theme,metaphor,work_id,dictionary,provenance,id,created_at,updated_at,reviewed_on,comments,text,context
Personal Identity; Lockean Philosophy,"""If all Cogitation be extinct, all our Ideas are extinct, so far as they are Cogitations, and seated in the Soul: So we must have them new imprest; we are, as it were, new born and begin the World again""",3932,Impression,Reading Burnet's three Remarks,10205,2005-03-15 00:00:00 UTC,2009-09-14 19:34:48 UTC,,•INTEREST.,"I proceed now to another Difficulty in your Doctrine of the Soul, which I mentioned formerly. You think the Soul, when we are asleep, is without Thoughts or Perceptions. I am still at a loss, I confess, how to frame any Idea of a thoughtless, senseless, lifeless Soul. This Carcase of a Soul I cannot understand: If it neither have Cogitation, nor Extension, as you suppose, what Being or manner of Being it hath, I am not able to comprehend. It must be a Substance, and a particular finite Substance, and yet without any Mode. If you say you have no idea of it, why then do you affirm to introduce a new and unintelligible State of the Soul, whereof neither you, nor others, can have any Conception? However, you ought to tell us, how you bring the Soul out of this unintelligible State. What Cause can you assign able to produce the first Thought at the end of this Sleep and Silence, in a total Ecclipse and intermission of Thinking? Upon your Supposition That all our Thoughts perish in sound Sleep, and all Cogitation is extinct, we seem to have a new Soul every Morning. If a Flame be extinct, the same cannot return, but a new one may be made. If a Body cease to move, and come to perfect rest, the Motion it had cannot be restor'd, but a new Motion may be produc'd. If all Cogitation be extinct, all our Ideas are extinct, so far as they are Cogitations, and seated in the Soul: So we must have them new imprest; we are, as it were, new born and begin the World again. If you say, the Ideas remain in the Soul, in that State of Silence and Insensibility, and need only a new Excitation; Why then, say I, may not Infants have innate Ideas (which you so much oppose) that want only Objects and Occasions to excite and actuate them, with a fit disposition of the Brain.
(pp. 16-7)",""
"","""For those Ideas of Heat, Light, and Colours, and other Sensible things, being not Qualities really existing in the Bodies without us, as the Atomical Philosophy instructs us, and therefore not passively stamped or imprinted upon the Soul from without in the same manner that a Signature is upon a piece of Wax, must needs arise partly from some Inward Vital Energy of the Soul it self, being Phantasms of the Soul, or several Modes of Cogitation or Perception in it.""",4475,Impressions,Searching in Google Books,19466,2012-01-20 22:30:18 UTC,2012-01-20 22:30:31 UTC,,"","Neither is this Passion of the Soul in Sensation a meer naked Passion or Suffering; because it is a Cogitation or Perception which hath something; of Active Vigour in it. For those Ideas of Heat, Light, and Colours, and other Sensible things, being not Qualities really existing in the Bodies without us, as the Atomical Philosophy instructs us, and therefore not passively stamped or imprinted upon the Soul from without in the same manner that a Signature is upon a piece of Wax, must needs arise partly from some Inward Vital Energy of the Soul it self, being Phantasms of the Soul, or several Modes of Cogitation or Perception in it. For which Cause some of the Platonists would not allow Sensations to be Passions in the Soul, but only Active Knowledges of the Passions of the Body.
