text,updated_at,metaphor,created_at,context,theme,reviewed_on,dictionary,comments,provenance,id,work_id
"[...] We find, indeed, admirable directions for our conduct in a great variety of respects; but then those directions resulted from the occasional application of those general principles to particular cases, according to the discretion of the several writers. There is no proper limitation of benevolence, as an active principle, but the impracticability of its farther extension; and if we, who so justly and highly venerate the characters and writings of the apostles, should however be enabled, by means of that superiority of light and knowledge which, in some respects, we undoubtedly enjoy, to apply this grand principle to cases which did not occur to them, we act in a manner perfectly conformable to the genius and spirit of Christianity, though the authority of a positive precept may be wanting. St. Paul, probably, had no idea of a state of civil society, in which the spirit of liberty would operate to the total annihilation of the very condition of slavery. He contented himself, therefore, with giving directions worthy of an apostle, for the religious conduct of masters and servants, under actually existing circumstances; but enlightened Christians in the present age, well know that slavery may be, and in many Christian countries has, in fact, been totally abolished, not only with safety, but with real advantage to society, and a great increase of the general happiness: they, therefore, justly condemn the state itself as inconsistent with the spirit of Christianity, though in peculiar circumstances private Christians may, perhaps, justifiably acquiesce in a state of things which it is not in the power of individuals to alter. But the evils attending the Slave Trade are of a nature very different, and of a far greater magnitude than those which necessarily result from the mere condition of slavery. In no state of society can a practice, involving in it circumstances of such atrocious and enormous guilt, be considered as defensible by any person whose understanding is not darkened by the turpitude of his heart; in whom not only the feelings of the moral sense are extinguished, but, in this instance at least, every ray even of common sense.
(pp. 445-6)",2011-08-23 14:35:07 UTC,"""In no state of society can a practice, involving in it circumstances of such atrocious and enormous guilt, be considered as defensible by any person whose understanding is not darkened by the turpitude of his heart; in whom not only the feelings of the moral sense are extinguished, but, in this instance at least, every ray even of common sense.""",2011-08-23 14:35:07 UTC,Essay XXIII,"",,"","",Reading at the Schomburg Center (NYPL),19085,7063
"First, As it is a truth which cannot, so it is a truth which needs not, to be concealed or palliated, that Virtue is not necessarily productive of, or connected with, temporal Happiness. ""Dies deficiet,"" fays the Roman orator, ""si velim numerare quibus bonis malè evenerit :nec minus si commemorem, quibus improbis optimè."" To maintain, with the learned Professor whom I have already quoted, that we are happy in exact proportion as we are virtuous, is, in other words, to assert, with the ancient Stoics, that Virtue is the only good, i. e. the sole source of our enjoyments;--an opinion so contrary to fact and experience, that it is wonderful any man can seriously attempt to defend it. Are the pleasures we receive from the senses to be entirely left out of the account? Are the pleasures of imagination nothing? Or, do we derive no addition to our happiness from our literary and intellectual pursuits? If the moral sense is carefully cherished and cultivated, it is indeed the source of a very sublime and exalted species of enjoyment. On some occasions, however, it is rather the source of pain than pleasure; and the more virtuous a man is, the larger sacrifices of private happiness he is disposed to make to the general good; so that it may well admit of a doubt, if he has no future reward in prospect, whether, upon the whole, his happiness would be promoted by an undeviating perseverance in a course of the most perfect Virtue to which a human being can attain. It should seem that Virtue of a lower standard, and mixed with a considerable portion of alloy, is better calculated for the purposes of this world merely. We see it passes every where current, and the acquisition of it is by no means difficult. To speak without a figure, I assert, that whatever we may suppose respecting a few sublimer spirits, the bulk of mankind, I mean those who are destitute of the finer feelings of Virtue, would certainly, in many instances, add to their temporal happiness by deviating from the strict line of rectitude; and 1 affirm, that there is no motive of a moral nature, but such as a future state furnishes, of sufficient force to deter such men from the practice of vice. Hope and fear are the two grand springs by which that curious machine, the human mind, is actuated; and to deprive Virtue of that support which she receives from their influence and operation, and to substitute in their room a sense of honour, or a love of moral beauty and order, is to betray the cause of Virtue. Secured by the awful sanctions of religion, the temple of Virtue stands unshaken upon a rock: but these, her false and pretended friends, would fain subvert that firm and solid foundation, and in lieu of it would erect an house for her upon the sand; but if I may be allowed to borrow the language of Scripture, ""When the floods come, and the winds blow, and ""beat upon that house, it will inevitably fail, ""and great will be the fall of it.""
