It is by the senses that "the Ideas of external sensible Objects are first conveyed into the Imagination; and Reason or the pure Intellect ... operates upon those Ideas, and upon them, Only after they are so lodged in that common Receptacle"

— Browne, Peter (d. 1735)


Place of Publication
London
Publisher
Printed [by James Bettenham] for William Inny
Date
1728
Metaphor
It is by the senses that "the Ideas of external sensible Objects are first conveyed into the Imagination; and Reason or the pure Intellect ... operates upon those Ideas, and upon them, Only after they are so lodged in that common Receptacle"
Metaphor in Context
... we have no other Faculties of perceiving or knowing anything divine or human but our Five Senses, and our Reason. ... [it is by the senses that] the Ideas of external sensible Objects are first conveyed into the Imagination; and Reason or the pure Intellect ... operates upon those Ideas, and upon them, Only after they are so lodged in that common Receptacle.
(p. 53)
Provenance
Reading Wasserman, Earl R. "The Inherent Values of Eighteenth-Century Personification." PMLA 65.4 (1950): 435-63. p. 449.
Citation
3 entries in ESTC (1728, 1729, 1736).

Peter Browne, The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of Human Understanding (London: Printed for William Inny, 1728). <Link to ESTC><Link to Internet Archive>
Date of Entry
06/01/2006

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.