work_id,theme,provenance,created_at,text,reviewed_on,id,comments,metaphor,dictionary,updated_at,context
4475,"",Searching in Google Books,2012-01-20 22:30:18 UTC,"Neither is this Passion of the Soul in Sensation a meer naked Passion or Suffering; because it is a Cogitation or Perception which hath something; of Active Vigour in it. For those Ideas of Heat, Light, and Colours, and other Sensible things, being not Qualities really existing in the Bodies without us, as the Atomical Philosophy instructs us, and therefore not passively stamped or imprinted upon the Soul from without in the same manner that a Signature is upon a piece of Wax, must needs arise partly from some Inward Vital Energy of the Soul it self, being Phantasms of the Soul, or several Modes of Cogitation or Perception in it. For which Cause some of the Platonists would not allow Sensations to be Passions in the Soul, but only Active Knowledges of the Passions of the Body.
(III.i.3, p. 79)",,19466,"","""For those Ideas of Heat, Light, and Colours, and other Sensible things, being not Qualities really existing in the Bodies without us, as the Atomical Philosophy instructs us, and therefore not passively stamped or imprinted upon the Soul from without in the same manner that a Signature is upon a piece of Wax, must needs arise partly from some Inward Vital Energy of the Soul it self, being Phantasms of the Soul, or several Modes of Cogitation or Perception in it.""",Impressions,2012-01-20 22:30:31 UTC,"Book III, Chapter i"
4475,"",Searching in Google Books,2012-01-22 17:19:39 UTC,"Whereas these Imaginations that we have of Individual Corporeal things when we are awake, and our Outward Senses employed upon their several Objects, do not seem to be Sensations of things Really existing and Present, as our Dreams do, but to be certain faint, evanid, shadowy and umbratile things, in comparison of those Sensations which we have at the same time with them when we are awake, that is, not as things existent without us, but as our own Cogitations. The Reason whereof is, because though they be both of the same kind, yet those Motions of the Spirits which are caused by the Nerves, from the Objects without when we are awake, being more vigorous, durable, constant and prevalent, do naturally obscure or extinguish those other weaker Phantasms or Imaginations which we have at the same time: And Reason interposing, brings in its Verdict for those Stronger Phantasms also whose Objects are durable and permanent, by means whereof the latter only seem to be Real Sensations, the former counterfeit and Fictitious Imaginations; or meer Picture and Landskip in the Soul. And this Aristotle long ago observed in this manner. In the day they are shut out and disappear, the Senses and Understanding working, as the lesser Fire is made to disappear by the Greater; and small Griefs and Pleasures by Great ones. But when we are at rest in our Beds, the least Phantasms make Impressions upon us. In the day-time, and when we are awake, those more fleeting Fancies and Imaginations, which proceed not from the Motions of the Nerves, caused by the Objects without, must needs yield and give place, as being baffled and confuted by those stronger, more durable and lasting Motions that come from the Nerves, caused by permanent Objects, Reason also carrying it clearly for the latter, by means whereof the former cannot appear as Real Things or Sensations. But when we are asleep, the same Phantasms and Imaginations are more strong, vivid and lively; because the Nerves are relaxated, there are often no Motions transmitted by them from the outward Objects into the Brain, to confound those Motions of the Spirits within, and distract the Soul's Attention to them; Just as the same Loudness of a Voice in a still Evening will be heard a great deal further and clearer, than in the Day-time when the Air is agitated with many contrary Motions crossing and confounding one another. But now there are no other Motions of the Spirits, besides these which cause Dreams to compare with them; and disgrace them, or put them out of Countenance; and as it were, by their louder Noise and Clamours, so to possess the Animadversive part of the Soul, that the weaker Murmurs of the other cannot obtain to be heard, as it is when we are awake, or in the Day-time. And therefore in Sleep the Mind Naturally admits these Phantasms as Sensations, there appearing none other to contradict that Verdict.