(III.i.3, p. 79)","Book III, Chapter i"
"","""In the day they [Phantasms] are shut out and disappear, the Senses and Understanding working, as the lesser Fire is made to disappear by the Greater; and small Griefs and Pleasures by Great ones. But when we are at rest in our Beds, the least Phantasms make Impressions upon us.""",4475,"",Searching in Google Books,19476,2012-01-22 17:19:39 UTC,2012-01-22 17:20:38 UTC,,"","Whereas these Imaginations that we have of Individual Corporeal things when we are awake, and our Outward Senses employed upon their several Objects, do not seem to be Sensations of things Really existing and Present, as our Dreams do, but to be certain faint, evanid, shadowy and umbratile things, in comparison of those Sensations which we have at the same time with them when we are awake, that is, not as things existent without us, but as our own Cogitations. The Reason whereof is, because though they be both of the same kind, yet those Motions of the Spirits which are caused by the Nerves, from the Objects without when we are awake, being more vigorous, durable, constant and prevalent, do naturally obscure or extinguish those other weaker Phantasms or Imaginations which we have at the same time: And Reason interposing, brings in its Verdict for those Stronger Phantasms also whose Objects are durable and permanent, by means whereof the latter only seem to be Real Sensations, the former counterfeit and Fictitious Imaginations; or meer Picture and Landskip in the Soul. And this Aristotle long ago observed in this manner. In the day they are shut out and disappear, the Senses and Understanding working, as the lesser Fire is made to disappear by the Greater; and small Griefs and Pleasures by Great ones. But when we are at rest in our Beds, the least Phantasms make Impressions upon us. In the day-time, and when we are awake, those more fleeting Fancies and Imaginations, which proceed not from the Motions of the Nerves, caused by the Objects without, must needs yield and give place, as being baffled and confuted by those stronger, more durable and lasting Motions that come from the Nerves, caused by permanent Objects, Reason also carrying it clearly for the latter, by means whereof the former cannot appear as Real Things or Sensations. But when we are asleep, the same Phantasms and Imaginations are more strong, vivid and lively; because the Nerves are relaxated, there are often no Motions transmitted by them from the outward Objects into the Brain, to confound those Motions of the Spirits within, and distract the Soul's Attention to them; Just as the same Loudness of a Voice in a still Evening will be heard a great deal further and clearer, than in the Day-time when the Air is agitated with many contrary Motions crossing and confounding one another. But now there are no other Motions of the Spirits, besides these which cause Dreams to compare with them; and disgrace them, or put them out of Countenance; and as it were, by their louder Noise and Clamours, so to possess the Animadversive part of the Soul, that the weaker Murmurs of the other cannot obtain to be heard, as it is when we are awake, or in the Day-time. And therefore in Sleep the Mind Naturally admits these Phantasms as Sensations, there appearing none other to contradict that Verdict.
(III.iv.4, pp. 115-117)","Book III, Chapter iv"
"","""So that Knowledge is not a Passion from any thing without the Mind, but an Active Exertion of the Inward Strength, Vigour and Power of the Mind, displaying it self from within; and the Intelligible Forms by which Things are Understood or Known, are not Stamps or Impressions passively printed upon the Soul from without, but Ideas vitally protended or actively exerted from within it self.""",4475,Impressions,Searching in Google Books,19481,2012-01-22 17:46:52 UTC,2012-01-22 17:47:04 UTC,,Negated metaphor. ,"Wherefore though it be vulgarly conceived that Knowledge arises from the Force of the Thing Known, acting upon that which knows from without; yet contrarywise it is most certain, to use Boetius's Expression, That Intellection and Knowledge do not arise from the Force and Activity of the Thing Known from Without, upon that which Knows, but from the Inward Power, Vigour and Activity of the Mind that Knows actively, Comprehending the Object within it self and Subduing and Prevailing over it. So that Knowledge is not a Passion from any thing without the Mind, but an Active Exertion of the Inward Strength, Vigour and Power of the Mind, displaying it self from within; and the Intelligible Forms by which Things are Understood or Known, are not Stamps or Impressions passively printed upon the Soul from without, but Ideas vitally protended or actively exerted from within it self.
(IV.i.1, p. 127)","Book IV, Chapter i"
"","""That there are some Ideas of the Mind which were not stamped or imprinted upon it from the Sensible Objects without, and therefore must needs arise from the Innate Vigour and Activity of the Mind it self, is evident, in that there are, First, Ideas of such things as neither are Affections of Bodies, nor could be imprinted or conveyed by any Local Motions, nor can be pictured at all by the Fancy in any sensible Colours; such as are the Ideas of Wisdom, Folly, Prudence, Imprudence, Knowledge, Ignorance, Verity, Falsity, Vertue, Vice, Honesty, Dishonesty, Justice, Injustice, Volition, Cogitation, nay, of Sense it self, which is a Species of Cogitation, and which is not perceptible by any Sense; and many other such like Notions as include something of Cogitation in them, or refer to Cogitative Beings only; which Ideas must needs spring from the Active Power and Innate Fecundity of the Mind it self, Because the Corporeal Objects of Sense can imprint no such things upon it.""",4475,Impressions,Searching in Google Books,19493,2012-01-22 18:45:25 UTC,2012-01-22 18:45:35 UTC,,"","That there are some Ideas of the Mind which were not stamped or imprinted upon it from the Sensible Objects without, and therefore must needs arise from the Innate Vigour and Activity of the Mind it self, is evident, in that there are, First, Ideas of such things as neither are Affections of Bodies, nor could be imprinted or conveyed by any Local Motions, nor can be pictured at all by the Fancy in any sensible Colours; such as are the Ideas of Wisdom, Folly, Prudence, Imprudence, Knowledge, Ignorance, Verity, Falsity, Vertue, Vice, Honesty, Dishonesty, Justice, Injustice, Volition, Cogitation, nay, of Sense it self, which is a Species of Cogitation, and which is not perceptible by any Sense; and many other such like Notions as include something of Cogitation in them, or refer to Cogitative Beings only; which Ideas must needs spring from the Active Power and Innate Fecundity of the Mind it self, Because the Corporeal Objects of Sense can imprint no such things upon it. Secondly, in that there are many Relative Notions and Ideas, attributed as well to Corporeal as Incorporeal things that proceed wholly from the Activity of the Mind Comparing one thing with another. Such as are Cause, Effect, Means, End, Order, Proportion, Similitude, Dissimilitude, Equality, Inequality, Aptitude, Inaptitude, Symmetry, Asymmetry, Whole and Part, Genus and Species, and the like.
