves very clearly, that we have no innate Principles, Perceptions of Truth, or Judgment of Reason, or no innate Ideas of Reflection: All this is acquired gradually by Observation and Experience, and by comparing one Thing with another, in the several Relations, Reasons, and Proportions of Things. In these Acquisitions and Improvements of Reason, Understand [end page 73] ing, and Judgment, Men are vastly different according to their different Capacities, Opportunities, Attention, and Degrees of Application; and nothing of all this is innate or born with us. In almost every Thing else, I must own Mr. Locke as my Master, and the first Guide and Director of my Understanding: But as this justly celebrated Philosopher, in this Case, might seem to have used the Word Idea in its most general Acceptation, so as to include all the original, simple Impressions of Sense, Appetite, and Instinct; I thought it necessary to remove such a Difficulty or Prejudice, lest the Authority of so great a Man, mistaken and misapplied, might lead others into Error, and darken and perplex, instead of clearing up the Truth to them. It would be equally contrary to Experience, and the present Constitution of Nature, either to suppose, that the Ideas of Sense, Appetite, and Instinct are not innate, or that the Perceptions of the Understanding, or the Judgments and Conclusions of Reason are so.