(III.iv.4, pp. 115-117)",,19476,"","""In the day they [Phantasms] are shut out and disappear, the Senses and Understanding working, as the lesser Fire is made to disappear by the Greater; and small Griefs and Pleasures by Great ones. But when we are at rest in our Beds, the least Phantasms make Impressions upon us.""","",2012-01-22 17:20:38 UTC,"Book III, Chapter iv"
4475,"",Searching in Google Books,2012-01-22 17:46:52 UTC,"Wherefore though it be vulgarly conceived that Knowledge arises from the Force of the Thing Known, acting upon that which knows from without; yet contrarywise it is most certain, to use Boetius's Expression, That Intellection and Knowledge do not arise from the Force and Activity of the Thing Known from Without, upon that which Knows, but from the Inward Power, Vigour and Activity of the Mind that Knows actively, Comprehending the Object within it self and Subduing and Prevailing over it. So that Knowledge is not a Passion from any thing without the Mind, but an Active Exertion of the Inward Strength, Vigour and Power of the Mind, displaying it self from within; and the Intelligible Forms by which Things are Understood or Known, are not Stamps or Impressions passively printed upon the Soul from without, but Ideas vitally protended or actively exerted from within it self.
(IV.i.1, p. 127)",,19481,Negated metaphor. ,"""So that Knowledge is not a Passion from any thing without the Mind, but an Active Exertion of the Inward Strength, Vigour and Power of the Mind, displaying it self from within; and the Intelligible Forms by which Things are Understood or Known, are not Stamps or Impressions passively printed upon the Soul from without, but Ideas vitally protended or actively exerted from within it self.""",Impressions,2012-01-22 17:47:04 UTC,"Book IV, Chapter i"
4475,"",Searching in Google Books,2012-01-22 18:45:25 UTC,"That there are some Ideas of the Mind which were not stamped or imprinted upon it from the Sensible Objects without, and therefore must needs arise from the Innate Vigour and Activity of the Mind it self, is evident, in that there are, First, Ideas of such things as neither are Affections of Bodies, nor could be imprinted or conveyed by any Local Motions, nor can be pictured at all by the Fancy in any sensible Colours; such as are the Ideas of Wisdom, Folly, Prudence, Imprudence, Knowledge, Ignorance, Verity, Falsity, Vertue, Vice, Honesty, Dishonesty, Justice, Injustice, Volition, Cogitation, nay, of Sense it self, which is a Species of Cogitation, and which is not perceptible by any Sense; and many other such like Notions as include something of Cogitation in them, or refer to Cogitative Beings only; which Ideas must needs spring from the Active Power and Innate Fecundity of the Mind it self, Because the Corporeal Objects of Sense can imprint no such things upon it. Secondly, in that there are many Relative Notions and Ideas, attributed as well to Corporeal as Incorporeal things that proceed wholly from the Activity of the Mind Comparing one thing with another. Such as are Cause, Effect, Means, End, Order, Proportion, Similitude, Dissimilitude, Equality, Inequality, Aptitude, Inaptitude, Symmetry, Asymmetry, Whole and Part, Genus and Species, and the like.
