id,dictionary,theme,reviewed_on,metaphor,created_at,provenance,comments,work_id,text,context,updated_at
8536,Inhabitants,"",,"""Without the help and assistance of the senses [the mind] can achieve nothing more than a labourer working in darkness behind shuttered windows""",2005-03-21 00:00:00 UTC,"Reading S. H. Clark's ""Locke and Metaphor Reconsidered"" in JHI 59:2 (1998) p. 247",•I've include twice: Labourer and Windows.,3275,Without the help and assistance of the senses [the mind] can achieve nothing more than a labourer working in darkness behind shuttered windows
(p. 139),"",2009-09-14 19:33:37 UTC
9968,Rooms,"",2004-11-08,"Ideas may be ""rouzed and tumbled out of their dark Cells, into open Day-light""",2003-09-15 00:00:00 UTC,Found again in Lamb's Preserving the Self (28) on 11/8/2004.,•This is a metaphorically rich chapter!
•I've included twice: People and Cells
,3866,"In this secondary Perception, as I may call it, or viewing again the Ideas, that are lodg'd in the Memory, the Mind is oftentimes more than barely passive, the appearance of those dormant Pictures, depending sometimes on the Will. The Mind very often sets it self on work in search of some hidden Idea, and turns, as it were, the Eye of the Soul upon it; though sometimes too they start up in our Minds of their own accord, and offer themselves to the Understanding; and very often are rouzed and tumbled out of their dark Cells, into open Day-light, by some turbulent and tempestuous Passion; our Affections bringing Ideas to our Memory, which had otherwise lain quiet and unregarded. This farther is to be observed, concerning Ideas lodg'd in the Memory, and upon occasion revived by the Mind, that they are not only (as the Word revive imports) none of them new ones; but also that the Mind takes notice of them, as of a former Impression, and renews its acquaintance with them, as with Ideas it had known before. So that though Ideas formerly imprinted are not all constantly in view, yet in remembrance they are constantly known to be such, as have been formerly imprinted, i.e. in view, and taken notice of before by the Understanding. So that though Ideas formerly imprinted are not constantly in view, yet in remembrance they are constantly known to be such, as have been formerly imprinted, i.e. in view, and taken notice of before by the Understanding.
(II.x.7) ",II.x.7,2009-09-14 19:34:36 UTC
10003,"","",,"""Thus he who has raised himself above the Alms-Basket, and not content to live lazily on scraps of begg'd Opinions, sets his own Thoughts on work, to find and follow Truth, will (whatever he lights on) not miss the Hunter's Satisfaction""",2003-09-04 00:00:00 UTC,Reading,"",3866,"For the Understanding, like the Eye, judging of Objects, only by its own Sight, cannot but be pleased with what it discovers, having less regret for what has scaped it, because it is unknown. Thus he who has raised himself above the Alms-Basket, and not content to live lazily on scraps of begg'd Opinions, sets his own Thoughts on work, to find and follow Truth, will (whatever he lights on) not miss the Hunter's Satisfaction; every moment of his Pursuit, will reward his Pains with some Delight; and he will have Reason to think his time not ill spent, even when he cannot much boast of any great Acquisition.