(pp. 143-5)",2011-08-24 03:13:12 UTC,"""Hope and fear are the two grand springs by which that curious machine, the human mind, is actuated; and to deprive Virtue of that support which she receives from their influence and operation, and to substitute in their room a sense of honour, or a love of moral beauty and order, is to betray the cause of Virtue.""",2011-08-24 03:12:55 UTC,Essay VII,"",,"","",Reading in Google Books,19087,7065
"In this chapter there is much extraneous matter; and Mr. Locke wanders frequently from the subject he professes to discuss, to which he never reverts without great apparent reluctance: but though there are in his digressive observations very objectionable passages, I shall confine my remarks to those arguments and assertions which bear an immediate relation to the point. ""Liberty,"" says Mr. Locke , sect. 8. ""is a power in any agent to do or to forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind."" This definition is consonant to the popular view of the subject; and it may be called practical Liberty, which no Philosopher ever pretended to call in question. Metaphysical Liberty is a power of forming opposite determinations in the same precise situation. A man in any given circumstances may undoubtedly act as he wills or pleases; but then the act, whatever it be, is a definite act, and in the same precise previous circumstances the same act would invariably take place; for the act results from the previous circumstances, and perfect uniformity in the cause must produce perfect uniformity in the effect. Whatever the ignorant or the vulgar may fancy, therefore, throughout the entire series of causes and effects, nothing could possibly have happened different from what has actually taken place. The course of events is fixed and immutable, and thoughts, volitions, and actions, proceed in one uninterrupted concatenation from the beginning to the end of time, agreeably to the laws originally established by the great Creator; and it is as impossible to disturb the regular progression of causes and effects in the mental as in the material world. A river may as soon be made to flow back to its fountain, as volitions can be exempted from the necessitating influence of motives.
(pp. 275-6)",2011-08-24 03:16:51 UTC,"""A river may as soon be made to flow back to its fountain, as volitions can be exempted from the necessitating influence of motives.""",2011-08-24 03:16:51 UTC,Essay XV,"",,"","",Reading in Google Books,19088,7066
"""But the next thing demanded, says Mr. Locke, sect. 25. is, Whether a man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, motion or rest?"" A question of which the absurdity is manifest. It is to ask, Whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleased with what he is pleased with?--A question which needs no answer."" True; and it is a question, therefore, which Mr. Locke might have spared himself the trouble of proposing. It is self-evident, that man has the liberty or rather the power to will that which he wills; and all that the Necessitarians pretend is, that man has not the Liberty or power of willing that which he does not will. ""In this, then,"" he repeats, sect. 28. ""consists freedom; in our being able to act or not to act, according as we shall chuse or will."" Thus far then Mr. Locke coincides with the advocates for philosophical Necessity, though his concessions are generally involved in a cloud of words; and he is still desirous, as it should seem, of ranking amongst the friends of philosophical Liberty. Our actions he allows to be necessarily determined by our volitions. He now goes on to ask, sect. 29. ""What determines the will?"" To which he answers, ""The mind or the intelligent agent itself, exerting its power this or that particular way; or, more explicitly, the mind is determined by motives grounded upon feelings of satisfaction or uneasiness."" This account is entirely consistent with the system of Necessity; for the advocates of that hypothesis insist as strongly as Mr. Locke, that our actions are the result of our volitions, which are themselves produced by motives, or by the mind actuated by a regard to motives; and as those motives were themselves produced by causes previously existing, it follows that motives, volitions, and actions, are all the definite effects of definite causes, and that they are all links of that
---- ""golden everlasting chain,
""Whose strong embrace holds heaven, and earth, and main.""