(IV.ii.1, pp. 148-9)",,19493,"","""That there are some Ideas of the Mind which were not stamped or imprinted upon it from the Sensible Objects without, and therefore must needs arise from the Innate Vigour and Activity of the Mind it self, is evident, in that there are, First, Ideas of such things as neither are Affections of Bodies, nor could be imprinted or conveyed by any Local Motions, nor can be pictured at all by the Fancy in any sensible Colours; such as are the Ideas of Wisdom, Folly, Prudence, Imprudence, Knowledge, Ignorance, Verity, Falsity, Vertue, Vice, Honesty, Dishonesty, Justice, Injustice, Volition, Cogitation, nay, of Sense it self, which is a Species of Cogitation, and which is not perceptible by any Sense; and many other such like Notions as include something of Cogitation in them, or refer to Cogitative Beings only; which Ideas must needs spring from the Active Power and Innate Fecundity of the Mind it self, Because the Corporeal Objects of Sense can imprint no such things upon it.""",Impressions,2012-01-22 18:45:35 UTC,"Book IV, Chapter ii"
4475,"",Searching in Google Books,2012-01-22 18:48:05 UTC,"2. But that which imposes upon Mens Judgements here, so as to make them think, that these are all Passive Impressions made upon the Soul by the Objects of Sense, is nothing else but this; because the Notions both of those Relative Ideas, and also of those other other Immaterial things, (as Vertue, Wisdom, the Soul, God) are most Commonly Excited and awakened occasionally from the Appulse of Outward Objects knocking at the Doors of our Senses. And these Men not distinguishing betwixt the Outward Occasion or Invitation of those Cogitations, and the immediate Active or Productive Cause of them, impute them therefore all alike, as well these intelligible, as the other Sensible Ideas, or Phantasms, to the Efficiency or Activity of the, outward Objects upon us. Wherefore that we may the better understand how far the Passion of Sense reaches, and where the Activity of the Mind begins, we will compare these three Things together: First, a Mirror, Looking-glass or Crystal Globe; Secondly, a Living Eye, that is, a Seeing or Perceptive Mirror or Looking-glass; Thirdly, a Mind or Intellect Superadded to this Living Eye or Seeing Mirror.
(IV.ii.2, pp. 149-150)",,19494,"","""But that which imposes upon Mens Judgements here, so as to make them think, that these are all Passive Impressions made upon the Soul by the Objects of Sense, is nothing else but this; because the Notions both of those Relative Ideas, and also of those other other Immaterial things, (as Vertue, Wisdom, the Soul, God) are most Commonly Excited and awakened occasionally from the Appulse of Outward Objects knocking at the Doors of our Senses.""",Impressions and Rooms,2012-01-22 18:51:05 UTC,"Book IV, Chapter ii"
4475,"",Searching in Google Books,2012-01-22 18:57:39 UTC,"10. There are many other such Ideas of the Mind, of certain Wholes made up of several Corporeal Parts, which, though Sometimes Locally discontinued, yet are joyned together by Relations, and Habitudes to one another (founded in some Actions of them, as they are Cogitative Beings) and by Order all conspiring into one thing; which, though they are altogether imperceptible by Sense, and therefore were never stamped or impressed upon the Mind from the Objects without yet, notwithstanding, are not meer Figments or Beings of Reason, but Things of the Greatest Reality, founded in certain Actions of Thinking and Cogitative Beings; which are altogether imperceptible by Sense, and therefore could not possibly be outwardly stamped upon the Mind; as for Example, a Polity or Commonwealth, called an Artificial Man, which is a Company of many United together by Consent or Contract under one Government, to be regulated by some certain Laws as it were by one Will for the Good of the Whole; where, though the Eye may see the Particular Persons, (or at least their outsides) that are the respective Members thereof, yet it can neither see the Bond which unites them together, which is nothing but Relation, nor comprehend the Whole that is made up of them, that is, a Polity or Commonwealth, according to the Formal Nature of it, which is an Idea that proceeds meerly from the Unitive Power and Activity of the Mind it self.