(IV.ii.1, pp. 148-9)","Book IV, Chapter ii"
"","""But that which imposes upon Mens Judgements here, so as to make them think, that these are all Passive Impressions made upon the Soul by the Objects of Sense, is nothing else but this; because the Notions both of those Relative Ideas, and also of those other other Immaterial things, (as Vertue, Wisdom, the Soul, God) are most Commonly Excited and awakened occasionally from the Appulse of Outward Objects knocking at the Doors of our Senses.""",4475,Impressions and Rooms,Searching in Google Books,19494,2012-01-22 18:48:05 UTC,2012-01-22 18:51:05 UTC,,"","2. But that which imposes upon Mens Judgements here, so as to make them think, that these are all Passive Impressions made upon the Soul by the Objects of Sense, is nothing else but this; because the Notions both of those Relative Ideas, and also of those other other Immaterial things, (as Vertue, Wisdom, the Soul, God) are most Commonly Excited and awakened occasionally from the Appulse of Outward Objects knocking at the Doors of our Senses. And these Men not distinguishing betwixt the Outward Occasion or Invitation of those Cogitations, and the immediate Active or Productive Cause of them, impute them therefore all alike, as well these intelligible, as the other Sensible Ideas, or Phantasms, to the Efficiency or Activity of the, outward Objects upon us. Wherefore that we may the better understand how far the Passion of Sense reaches, and where the Activity of the Mind begins, we will compare these three Things together: First, a Mirror, Looking-glass or Crystal Globe; Secondly, a Living Eye, that is, a Seeing or Perceptive Mirror or Looking-glass; Thirdly, a Mind or Intellect Superadded to this Living Eye or Seeing Mirror.
(IV.ii.2, pp. 149-150)","Book IV, Chapter ii"
"","""There are many other such Ideas of the Mind, of certain Wholes made up of several Corporeal Parts, which, though Sometimes Locally discontinued, yet are joyned together by Relations, and Habitudes to one another (founded in some Actions of them, as they are Cogitative Beings) and by Order all conspiring into one thing; which, though they are altogether imperceptible by Sense, and therefore were never stamped or impressed upon the Mind from the Objects without yet, notwithstanding, are not meer Figments or Beings of Reason, but Things of the Greatest Reality, founded in certain Actions of Thinking and Cogitative Beings; which are altogether imperceptible by Sense, and therefore could not possibly be outwardly stamped upon the Mind.""",4475,Impressions,Searching in Google Books,19497,2012-01-22 18:57:39 UTC,2012-01-22 18:57:39 UTC,,INTEREST: Hobbes' artificial man has to be an ideal cogitation. Relations not perceptible.,"10. There are many other such Ideas of the Mind, of certain Wholes made up of several Corporeal Parts, which, though Sometimes Locally discontinued, yet are joyned together by Relations, and Habitudes to one another (founded in some Actions of them, as they are Cogitative Beings) and by Order all conspiring into one thing; which, though they are altogether imperceptible by Sense, and therefore were never stamped or impressed upon the Mind from the Objects without yet, notwithstanding, are not meer Figments or Beings of Reason, but Things of the Greatest Reality, founded in certain Actions of Thinking and Cogitative Beings; which are altogether imperceptible by Sense, and therefore could not possibly be outwardly stamped upon the Mind; as for Example, a Polity or Commonwealth, called an Artificial Man, which is a Company of many United together by Consent or Contract under one Government, to be regulated by some certain Laws as it were by one Will for the Good of the Whole; where, though the Eye may see the Particular Persons, (or at least their outsides) that are the respective Members thereof, yet it can neither see the Bond which unites them together, which is nothing but Relation, nor comprehend the Whole that is made up of them, that is, a Polity or Commonwealth, according to the Formal Nature of it, which is an Idea that proceeds meerly from the Unitive Power and Activity of the Mind it self.