(Epistle to the Reader, p. 6)",The Epistle to the Reader,2009-09-14 19:34:38 UTC
10005,Inhabitant,"Negated Metaphor, Stranger Within",,"""Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view, it is with a consciousness, that it had been there before, and was not wholly a stranger to the mind""",2003-09-06 00:00:00 UTC,"Searching ""mind"" and ""stranger"" in Past Masters","",3866,"To which let me add: If there be any innate ideas, any ideas in the mind, which the mind does not actually think on, they must be lodged in the memory, and from thence must be brought into view by remembrance; i.e. must be known, when they are remembered, to have been perceptions in the mind before, unless remembrance can be without remembrance. For to remember is to perceive any thing with memory, or with a consciousness, that it was known or perceived before. Without this, whatever idea comes into the mind is new, and not remembered; this consciousness of its having been in the mind before being that which distinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking. Whatever idea was never perceived by the mind, was never in the mind. Whatever idea is in the mind, is either an actual perception; or else, having been an actual perception, is so in the mind, that by the memory it can be made an actual perception again. Whenever there is the actual perception of any idea without memory, the idea appears perfectly new and unknown before to the understanding. Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view, it is with a consciousness, that it had been there before, and was not wholly a stranger to the mind. Whether this be not so, I appeal to every one's observation; and then I desire an instance of an idea, pretended to be innate, which (before any impression of it by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember as an idea he had formerly known; without which consciousness of a former perception there is no remembrance; and whatever idea comes into the mind without that consciousness is not remembered, or comes not out of the memory, nor can be said to be in the mindbefore that appearance: For what is not either actually in view or in the memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one as if it had never been there. Suppose a child had the use of his eyes, till he knows and distinguishes colours; but then cataracts shut the windows, and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark, and in that time perfectly loses all memory of the ideas of colours he once had. This was the case of a blind man I once talked with, who lost his sight by the small-pox when he was a child, and had no more notion of colours than one born blind. I ask, whether any one can say this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind? And I think nobody will say, that either of them had in his mind any ideas of colours at all. His cataracts are couched, and then he has the ideas (which he remembers not) of colours, de novo, by his restored sight, conveyed to his mind, and that without any consciousness of a former acquaintance: And these now he can revive, and call to mind in the dark. In this case all these ideas of colours, which when out of view can be revived with a consciousness of a former acquaintance, being thus in the memory, are said to be in the mind. The use I make of this, is, that whatever idea, being not actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the memory; and if it be not in the memory, it is not in the mind; and if it be in the memory, it cannot by the memory be brought into actual view, without a perception that it comes out of the memory; which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remembered. If therefore there be any innate ideas, they must be in the memory, or else no where in the mind; and if they be in the memory, they can be revived without any impression from without; and whenever they are brought into the mind, they are remembered, i.e. they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a constant and distinguishing difference between what is, and what is not in the memory, or in the mind; that what is not in the memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new and unknown before; and what is in the memory, or in the mind, whenever it is suggested by the memory, appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in itself, and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried, whether there be any innate ideas in the mind, before impression from sensation or reflection. I would fain meet with the man, who when he came to the use of reason, or at any other time, remembered any of them: And to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will say, there are ideas in the mind, that are not in the memory: I desire him to explain himself, and make what he says intelligible.",I.iv.20,2009-09-14 19:34:38 UTC
10263,Inhabitants,"",2011-08-31,"""A Mind dwelling in a Body, is in many respects superior to it; yet in some respects is under it.""",2005-07-20 00:00:00 UTC,"Searching ""mind"" in Ad Fontes's Digital Library of Classic Protestant Texts","",3948,"The Third Head in this Article, is that which is negatively expressed, That God is without Body, Parts, or Passions. In general, all these are so plainly contrary to the Ideas of Infinite Perfection, and they appear so evidently to be Imperfections, that this part of the Article will need little Explanation. We do plainly perceive that our Bodies are clogs to our Minds: And all the use that even the purest sort of Body in an Estate conceived to be glorified, can be of to a Mind, is to be an Instrument of local Motion, or to be a repository of Ideas for Memory and Imagination: But God, who is every where, and is one pure and simple Act, can have no such use for a Body. A Mind dwelling in a Body, is in many respects superior to it; yet in some [end page 54] respects is under it. We who feel how an Act of our Mind can so direct the Motions of our Body, that a thought sets our Limbs and Joints a-going, can from thence conceive, how that the whole extent of Matter, should receive such Motions as the Acts of the Supreme Mind give it: But yet not as a Body united to it, or that the Deity either needs such a Body, or can receive any trouble from it. Thus far the apprehension of the thing is very plainly made out to us. Our thoughts put some parts of our Body in a present Motion, when the Organization is regular, and all the parts are exact; and when there is no Obstruction in those Vessels or Passages through which that heat, and those Spirits do pass that cause the motion. We do in this perceive, that a thought does command matter; but our Minds are limited to our Bodies, and these do not obey them; but as they are in an exact disposition and a fitness to be so moved. Now these are plain Imperfections, but removing them from God, we can from hence apprehend that all the Matter in the Universe, may be so intirely subject to the Divine Mind, that it shall move and be whatsoever, and wheresoever he will have it to be. This is that which all men do agree in.
