"An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: and this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness."

— Hume, David (1711-1776)


Place of Publication
London
Publisher
Printed for John Noon
Date
January 1739
Metaphor
"An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: and this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness."
Metaphor in Context
This operation of the mind , which forms the belief of any matter of fact, seems hitherto to have been one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy; though no one has so much as suspected, that there was any difficulty in explaining it. For my part, I must own, that I find a considerable difficulty in the case; and that even when I think I understand the subject perfectly, I am at a loss for terms to express my meaning. I conclude, by an induction which seems to me very evident, that an opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from a fiction, not in the nature, or the order of its parts, but in the manner of its being conceived. But when I would explain this manner, I scarce find any word that fully answers the case, but am obliged to have recourse to every one's feeling, in order to give him a perfect notion of this operation of the mind . An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: and this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness.This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind , which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute about the terms. The imagination has the command over all its ideas, and can join, and mix, and vary them in all the ways possible. It may conceive objects with all the circumstances of place and time. It may set them, in a manner, before our eyes in their true colours, just as they might have existed. But as it is impossible that that faculty can ever of itself reach belief, it is evident, that belief consists not in the nature and order of our ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in their feeling to the mind . I confess, that it is impossible to explain perfectly this feeling or manner of conception. We may make use of words that express something near it. But its true and proper name is belief, which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy, we can go no further than assert, that it is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more force and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; infixes them in the mind; and renders them the governing principles of all our actions.
(I.iii.7)
Provenance
Searching in Past Masters
Citation
Published anonymously with vols. I and II appearing in January in 1739 and vol. III appearing in November of 1740. Only 1 entry in the ESTC (1740).

David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. 3 vols. (London: Printed for John Noon, 1739; Thomas Longman, 1740). <Link to ESTC><Link to ECCO><Link to ECCO-TCP><Link to OLL>

Reading David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. D. F. and M. J. Norton (Oxford: OUP, 2000). Searching in Past Masters and OLL editions.
Date of Entry
09/18/2003
Date of Review
09/26/2010

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.