(IV.ii.10, pp. 166-7)",,19497,INTEREST: Hobbes' artificial man has to be an ideal cogitation. Relations not perceptible.,"""There are many other such Ideas of the Mind, of certain Wholes made up of several Corporeal Parts, which, though Sometimes Locally discontinued, yet are joyned together by Relations, and Habitudes to one another (founded in some Actions of them, as they are Cogitative Beings) and by Order all conspiring into one thing; which, though they are altogether imperceptible by Sense, and therefore were never stamped or impressed upon the Mind from the Objects without yet, notwithstanding, are not meer Figments or Beings of Reason, but Things of the Greatest Reality, founded in certain Actions of Thinking and Cogitative Beings; which are altogether imperceptible by Sense, and therefore could not possibly be outwardly stamped upon the Mind.""",Impressions,2012-01-22 18:57:39 UTC,"Book IV, Chapter ii"
4475,"",Searching in Google Books,2012-01-22 19:00:12 UTC,"In a word, all the Ideas of things called Artificial or Mechanical, contain something in them that never came from Sense, nor was ever stamped upon the Soul from the Objects without, which, though it be not meerly notional or Imaginary but really belongs to the Nature of that Thing, yet is no otherwise than Intellectually Comprehended. As for Example, an House or Palace is not only Stone, Brick, Mortar, Timber, Iron, Glass, heaped together; but the Very Essence and formal Reason of it is made up of Relative or Schetical Notions it being a certain Disposition of those several Materials into a Whole or Collection, consisting of several Parts, Rooms, Stairs, Passages, Doors, Chimneys, Windows, convenient for Habitation, and fit for the several Uses of Men; in which there is the Logick of Whole and Parts, Order, Proportion, Symmetry, Aptitude, Concinnity, all complicated with Wood, Stone, Iron, and Glass, as it were informing and adorning the Rude and Confused Mass of Matter, and making it both beautiful and Serviceable. And therefore for this Cause, no Man that is in his Wits will say that a stately and Royal Palace hath therefore less Reality, Entity, and Substantiality in it, than an Heap of Rubbish confusedly cast together; because, forsooth, the Idea of it partly consists of Logical Notions, which are thought to be Meer Imaginary Things; whereas the Whole is all Solid Matter without this Notional Form. For this Logical Form, which is the Passive Stamp or Print of Intellectuality in it, the first Archetypes contained in the Idea or Skill of the Architect, and thence introduced into the Rude Matter, successively with much Pains and Labour, is the only Thing that distinguishes it from meer Dirt and Rubbish, and gives it the Essence of an House or Palace. And it hath therefore the more of Entity in it, because it partakes of Art or Intellectuality. But the Eye or Sense of a Brute, though it have as much Passively impressed upon it from without, as the Soul of a Man hath, when it looks upon the most Royal and Magnificent Palace, if it should see all the Inside also as well as the Outside, could not Comprehend from thence the Formal Idea and Nature of an House or Palace, which nothing but an Active Intellectual Principle can reach unto.
(IV.ii.10, pp. 167-9)",,19498,"","""In a word, all the Ideas of things called Artificial or Mechanical, contain something in them that never came from Sense, nor was ever stamped upon the Soul from the Objects without, which, though it be not meerly notional or Imaginary but really belongs to the Nature of that Thing, yet is no otherwise than Intellectually Comprehended.""",Impressions,2012-01-22 19:00:12 UTC,"Book IV, Chapter ii"
4475,"",Searching in Google Books,2012-01-22 19:02:13 UTC,"In a word, all the Ideas of things called Artificial or Mechanical, contain something in them that never came from Sense, nor was ever stamped upon the Soul from the Objects without, which, though it be not meerly notional or Imaginary but really belongs to the Nature of that Thing, yet is no otherwise than Intellectually Comprehended. As for Example, an House or Palace is not only Stone, Brick, Mortar, Timber, Iron, Glass, heaped together; but the Very Essence and formal Reason of it is made up of Relative or Schetical Notions it being a certain Disposition of those several Materials into a Whole or Collection, consisting of several Parts, Rooms, Stairs, Passages, Doors, Chimneys, Windows, convenient for Habitation, and fit for the several Uses of Men; in which there is the Logick of Whole and Parts, Order, Proportion, Symmetry, Aptitude, Concinnity, all complicated with Wood, Stone, Iron, and Glass, as it were informing and adorning the Rude and Confused Mass of Matter, and making it both beautiful and Serviceable. And therefore for this Cause, no Man that is in his Wits will say that a stately and Royal Palace hath therefore less Reality, Entity, and Substantiality in it, than an Heap of Rubbish confusedly cast together; because, forsooth, the Idea of it partly consists of Logical Notions, which are thought to be Meer Imaginary Things; whereas the Whole is all Solid Matter without this Notional Form. For this Logical Form, which is the Passive Stamp or Print of Intellectuality in it, the first Archetypes contained in the Idea or Skill of the Architect, and thence introduced into the Rude Matter, successively with much Pains and Labour, is the only Thing that distinguishes it from meer Dirt and Rubbish, and gives it the Essence of an House or Palace. And it hath therefore the more of Entity in it, because it partakes of Art or Intellectuality. But the Eye or Sense of a Brute, though it have as much Passively impressed upon it from without, as the Soul of a Man hath, when it looks upon the most Royal and Magnificent Palace, if it should see all the Inside also as well as the Outside, could not Comprehend from thence the Formal Idea and Nature of an House or Palace, which nothing but an Active Intellectual Principle can reach unto.