(pp. 54-5)","",2011-08-31 13:29:37 UTC
10493,Inhabitants,"",,"""There are so many ways of fallacy, such arts of giving colours, appearances and resemblances by this court-dresser, the fancy, that he who is not wary to admit nothing but truth itself, very careful not to make his mind subservient to any thing else, cannot but be caught.""",2005-03-21 00:00:00 UTC,"Reading Johnson's Dictionary (1755). Given as an illustration of ""COURT-DRESSER""",•I've cut and paste from LIberty Fund: http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/Locke0154/Works/HTMLs/0128-02_Pt04_Conduct.html,4050,"In the whole conduct of the understanding, there is nothing of more moment than to know when and where, and how far to give assent; and possibly there is nothing harder. It is very easily said, and nobody questions it, that giving and withholding our assent, and the degrees of it, should be regulated by the evidence which things carry with them; and yet we see men are not the better for this rule; some firmly embrace doctrines upon slight grounds, some upon no grounds, and some contrary to appearance: some admit of certainty, and are not to be moved in what they hold: others waver in every thing, and there want not those that reject all as uncertain. What then shall a novice, an inquirer, a stranger do in the case? I answer, use his eyes. There is a correspondence in things, and agreement and disagreement in ideas, discernible in very different degrees, and there are eyes in men to see them, if they please; only their eyes may be dimmed or dazzled, and the discerning sight in them impaired or lost. Interest and passion dazzles; the custom of arguing on any side, even against our persuasions, dims the understanding, and makes it by degrees lose the faculty of discerning clearly between truth and falsehood, and so of adhering to the right side. It is not safe to play with errour, and dress it up to ourselves or others in the shape of truth. The mind by degrees loses its natural relish of real solid truth, is reconciled insensibly to any thing that can be dressed up into any faint appearance of it; and if the fancy be allowed the place of judgment at first in sport, it afterwards comes by use to usurp it; and what is recommended by this flatterer (that studies but to please) is received for good. There are so many ways of fallacy, such arts of giving colours, appearances and resemblances by this court-dresser, the fancy, that he who is not wary to admit nothing but truth itself, very careful not to make his mind subservient to any thing else, cannot but be caught. He that has a mind to believe, has half assented already; and he that by often arguing against his own sense, imposes falsehood on others, is not far from believing himself. This takes away the great distance there is betwixt truth and falsehood; it brings them almost together, and makes it no great odds, in things that approach so near, which you take; and when things are brought to that pass, passion, or interest, &c. easily, and without being perceived, determine which shall be the right.",§33 Assent,2013-06-11 19:45:21 UTC
19100,Inhabitants,"",,"""Yet I suspect, I say, that this way of speaking of Faculties has misled many into a confused Notion of so many distinct Agents in us, which had their several Provinces and Authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several Actions, as so many distinct Beings; which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty in questions relating to them.""",2011-08-26 15:23:54 UTC,Reading,INTEREST: a meta-metaphorical insight into the personification of the mind.,3866,"These powers of the mind, viz. of Perceiving and of Preferring, are usually call'd by another Name: And the ordinary way of Speaking is, that the Understanding and Will are two Faculties of the mind; a word proper enough, if it be used as all Words should be, so as not to breed any confusion in Mens Thoughts, by being supposed (as I suspect it has been) to stand for some real Beings in the Soul that performed those Actions of Understanding and Volition. For when we say the Will is the commanding and superior Faculty of the Soul: that it is, or is not free; that it determines the inferior Faculties; that it follows the Dictates of the Understanding, etc. though these, and the like Expressions, by those that carefully attend to their own Ideas, and conduct their Thoughts more by the evidence of Things, than the sound of Words, may be understood in a clear and distinct sense: Yet I suspect, I say, that this way of speaking of Faculties has misled many into a confused Notion of so many distinct Agents in us, which had their several Provinces and Authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several Actions, as so many distinct Beings; which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty in questions relating to them.