(IV.ii.10, pp. 166-7)","Book IV, Chapter ii"
"","""In a word, all the Ideas of things called Artificial or Mechanical, contain something in them that never came from Sense, nor was ever stamped upon the Soul from the Objects without, which, though it be not meerly notional or Imaginary but really belongs to the Nature of that Thing, yet is no otherwise than Intellectually Comprehended.""",4475,Impressions,Searching in Google Books,19498,2012-01-22 19:00:12 UTC,2012-01-22 19:00:12 UTC,,"","In a word, all the Ideas of things called Artificial or Mechanical, contain something in them that never came from Sense, nor was ever stamped upon the Soul from the Objects without, which, though it be not meerly notional or Imaginary but really belongs to the Nature of that Thing, yet is no otherwise than Intellectually Comprehended. As for Example, an House or Palace is not only Stone, Brick, Mortar, Timber, Iron, Glass, heaped together; but the Very Essence and formal Reason of it is made up of Relative or Schetical Notions it being a certain Disposition of those several Materials into a Whole or Collection, consisting of several Parts, Rooms, Stairs, Passages, Doors, Chimneys, Windows, convenient for Habitation, and fit for the several Uses of Men; in which there is the Logick of Whole and Parts, Order, Proportion, Symmetry, Aptitude, Concinnity, all complicated with Wood, Stone, Iron, and Glass, as it were informing and adorning the Rude and Confused Mass of Matter, and making it both beautiful and Serviceable. And therefore for this Cause, no Man that is in his Wits will say that a stately and Royal Palace hath therefore less Reality, Entity, and Substantiality in it, than an Heap of Rubbish confusedly cast together; because, forsooth, the Idea of it partly consists of Logical Notions, which are thought to be Meer Imaginary Things; whereas the Whole is all Solid Matter without this Notional Form. For this Logical Form, which is the Passive Stamp or Print of Intellectuality in it, the first Archetypes contained in the Idea or Skill of the Architect, and thence introduced into the Rude Matter, successively with much Pains and Labour, is the only Thing that distinguishes it from meer Dirt and Rubbish, and gives it the Essence of an House or Palace. And it hath therefore the more of Entity in it, because it partakes of Art or Intellectuality. But the Eye or Sense of a Brute, though it have as much Passively impressed upon it from without, as the Soul of a Man hath, when it looks upon the most Royal and Magnificent Palace, if it should see all the Inside also as well as the Outside, could not Comprehend from thence the Formal Idea and Nature of an House or Palace, which nothing but an Active Intellectual Principle can reach unto.
(IV.ii.10, pp. 167-9)","Book IV, Chapter ii"
"","""But the Eye or Sense of a Brute, though it have as much Passively impressed upon it from without, as the Soul of a Man hath, when it looks upon the most Royal and Magnificent Palace, if it should see all the Inside also as well as the Outside, could not Comprehend from thence the Formal Idea and Nature of an House or Palace, which nothing but an Active Intellectual Principle can reach unto.""",4475,Impressions,Searching in Google Books,19499,2012-01-22 19:02:13 UTC,2012-01-22 19:02:53 UTC,,"","In a word, all the Ideas of things called Artificial or Mechanical, contain something in them that never came from Sense, nor was ever stamped upon the Soul from the Objects without, which, though it be not meerly notional or Imaginary but really belongs to the Nature of that Thing, yet is no otherwise than Intellectually Comprehended. As for Example, an House or Palace is not only Stone, Brick, Mortar, Timber, Iron, Glass, heaped together; but the Very Essence and formal Reason of it is made up of Relative or Schetical Notions it being a certain Disposition of those several Materials into a Whole or Collection, consisting of several Parts, Rooms, Stairs, Passages, Doors, Chimneys, Windows, convenient for Habitation, and fit for the several Uses of Men; in which there is the Logick of Whole and Parts, Order, Proportion, Symmetry, Aptitude, Concinnity, all complicated with Wood, Stone, Iron, and Glass, as it were informing and adorning the Rude and Confused Mass of Matter, and making it both beautiful and Serviceable. And therefore for this Cause, no Man that is in his Wits will say that a stately and Royal Palace hath therefore less Reality, Entity, and Substantiality in it, than an Heap of Rubbish confusedly cast together; because, forsooth, the Idea of it partly consists of Logical Notions, which are thought to be Meer Imaginary Things; whereas the Whole is all Solid Matter without this Notional Form. For this Logical Form, which is the Passive Stamp or Print of Intellectuality in it, the first Archetypes contained in the Idea or Skill of the Architect, and thence introduced into the Rude Matter, successively with much Pains and Labour, is the only Thing that distinguishes it from meer Dirt and Rubbish, and gives it the Essence of an House or Palace. And it hath therefore the more of Entity in it, because it partakes of Art or Intellectuality. But the Eye or Sense of a Brute, though it have as much Passively impressed upon it from without, as the Soul of a Man hath, when it looks upon the most Royal and Magnificent Palace, if it should see all the Inside also as well as the Outside, could not Comprehend from thence the Formal Idea and Nature of an House or Palace, which nothing but an Active Intellectual Principle can reach unto.