(IV.ii.10, pp. 167-9)",,19499,"","""But the Eye or Sense of a Brute, though it have as much Passively impressed upon it from without, as the Soul of a Man hath, when it looks upon the most Royal and Magnificent Palace, if it should see all the Inside also as well as the Outside, could not Comprehend from thence the Formal Idea and Nature of an House or Palace, which nothing but an Active Intellectual Principle can reach unto.""",Impressions,2012-01-22 19:02:53 UTC,"Book IV, Chapter ii"
4475,"",Searching in Google Books,2012-01-22 19:05:37 UTC,"Hitherto therefore we have seen, that the Relative Ideas that we have in our Mind, are not Passions impressed upon the Soul from the Objects without; but arise from the innate Activity of the Mind it self; and therefore because the Essences or Ideas of all Compounded Corporeal Things themselves, whether Artificial or Natural; that is, whether made by the Artifice of Men or Nature, always necessarily include these Logical Relations in them, we have demonstratively proved from thence, that no Corporeal Compounded Thing whatsoever is understood by Sense, nor the Idea of it passively stamped upon the Mind, from the Objects without, but comprehended only by the large Unitive Power of the Intellect, and exerted from the Innate Activity thereof.
(IV.ii.10, pp. 172-3)",,19500,"","""Hitherto therefore we have seen, that the Relative Ideas that we have in our Mind, are not Passions impressed upon the Soul from the Objects without; but arise from the innate Activity of the Mind it self; and therefore because the Essences or Ideas of all Compounded Corporeal Things themselves, whether Artificial or Natural; that is, whether made by the Artifice of Men or Nature, always necessarily include these Logical Relations in them, we have demonstratively proved from thence, that no Corporeal Compounded Thing whatsoever is understood by Sense, nor the Idea of it passively stamped upon the Mind, from the Objects without, but comprehended only by the large Unitive Power of the Intellect, and exerted from the Innate Activity thereof.""",Impressions,2012-01-22 19:05:37 UTC,"Book IV, Chapter ii"
4475,"",Searching in Google Books,2012-01-22 19:11:46 UTC,"Nay further, the Man will also espy some Symbolical Resemblances of Morality, of Vertue and Vice in the variously proportioned Sounds and Airs; for there are Ethical (as Aristotle hath observed) as well as Enthusiastical Harmonies as the Physiognomists in like manner observe Signatures of Morality in the Countenances of Men and their Pictures, which it is yet less possible that a Brute would be sensible of; these Differences arising, not from the Absolute Nature of the Objects without, or their bare Impression which they make; but the Different Analogy which they have to some inward and Active Anticipations which they meet withal in the Percipient. For the Man hath certain Moral Anticipations and Signatures stamped inwardly upon his Soul, which makes him presently take Notice of whatsoever symbolizes with it in Corporeal Things; but the Brute hath none.
(IV.ii.14, pp. 181-2)",,19502,Cudworth makes the distinction clear. Throughout he has been denying the impression metaphor. Now he allows it. INTEREST. REVISIT. USE IN ENTRY.,"""For the Man hath certain Moral Anticipations and Signatures stamped inwardly upon his Soul, which makes him presently take Notice of whatsoever symbolizes with it in Corporeal Things; but the Brute hath none.""",Impressions and Writing,2012-01-22 19:11:46 UTC,"Book IV, Chapter ii"