"Lastly, Supposing the Mind was not an Immaterial Substance, Grant it to be a Material one, if it has yet any Peculiar nature or Constitution of it's own, it could not be a Rasa Tabula, upon which any Thing might be Imprinted; This Paper, for Instance, on which I Write, is Susceptible of those Characters, which I Draw upon it, because it's Nature is such, as to Receive the Impression of the Ink, which Falls from the Pen, but Fire, or Flame, would not Admit of the same Characters, Described in the same Way, nor would Oil, or Spirit of Nitre, do it, nor, on the Contrary, would it be Possible to Write these Characters upon this Paper with those Substances"

— Greene, Robert (c. 1678-1730)


Place of Publication
Cambridge
Publisher
Printed at the University-Press, by Cornelius Crownfield, and are to be sold by him, E. Jefferys, and W. Thurlbourne booksellers in Cambridge, and by J. Knapton, R. Knaplock, W. and J. Innys, and B. Motte, London
Date
1727
Metaphor
"Lastly, Supposing the Mind was not an Immaterial Substance, Grant it to be a Material one, if it has yet any Peculiar nature or Constitution of it's own, it could not be a Rasa Tabula, upon which any Thing might be Imprinted; This Paper, for Instance, on which I Write, is Susceptible of those Characters, which I Draw upon it, because it's Nature is such, as to Receive the Impression of the Ink, which Falls from the Pen, but Fire, or Flame, would not Admit of the same Characters, Described in the same Way, nor would Oil, or Spirit of Nitre, do it, nor, on the Contrary, would it be Possible to Write these Characters upon this Paper with those Substances"
Metaphor in Context
Lastly, Supposing the Mind was not an Immaterial Substance, Grant it to be a Material one, if it has yet any Peculiar nature or Constitution of it's own, it could not be a Rasa Tabula, upon which any Thing might be Imprinted; This Paper, for Instance, on which I Write, is Susceptible of those Characters, which I Draw upon it, because it's Nature is such, as to Receive the Impression of the Ink, which Falls from the Pen, but Fire, or Flame, would not Admit of the same Characters, Described in the same Way, nor would Oil, or Spirit of Nitre, do it, nor, on the Contrary, would it be Possible to Write these Characters upon this Paper with those Substances; That is, the Paper I Write on, as much Concurrs by it's Nature to the Production of these Characters, as the Ink does, or the Hand which Writes them; And thus it is in the Mind, if it is any Thing at all; It cannot Receive any Characters, whatever we Please, but such only, as are Suitable to it's Being and Constitution; and therefore, if such Being and Constitution in Different Men is Different, the Inscriptions made upon their Minds will be Different likewise; and Consequently, what may seem Good to some Men, may Appear Vicious and Ill to others, what may Produce Pleasure in one Man, may in another Cause Pain and Uneasiness, and which is more, what one Person shall Esteem Just and Reasonable, another may Think has the utmost Iniquity and Baseness in it; And all this may be Derived from the Various Genius's and Complexions of Men's Minds, and upon the Concession, that they are not, nor can be Considered, as so many Rasae Tabulae.
(V.ii.5, p. 603)
Provenance
Searching "tabula rasa" in ECCO
Citation
Greene, Robert. The principles of the philosophy of the expansive and contractive forces. Or an inquiry into the principles of the modern philosophy, that is, into the several chief rational sciences, which are extant. In seven books. By Robert Greene, ... Cambridge, 1727. Based on information from English Short Title Catalogue. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale Group. http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO
Theme
Blank Slate; Writing to the Moment
Date of Entry
10/08/2006

The Mind is a Metaphor is authored by Brad Pasanek, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia.