text,updated_at,metaphor,created_at,context,theme,reviewed_on,dictionary,comments,provenance,id,work_id
"Having hitherto shewed that Sense or Passion from Corporeal Things existent without the Soul, is not Intellection or Knowledge, so that Bodies themselves are not known or understood by Sense; It must needs follow from hence, that Knowledge is an Inward and Active Energy of the Mind it self, and the displaying of its own Innate Vigour from within, whereby it doth Conquer, a Master and Command its Objects, and so begets a Clear, Serene, Victorious, and Satisfactory Sense within it self.
(IV.i, p. 126)",2012-01-18 21:54:54 UTC,"""It must needs follow from hence, that Knowledge is an Inward and Active Energy of the Mind it self, and the displaying of its own Innate Vigour from within, whereby it doth Conquer, Master and Command its Objects, and so begets a Clear, Serene, Victorious, and Satisfactory Sense within it self.""",2005-07-07 00:00:00 UTC,"Book IV, Chapter i",Self-Mastery,2012-01-18,"","Taylor quotes from Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality . London, 1731. Book IV, chap. 1, p. 126.","Reading Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 165.",11773,4475
"4. But I have not taken all this Pains only to Confute Scepticism or Phantasticism, or meerly to defend and corroborate our Argument for the Immutable Natures of Just and Unjust; but also for some other Weighty Purposes that are very much conducing to the Business that we have in hand. And first of all, that the Soul is not a meer Rasa Tabula, a Naked and Passive Thing, which has no innate Furniture or Activity of its own, nor any thing at all in it, but what was impressed upon it without; for if it were so, then there could not possibly be any such Thing as Moral Good and Evil, Just and Unjust; Forasmuch as these Differences do not arise meerly from the outward Objects, or from the Impresses which they make upon us by Sense, there being no such Thing in them; in which Sense it is truly affirmed by the Author of the Leviathan, Page 24. That there is no common Rule of Good and Evil. to be taken from the Nature of the Objects themselves, that is, either considered absolutely in themselves, or Relatively to external Sense only, but according to some other interior Analogy which Things have to a certain inward Determination in the Soul it self, from whence the Foundation of all this Difference must needs arise, as I shall shew afterwards; Not that the Anticipations of Morality spring meerly from intellectual Forms and notional Idea's of the Mind, or from certain Rules or Propositions, arbitrarily printed upon the Soul as upon a Book, but from some other other more inward, and vital Principle, in intellectual Beings, as such, whereby they have a natural Determination in them to do some Things, and to avoid others, which could not be, if they were meer naked Passive Things. Wherefore since the Nature of Morality cannot be understood, without some Knowledge of the Nature of the Soul, I thought it seasonable and requisite here to take this Occasion offered, and to prepare the Way to our following Discourse, by shewing in general, that the Soul is not a meer Passive and Receptive Thing, which hath no innate active Principle of its own, Because upon this Hypothesis there could be no such Thing as Morality.
(IV.vi.4, pp. 287-8)",2013-10-02 19:37:32 UTC,"""And first of all, that the Soul is not a meer Rasa Tabula, a naked and Passive Thing, which has no innate Furniture or Activity its own, nor any thing at all in it, but what was impressed on it from without.""",2005-07-07 00:00:00 UTC,"Book IV, Chapter vi",Blank Slate; Negated Metaphor,2012-01-22,Writing,"•I've included twice: Tabula Rasa and Furniture
•Taylor writes, ""Cudworth's book, although it was only published in 1731, well after his death in 1688, was actually written before Locke's Essay appeared, with its famous description of the Mind as originally ""white Paper, void of all Characters"" (2.1.2). He is not responding directly to Locke here, nor did Locke to him. But the opposition could not have been clearer if they had been in direct polemic with each other"" (542, n. 11).
•Cited in John Ellis's Knowledge of Divine Things from Revelation (1747). p. 102. See ECCO.
• Reassigned to main title for Cudworth's Treatise
•Taylor quotes from Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality. London, 1731. p. 242.
","Reading Taylor's Sources of the Self (165); Found again searching in Past Masters; found again searching ""tabula rasa"" in ECCO; found again searching in Google Books. Cited in John Ellis's Knowledge of Divine Things from Revelation (London: 1747), 102.",11774,4475
"Neither is this Passion of the Soul in Sensation a meer naked Passion or Suffering; because it is a Cogitation or Perception which hath something; of Active Vigour in it. For those Ideas of Heat, Light, and Colours, and other Sensible things, being not Qualities really existing in the Bodies without us, as the Atomical Philosophy instructs us, and therefore not passively stamped or imprinted upon the Soul from without in the same manner that a Signature is upon a piece of Wax, must needs arise partly from some Inward Vital Energy of the Soul it self, being Phantasms of the Soul, or several Modes of Cogitation or Perception in it. For which Cause some of the Platonists would not allow Sensations to be Passions in the Soul, but only Active Knowledges of the Passions of the Body.
(III.i.3, p. 79)",2012-01-20 22:30:31 UTC,"""For those Ideas of Heat, Light, and Colours, and other Sensible things, being not Qualities really existing in the Bodies without us, as the Atomical Philosophy instructs us, and therefore not passively stamped or imprinted upon the Soul from without in the same manner that a Signature is upon a piece of Wax, must needs arise partly from some Inward Vital Energy of the Soul it self, being Phantasms of the Soul, or several Modes of Cogitation or Perception in it.""",2012-01-20 22:30:18 UTC,"Book III, Chapter i","",,Impressions,"",Searching in Google Books,19466,4475
"3. For though the Soul be a distinct Substance, and of a different Nature from the Body, yet notwithstanding in every Animal it is intimately conjoyned with the Body, and Cleaves to it in such a Manner, as that both together Compound and make up one thing. And therefore it is not present with it only as a Mariner with a Ship, that is, meerly Locally, or knowingly and unpassionately present, they still continuing two distinct Things; but it is vitally united to it, and passionately present with it. And therefore when the Body is hurt, the Soul doth not unpassionately know or understand it, as when a Mariner knows that a Ship hath sprung a Leak, or when a Man is informed that his Neighbour's House is set on fire; but it feels a strong and vehement Pain, and hath a dolorous Sense or Perception of it, as being one thing with it. So in like manner when the Body wants either Meat or Drink, the Soul doth not unpassionately know this as an Indifferent By-stander, and therefore rationally only will or desire Meat and Drink for it, but it feels a passionate Sense of Hunger and Thirst in it self, as being Intimately concerned in the Business. Now the same is true also in those other Sensations, in which the Animal seems to be less concerned, as of Light and Colour, Heat and Cold, Sounds and Odours, that they are not simple Knowledges or Intellections of that part of the Soul which acts alone by it self, but they are the Perceptions of that which is vitally united with the Body, and sympathizing with the Motions and Passions of it, makes up one Compound with it. Wherefore though all Cogitations be formally in the Soul, and not in the Body, yet these sensitive Cogitations being in the Soul no otherwise than as vitally united to the Body, they are not so properly the Cogitations of the Soul, as of the mixed, or both together, as Plotinus calls it, the Compound of Soul and Body, or, as that Philosopher will have it, of the Body and a certain Vivificating Light, imparted from the Soul to it. And therefore, as he observeth out of Aristotle, 'as it is absurd to say the Soul Weaves,' (or indeed the Body either, Weaving being a mixt Action of the Man and Weaving Instruments) so it is absurd to say that the Soul alone doth Covet, Grieve or Perceive: these things proceeding from the Compound or the Coalescence of Soul and Body together; being not pure Mental, but Corporeal Cogitations of the Soul, as it vitally informs the Body, and is Passionately united to it.
(III.ii.3, pp. 88-90)",2012-01-22 16:51:00 UTC,"""And therefore it [the soul] is not present with it only as a Mariner with a Ship, that is, meerly Locally, or knowingly and unpassionately present, they still continuing two distinct Things; but it is vitally united to it, and passionately present with it. And therefore when the Body is hurt, the Soul doth not unpassionately know or understand it, as when a Mariner knows that a Ship hath sprung a Leak, or when a Man is informed that his Neighbour's House is set on fire; but it feels a strong and vehement Pain, and hath a dolorous Sense or Perception of it, as being one thing with it.""",2012-01-22 16:37:10 UTC,"Book III, Chapter ii","",,"",Like Descartes denial of the pilot and the ship comparison. A negated metaphor.,Searching in Google Books,19467,4475
"3. For though the Soul be a distinct Substance, and of a different Nature from the Body, yet notwithstanding in every Animal it is intimately conjoyned with the Body, and Cleaves to it in such a Manner, as that both together Compound and make up one thing. And therefore it is not present with it only as a Mariner with a Ship, that is, meerly Locally, or knowingly and unpassionately present, they still continuing two distinct Things; but it is vitally united to it, and passionately present with it. And therefore when the Body is hurt, the Soul doth not unpassionately know or understand it, as when a Mariner knows that a Ship hath sprung a Leak, or when a Man is informed that his Neighbour's House is set on fire; but it feels a strong and vehement Pain, and hath a dolorous Sense or Perception of it, as being one thing with it. So in like manner when the Body wants either Meat or Drink, the Soul doth not unpassionately know this as an Indifferent By-stander, and therefore rationally only will or desire Meat and Drink for it, but it feels a passionate Sense of Hunger and Thirst in it self, as being Intimately concerned in the Business. Now the same is true also in those other Sensations, in which the Animal seems to be less concerned, as of Light and Colour, Heat and Cold, Sounds and Odours, that they are not simple Knowledges or Intellections of that part of the Soul which acts alone by it self, but they are the Perceptions of that which is vitally united with the Body, and sympathizing with the Motions and Passions of it, makes up one Compound with it. Wherefore though all Cogitations be formally in the Soul, and not in the Body, yet these sensitive Cogitations being in the Soul no otherwise than as vitally united to the Body, they are not so properly the Cogitations of the Soul, as of the mixed, or both together, as Plotinus calls it, the Compound of Soul and Body, or, as that Philosopher will have it, of the Body and a certain Vivificating Light, imparted from the Soul to it. And therefore, as he observeth out of Aristotle, 'as it is absurd to say the Soul Weaves,' (or indeed the Body either, Weaving being a mixt Action of the Man and Weaving Instruments) so it is absurd to say that the Soul alone doth Covet, Grieve or Perceive: these things proceeding from the Compound or the Coalescence of Soul and Body together; being not pure Mental, but Corporeal Cogitations of the Soul, as it vitally informs the Body, and is Passionately united to it.
(III.ii.3, pp. 88-90)",2012-01-22 16:51:15 UTC,"""Wherefore though all Cogitations be formally in the Soul, and not in the Body, yet these sensitive Cogitations being in the Soul no otherwise than as vitally united to the Body, they are not so properly the Cogitations of the Soul, as of the mixed, or both together, as Plotinus calls it, the Compound of Soul and Body, or, as that Philosopher will have it, of the Body and a certain Vivificating Light, imparted from the Soul to it.""",2012-01-22 16:39:39 UTC,"Book III, Chapter ii","",,"","",Searching in Google Books,19468,4475
"3. For though the Soul be a distinct Substance, and of a different Nature from the Body, yet notwithstanding in every Animal it is intimately conjoyned with the Body, and Cleaves to it in such a Manner, as that both together Compound and make up one thing. And therefore it is not present with it only as a Mariner with a Ship, that is, meerly Locally, or knowingly and unpassionately present, they still continuing two distinct Things; but it is vitally united to it, and passionately present with it. And therefore when the Body is hurt, the Soul doth not unpassionately know or understand it, as when a Mariner knows that a Ship hath sprung a Leak, or when a Man is informed that his Neighbour's House is set on fire; but it feels a strong and vehement Pain, and hath a dolorous Sense or Perception of it, as being one thing with it. So in like manner when the Body wants either Meat or Drink, the Soul doth not unpassionately know this as an Indifferent By-stander, and therefore rationally only will or desire Meat and Drink for it, but it feels a passionate Sense of Hunger and Thirst in it self, as being Intimately concerned in the Business. Now the same is true also in those other Sensations, in which the Animal seems to be less concerned, as of Light and Colour, Heat and Cold, Sounds and Odours, that they are not simple Knowledges or Intellections of that part of the Soul which acts alone by it self, but they are the Perceptions of that which is vitally united with the Body, and sympathizing with the Motions and Passions of it, makes up one Compound with it. Wherefore though all Cogitations be formally in the Soul, and not in the Body, yet these sensitive Cogitations being in the Soul no otherwise than as vitally united to the Body, they are not so properly the Cogitations of the Soul, as of the mixed, or both together, as Plotinus calls it, the Compound of Soul and Body, or, as that Philosopher will have it, of the Body and a certain Vivificating Light, imparted from the Soul to it. And therefore, as he observeth out of Aristotle, 'as it is absurd to say the Soul Weaves,' (or indeed the Body either, Weaving being a mixt Action of the Man and Weaving Instruments) so it is absurd to say that the Soul alone doth Covet, Grieve or Perceive: these things proceeding from the Compound or the Coalescence of Soul and Body together; being not pure Mental, but Corporeal Cogitations of the Soul, as it vitally informs the Body, and is Passionately united to it.
(III.ii.3, pp. 88-90)",2012-01-22 16:51:26 UTC,"""And therefore, as he observeth out of Aristotle, 'as it is absurd to say the Soul Weaves,' (or indeed the Body either, Weaving being a mixt Action of the Man and Weaving Instruments) so it is absurd to say that the Soul alone doth Covet, Grieve or Perceive: these things proceeding from the Compound or the Coalescence of Soul and Body together; being not pure Mental, but Corporeal Cogitations of the Soul, as it vitally informs the Body, and is Passionately united to it.""",2012-01-22 16:42:54 UTC,"Book III, Chapter ii","",,"",Negated metaphor or disanalogy. ,Searching in Google Books,19469,4475
"2. Sense is but the Offering or Presenting of some Object to the Mind, to give it an Occasion to exercise its own Inward Activity upon Which two things being many times nearly conjoyned together in Time, though they be very different in Nature from one another, yet they are vulgarly mistaken for one and the some thing, as if it were all nothing but meer Sensation or Passion from the Body. Whereas Sense it self is but the Passive Perception of some Individual Material Forms, but to Know or Understand is Actively to Comprehend a thing by some Abstract, Free and Universal Reasonings, from whence the Mind as it were looking down (as Boetius expresseth it) upon the Individuals below it, views and understands them. But Sense which lies Flat and Grovelling in the Individuals, and is stupidly fixed in the Material Form, is not able to rise up or ascend to an Abstract Universal Notion; For which Cause it never Affirms or Denies any thing of its Object, because (as Aristotle observes) in all Affirmation, and Negation at least, the Predicate is always Universal. The Eye which is placed in a Level with the Sea, and touches the Surface of it, cannot take any large Prospect upon the Sea, much less see the whole Amplitude of it. But an Eye Elevated to a higher Station, and from thence looking down, may comprehensively view the whole Sea at once, or at least so much of it as is within our Horizon. The Abstract Universal Reasons are that higher Station of the Mind, from whence looking down upon Individual things, it hath a Commanding view of them, and as it were a Priori comprehends or Knows them.
(III.iii.2, pp. 94-5)
",2012-01-22 16:49:35 UTC,"""Whereas Sense it self is but the Passive Perception of some Individual Material Forms, but to Know or Understand is Actively to Comprehend a thing by some Abstract, Free and Universal Reasonings, from whence the Mind as it were looking down (as Boetius expresseth it) upon the Individuals below it, views and understands them.""",2012-01-22 16:48:46 UTC,"Book III, Chapter ii",As it Were,,Optics,"Metaphor set off with ""as it were.""",Searching in Google Books,19470,4475
"2. Sense is but the Offering or Presenting of some Object to the Mind, to give it an Occasion to exercise its own Inward Activity upon Which two things being many times nearly conjoyned together in Time, though they be very different in Nature from one another, yet they are vulgarly mistaken for one and the some thing, as if it were all nothing but meer Sensation or Passion from the Body. Whereas Sense it self is but the Passive Perception of some Individual Material Forms, but to Know or Understand is Actively to Comprehend a thing by some Abstract, Free and Universal Reasonings, from whence the Mind as it were looking down (as Boetius expresseth it) upon the Individuals below it, views and understands them. But Sense which lies Flat and Grovelling in the Individuals, and is stupidly fixed in the Material Form, is not able to rise up or ascend to an Abstract Universal Notion; For which Cause it never Affirms or Denies any thing of its Object, because (as Aristotle observes) in all Affirmation, and Negation at least, the Predicate is always Universal. The Eye which is placed in a Level with the Sea, and touches the Surface of it, cannot take any large Prospect upon the Sea, much less see the whole Amplitude of it. But an Eye Elevated to a higher Station, and from thence looking down, may comprehensively view the whole Sea at once, or at least so much of it as is within our Horizon. The Abstract Universal Reasons are that higher Station of the Mind, from whence looking down upon Individual things, it hath a Commanding view of them, and as it were a Priori comprehends or Knows them.
