"all that Enumeration of Ideas in the World, and the Sensations, which are said to be the Cause of them, will not be Sufficient to Prove, that the Mind is nothing else, that a Rasa Tabula, or a Piece of Blank Paper, good for little, but to Write on"
— Greene, Robert (c. 1678-1730)
Place of Publication
Cambridge
Publisher
Printed at the University-Press, by Cornelius Crownfield, and are to be sold by him, E. Jefferys, and W. Thurlbourne booksellers in Cambridge, and by J. Knapton, R. Knaplock, W. and J. Innys, and B. Motte, London
Date
1727
Metaphor
"all that Enumeration of Ideas in the World, and the Sensations, which are said to be the Cause of them, will not be Sufficient to Prove, that the Mind is nothing else, that a Rasa Tabula, or a Piece of Blank Paper, good for little, but to Write on"
Metaphor in Context
If any Thing is Insinuated, Either;
1st. THAT the Mind is a Rasa Tabula, since it would not have one of these Ideas if it's Organs or Sensation were Stopt, or Disabled, from Informing it, we have already Considered that Pretence; And it may be here Added, that even in this Case, the Mind is no more Proved to be a Rasa Tabula, from the Necessity it finds of Sensations to Furnish it with the Ideas of External Nature, than External Nature is a Rasa Tabula, from the Necessity it finds of the Mind to the being Perceived; That is, Perception is as Necessary to our Sensations, as our Organs of Sense are; And till it is Evinced, that the Mind is nothing in it's self, and that Perception is only a Quality, resulting from a Systeme of Matter fitly Disposed to Produce it, all that Enumeration of Ideas in the World, and the Sensations, which are said to be the Cause of them, will not be Sufficient to Prove, that the Mind is nothing else, that a Rasa Tabula, or a Piece of Blank Paper, good for little, but to Write on.
(V.iii.5, p. 611)
1st. THAT the Mind is a Rasa Tabula, since it would not have one of these Ideas if it's Organs or Sensation were Stopt, or Disabled, from Informing it, we have already Considered that Pretence; And it may be here Added, that even in this Case, the Mind is no more Proved to be a Rasa Tabula, from the Necessity it finds of Sensations to Furnish it with the Ideas of External Nature, than External Nature is a Rasa Tabula, from the Necessity it finds of the Mind to the being Perceived; That is, Perception is as Necessary to our Sensations, as our Organs of Sense are; And till it is Evinced, that the Mind is nothing in it's self, and that Perception is only a Quality, resulting from a Systeme of Matter fitly Disposed to Produce it, all that Enumeration of Ideas in the World, and the Sensations, which are said to be the Cause of them, will not be Sufficient to Prove, that the Mind is nothing else, that a Rasa Tabula, or a Piece of Blank Paper, good for little, but to Write on.
(V.iii.5, p. 611)
Categories
Provenance
Searching "tabula rasa" in ECCO
Citation
Greene, Robert. The principles of the philosophy of the expansive and contractive forces. Or an inquiry into the principles of the modern philosophy, that is, into the several chief rational sciences, which are extant. In seven books. By Robert Greene, ... Cambridge, 1727. Based on information from English Short Title Catalogue. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale Group. http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO
Theme
Blank Slate
Date of Entry
10/08/2006