(IV.ii.10, pp. 167-9)","Book IV, Chapter ii"
"","""As he could perceive no connate colours, no pictures or portraictures in his external eye: so neither could he finde any signatures in his minde till some outward objects had made some impression upon his [GREEK] his soft and plyable understanding impartially prepared for every seal.""",3591,Impressions and Writing,Reading,20466,2013-06-10 14:19:51 UTC,2013-06-10 14:19:51 UTC,,"","This makes the Platonists look upon the spirit of man as the Candle of the Lord for illuminating and irradiating of objects, and darting more light upon them then it receives from them. But Plato as he failed in corporeal vision whilest he thought that it was per extramiss•onem radiorum; So he did not ab errore suo recedere in his intellectual optio••but in the very same manner tells us that spiritual vision also is per emissionem radiorum. And truly he might as well phansie such implanted Ideas, such seeds of light in his external eye, as such seminal principles in the eye of the minde. Therefore Aristotle (who did better clarifie both these kindes of visions) pluckt these motes out of the sensitive eye, and those beames out of the intellectual. He did not antedate his own knowledge, nor remember the several postures of his soul, and the famous exploits of his minde before he was born; but plainly profest that his understanding came naked into the world. He shews you an [GREEK], an abrasa tabula, a virgin-soul espousing it self to the body, in a most entire, affectionate, and conjugal union, and by the blessing of heaven upon this loving paire, he did not doubt of a Notional off-spring & posterity; this makes him set open the windows of sense to welcome and entertain the first dawnings, the early glimmerings of morninglight. Clarum mane fenestras intrat & Angustas extendit lumine rimas. Many sparks and appearances fly from variety of objects to the understanding; The minde, that catches them all, and cherishes them, and blows them; and thus the Candle of knowledge is lighted. As he could perceive no connate colours, no pictures or portraictures in his external eye: so neither could he finde any signatures in his minde till some outward objects had made some impression upon his [GREEK] his soft and plyable understanding impartially prepared for every seal. That this is the true method of knowledge he doth appeal to their own eyes, to their own understandings; do but analyse your own thoughts, do but consult with your own breasts, tell us whence it was that the light first sprang in upon you. Had you such notions as these when you first peept into being? at the first opening of the souls eye? in the first exordium of infancy? had you these connate Species in the cradle? and were they rockt asleep with you? or did you then meditate upon these principles? Totum est majus parte, & Nihil potest esse & non esse simul. Ne're tell us that you wanted origanical dispositiōs, for you plainly have recourse to the sensitive powers, and must needs subscribe to this, that al knowledg comes flourishing in at these lattices. Why else should not your Candle enlighten you before? who was it that chained up; and fettered your common notions▪ Who was it that restrained and imprisoned your connate Idea's? Me thinks the working of a Platonists soul should not at all depend on [GREEK]; and why had you no connate demonstrations, as well as connate principles? Let's but see a catalogue of all these truths you brought with you into the world. If you speak of the principles of the Laws of Nature, you shall hear the Schoolmen determining. Infans pro illo statu non obligatur lege naturali, quia non habet usum Rationis & libertatis. And a more sacred Author saies as much, Lex Naturae est lex intelligentiae quam tamen ignorat pueritia, nescit infantia. There's some time to be allowed for the promulgation of Natures Law by the voice of Reason. They must have some time to spell the [GREEK] that was of Reasons writing. The minde having such gradual and climbing accomplishments, doth strongly evince that the true rise of knowledge is from the observing and comparing of objects, and from thence exstracting the quintessence of some such principles as are worthy of all acceptation; that have so much of certainty in them, that they are neer to a Tautology and Identity, for this first principles are.
(pp. 90-2)","Chap. XI. The light of Reason is a derivative light.
"