(II.xxi.6)","Book II, Chapter xxi",2011-08-26 15:24:11 UTC
21535,Inhabitants,"",,"""Man is a Creature of so mixed a Composure, and of a Frame so inconsistent and different from Itself, that it easily speaks his Affinity to the highest and meanest Beings; that is to say, he is made of Body and Soul, he is at once an Engine and an Engineer.""",2013-07-08 21:23:10 UTC,"Reading Dennis Todd's Imagining Monsters (University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 138.","",7512,"Man is a Creature of so mixed a Composure, and of a Frame so inconsistent and different from Itself, that it easily speaks his Affinity to the highest and meanest Beings; that is to say, he is made of Body and Soul, he is at once an Engine and an Engineer: Tho' indeed both that Body and Soul act in many Instances separate and independent of each other: For when he Thinks, Reasons, and Concludes, he has not in all that Work the least Assistance from his Body: His finest Fibres, purest Blood, and highest Spirits are as brute and distant from a Capacity of Thinking as his very Bones; and the Body is so mere a Machine, that it Hungers, Thirsts, Tastes and Digests, without any exerted Thought of the Mind to command that Operation: which when he observes upon himself, he may, without deriving it from Vapour, Fume or Distemper, believe that his Soul may as well Exist out of, as in that Body from which it borrows nothing to make it capable of performing its most perfect Functions. This may give him hopes, that tho' his Trunk return to its native Dust he may not all Peristi, but the Inhabitant of it may remove to another Mansion; especially since he knows only Mechanically that they have, not Demonstratively how they have, even a present Union.
(Chap. II)",Chapter II,2013-07-08 21:23:28 UTC
21536,Inhabitants and Rooms,"",,"""This may give him hopes, that tho' his Trunk return to its native Dust he may not all Perish, but the Inhabitant of it may remove to another Mansion; especially since he knows only Mechanically that they have, not Demonstratively how they have, even a present Union.""",2013-07-08 21:25:39 UTC,"Reading Dennis Todd's Imagining Monsters (University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 138.","",7512,"Man is a Creature of so mixed a Composure, and of a Frame so inconsistent and different from Itself, that it easily speaks his Affinity to the highest and meanest Beings; that is to say, he is made of Body and Soul, he is at once an Engine and an Engineer: Tho' indeed both that Body and Soul act in many Instances separate and independent of each other: For when he Thinks, Reasons, and Concludes, he has not in all that Work the least Assistance from his Body: His finest Fibres, purest Blood, and highest Spirits are as brute and distant from a Capacity of Thinking as his very Bones; and the Body is so mere a Machine, that it Hungers, Thirsts, Tastes and Digests, without any exerted Thought of the Mind to command that Operation: which when he observes upon himself, he may, without deriving it from Vapour, Fume or Distemper, believe that his Soul may as well Exist out of, as in that Body from which it borrows nothing to make it capable of performing its most perfect Functions. This may give him hopes, that tho' his Trunk return to its native Dust he may not all Perish, but the Inhabitant of it may remove to another Mansion; especially since he knows only Mechanically that they have, not Demonstratively how they have, even a present Union.
(Chap. II)",Chapter II,2013-07-08 21:25:39 UTC
23408,Inhabitants,"",,"""When we find out an Idea, by whose Intervention we discover the Connexion of two others, this is a Revelation from God to us, by the Voice of Reason""",2014-03-02 16:23:02 UTC,"Reading S. H. Clark's ""Locke and Metaphor Reconsidered"" in JHI 59:2 (1998) p. 261",•REVISIT and fill out paragraph.,7802,"When we find out an Idea, by whose Intervention we discover the Connexion of two others, this is a Revelation from God to us, by the Voice of Reason. For we then come to know a Truth that we did not know before. When God declares any Truth to us, that is a Revelation to us by the Voice of his Spirit, and we are advanced in our Knowledge.
(IV.vii.11)",IV.vii.11,2014-03-02 16:23:02 UTC