(III.iii.2, pp. 94-5)",2012-01-22 17:01:51 UTC,"""The Eye which is placed in a Level with the Sea, and touches the Surface of it, cannot take any large Prospect upon the Sea, much less see the whole Amplitude of it. But an Eye Elevated to a higher Station, and from thence looking down, may comprehensively view the whole Sea at once, or at least so much of it as is within our Horizon. The Abstract Universal Reasons are that higher Station of the Mind, from whence looking down upon Individual things, it hath a Commanding view of them, and as it were a Priori comprehends or Knows them.""",2012-01-22 16:53:35 UTC,"Book III, Chapter ii",Mind's Eye,,Optics,USE IN ENTRY,Searching in Google Books,19471,4475
"4. The Essence of nothing is reached unto by the Senses looking Outward, but by the Mind's looking inward into it self. That which wholly looks abroad outward upon its Object, is not one with that which it perceives, but is at a distance from it, and therefore cannot Know and Comprehend it; but Knowledge and Intellection doth not meerly look out upon a thing at distance, but makes an Inward Reflection upon the thing it knows, and according to the Etymon of the Word, the Intellect doth read inward Characters written within itself, and Intellectually comprehend its Object within it self, and is the same with it. For though this may be conceived to be true of Individual things Known (although the Mind understands them also under abstract Notions of its own) yet, at least in Aristotle's Sense, it is unquestionably true, In Abstract things themselves, which are the Primary Objects of Science, the Intellect and the thing known are really one and the same. For those Ideas or Objects of Intellection are nothing else but Modifications of the Mind itself. But Sense is of that which is without, Sense wholly gazes and gads abroad, and therefore doth not know and comprehend its Object, because it is different from it. Sense is a Line, the Mind is a Circle. Sense is like a Line which is the Flux of a Point running out from it self, but Intellect like a Circle that keeps within it self.
(III.iii.4, pp. 97-9)",2012-01-22 17:05:45 UTC,"""That which wholly looks abroad outward upon its Object, is not one with that which it perceives, but is at a distance from it, and therefore cannot Know and Comprehend it; but Knowledge and Intellection doth not meerly look out upon a thing at distance, but makes an Inward Reflection upon the thing it knows, and according to the Etymon of the Word, 'the Intellect' doth read inward Characters written within itself, and Intellectually comprehend its Object within it self, and is the same with it.""",2012-01-22 17:05:45 UTC,"Book III, Chapter iii","",,Writing,USE IN ENTRY. Meta-metaphorical citation of etymology.,Searching in Google Books,19472,4475
"4. The Essence of nothing is reached unto by the Senses looking Outward, but by the Mind's looking inward into it self. That which wholly looks abroad outward upon its Object, is not one with that which it perceives, but is at a distance from it, and therefore cannot Know and Comprehend it; but Knowledge and Intellection doth not meerly look out upon a thing at distance, but makes an Inward Reflection upon the thing it knows, and according to the Etymon of the Word, the Intellect doth read inward Characters written within itself, and Intellectually comprehend its Object within it self, and is the same with it. For though this may be conceived to be true of Individual things Known (although the Mind understands them also under abstract Notions of its own) yet, at least in Aristotle's Sense, it is unquestionably true, In Abstract things themselves, which are the Primary Objects of Science, the Intellect and the thing known are really one and the same. For those Ideas or Objects of Intellection are nothing else but Modifications of the Mind itself. But Sense is of that which is without, Sense wholly gazes and gads abroad, and therefore doth not know and comprehend its Object, because it is different from it. Sense is a Line, the Mind is a Circle. Sense is like a Line which is the Flux of a Point running out from it self, but Intellect like a Circle that keeps within it self.
(III.iii.4, pp. 97-9)",2012-01-22 17:07:48 UTC,"""But Sense is of that which is without, Sense wholly gazes and gads abroad, and therefore doth not know and comprehend its Object, because it is different from it.""",2012-01-22 17:07:48 UTC,"Book III, Chapter iii","",,Inhabitants,"",Searching in Google Books,19473,4475