(pp. 280-1)",2011-08-24 03:18:57 UTC,"""[I]t follows that motives, volitions, and actions, are all the definite effects of definite causes, and that they are all links of that // ---- ""golden everlasting chain, / Whose strong embrace holds heaven, and earth, and main.""",2011-08-24 03:18:57 UTC,Essay XV,"",,"","",Reading in Google Books,19089,7066
"The Necessarians, far from being silenced by these popular and specious reasonings, with great ardour and confidence thus resume the argument:--It is acknowledged, say they, by our opponents,then,that nothing can come into existence without a cause. All the affections, emotions, and feelings of the mind, however modified and however distinguished, are the real and genuine effects of some real and adequate cause. The question therefore to be decided is this, ""Whether those mental affections are produced by a regular concatenation of circumstances or motives operating as real and adequate causes, or whether they are the result of a certain faculty of the mind fortunately discovered for this very purpose, and dignified with the appellation of the self-determining power."" He who affirms that the self-determining power is the cause of volition, must doubtless intend to convey some farther idea than that the power by which our volitions are determined is the cause of volition; for this is a mere identical proposition, which can never be seriously proposed as the subject of philosophical discussion.--By the self-determining power therefore must be meant, if indeed it has any meaning, either the actual exertion of volition, or the mental energy which precedes volition, and which is the efficient cause of it. If it means the actual exertion of volition, then the assertors of this power evidently confound the cause with the effect, making the act of volition prior to itself, distinct from itself, and the cause of itself. But if it means the mental energy preceding and producing volition, it is then plainly equivalent to the term motive, and the question is reduced to a mere verbal controversy; for this mental energy, denoting only a particular disposition and state of mind, must itself have resulted from a previous disposition of mind, as likewise that previous disposition from one yet more remote:--a regular and uninterrupted concatenation of volitions thus extending itself backwards to the original source of agency, each volition or mental state, like wave impelling wave, arising from preceding, and giving rise to succeeding states or definite situations of mind analogous to itself, and corresponding to those immutable laws by which the mental no less than the material world is governed by infinite wisdom and power.--But the term motive, according to the Necessarian definition, includes all those previous circumstances which contribute to produce a definite volition or determination of the will.--To what purpose then attempt to distinguish between the power and the motive of determination, when the ideas precisely coincide; the definite cause of a definite volition being all which is really meant by either?--Or where is the difference between the Libertarian, who says that the mind chuses the motive; and the Necessarian, who asserts that the motive determines the mind; if the volition be the necessary result of all the previous circumstances?--The distinction in this case can only amount to an idle and trifling evasion; and it is evident, that in order to preserve a shadow of liberty, its advocates make no scruple to adopt a gross impropriety of expression: to boast, that the mind chuses the motive when the mind is restricted to a definite choice, is ridiculous; and it is in fact as great a solecism, as to affirm that the volition chuses the motive: for the choice of the mind is not prior, but subsequent to the motive; it is therefore not the cause, but the effect of the motive; and this pretended mental choice is manifestly neither more nor less than the necessary determination of volition.
(pp. 9-12)",2011-08-24 03:36:17 UTC,"""But if it means the mental energy preceding and producing volition, it is then plainly equivalent to the term motive, and the question is reduced to a mere verbal controversy; for this mental energy, denoting only a particular disposition and state of mind, must itself have resulted from a previous disposition of mind, as likewise that previous disposition from one yet more remote:--a regular and uninterrupted concatenation of volitions thus extending itself backwards to the original source of agency, each volition or mental state, like wave impelling wave, arising from preceding, and giving rise to succeeding states or definite situations of mind analogous to itself, and corresponding to those immutable laws by which the mental no less than the material world is governed by infinite wisdom and power.""",2011-08-24 03:36:17 UTC,Essay I,"",,"","",Reading in Google Books,19090,7067