text,updated_at,metaphor,created_at,context,theme,reviewed_on,dictionary,comments,provenance,id,work_id
"I shall not trouble the reader with the opinions of the antients, in regard to the immediate cause of Dreaming. Epicurus fancied, that an infinite multitude of subtle images; some flowing from bodies, some formed in the air of their own accord, and others made up of [end page 208] different things variously combined, are always moving up and down around us: and that these images, being of extreme fineness, penetrate our bodies, and, striking upon the mind, give rise to that mode of perception which we call Imagination, and to which he refers the origin both of our dreams, and of our thought when we are awake. Aristotle seems to think, that every object of sense makes, upon the human soul, or upon some part of our frame, a certain impression; which remains for some time after the object that made it is gone; and which, being afterwards recognized by the mind in sleep, gives rise to those visionary images that then present themselves.--These opinions, if one were to examine them, would be found, either to amount to nothing that can be understood; or to ascribe to human thought a sort of material or bodily nature, which to me is perfectly inconceivable.
(pp. 208-9)",2009-09-14 19:42:22 UTC,"""Aristotle seems to think, that every object of sense makes, upon the human soul, or upon some part of our frame, a certain impression; which remains for some time after the object that made it is gone; and which, being afterwards recognized by the mind in sleep""",2005-07-26 00:00:00 UTC,"","",,Impression,"•B. refers us back to ""Essay on Memory, Chapter ii, section i""
•B.'s position on impressions is pretty interesting. Neither body nor mind? Always figurative? See previous entries.",Reading,14946,5588
"I should now consider the principal tribes comprehended under the general name of moral evidence; but, that every difficulty may be removed, which might retard our progress in the proposed discussion, it will be necessary, in the first place, to explore more accurately those sources in our nature, which give being to experience, and consequently to all those attainments, moral and intellectual, that are derived from it. These sources are two, sense and memory. The senses, both external and internal, are the original inlets of perception. They inform the mind of the facts which, in the present instant, are situated within the sphere of their activity, and no sooner discharge their office in any particular instance, than the articles of information exhibited by them, are devolved on the memory. Remembrance instantly succeeds sensation, insomuch that the memory becomes the sole repository of the knowledge received from sense; knowledge which, without this repository, would be as instantaneously lost as it is gotten, and could be of no service to the mind. Our sensations would be no better than the fleeting pictures of a moving object on a camera obscura, which leave not the least vestige behind them. Memory therefore is the only original voucher extant, of those past realities for which we had once the evidence of sense. Her ideas are, as it were, the prints that have been left by sensible impressions. But from these two faculties, considered in themselves, there results to us the knowledge only of individual facts, and only of such facts as either heretofore have come, or at present do come, under the notice of our senses.
(I, pp. 129-130)",2013-07-02 20:58:30 UTC,"""Memory therefore is the only original voucher extant, of those past realities for which we had once the evidence of sense. Her ideas are, as it were, the prints that have been left by sensible impressions.""",2013-07-02 20:58:30 UTC,"","",,Impressions,"",C-H Lion,21452,5476
"Now, in order to render this knowledge useful to us, in discovering the nature of things, and in regulating our conduct, a further process of the mind is necessary, which deserves to be carefully attended to, and may be thus illustrated. I have observed a stone fall to the ground when nothing intervened to impede its motion. This single fact produces little or no effect on the mind beyond a bare remembrance. At another time I observe the fall of a tile, at another of an apple, and so of almost every kind of body in the like situation. Thus my senses first, and then my memory, furnish me with numerous examples, which, though different in every other particular, are similar in this, that they present a body moving downwards till obstructed either by the ground or by some intervenient object. Hence my first notion of gravitation. For, with regard to the similar circumstances of different facts, as by the repetition such circumstances are more deeply imprinted, the mind acquires a habit of retaining them, omitting those circumstances peculiar to each, wherein their differences consist. Hence, if objects of any kind in a particular manner circumstanced, are remembered to have been usually, and still more, if uniformly, succeeded by certain particular consequences, the idea of the former in the supposed circumstance introduced into the mind, immediately associates the idea of the latter; and if the object itself so circumstanced, be presented to the senses, the mind instantly anticipates the appearance of the customary consequence. This holds also inversely. The retention and association above explained, are called Experience. The anticipation is in effect no other than a particular conclusion from that experience. Here we may remark, by the way, that though memory gives birth to experience, which results from the comparison of facts remembered, the experience or habitual association remains, when the individual facts on which it is founded are all forgotten. I know from an experience, which excludes all doubt, the power of fire in melting silver, and yet may not be able at present to recollect a particular instance in which I have seen this effect produced, or even in which I have had the fact attested by a credible witness.
(I, pp. 130-2)",2013-07-02 20:59:34 UTC,"""For, with regard to the similar circumstances of different facts, as by the repetition such circumstances are more deeply imprinted, the mind acquires a habit of retaining them, omitting those circumstances peculiar to each, wherein their differences consist.""",2013-07-02 20:59:34 UTC,"","",,Impressions,"",C-H Lion,21453,5476
"The author of the treatise above quoted, hath divided the principles of association in ideas into resemblance, contiguity, and causation. I do not here inquire into all the defects of this enumeration, but only observe, that even on his own system, order both in space and time ought to have been included. It appears at least to have an equal title with causation, which, according to him, is but a particular modification and combination of the other two. Causation considered as an associating principle, is, in his theory, no more than the contiguous succession of two ideas, which is more deeply imprinted on the mind by its experience of a similar contiguity and succession of the impressions from which they are copied. This therefore is the result of resemblance and vicinity united. Order in place is likewise a mode of vicinity, where this last tie is strengthened by the regularity and simplicity of figure; which qualities arise solely from the resemblance of the corresponding parts of the figure, or the parts similarly situated. Regular figures, besides the advantages which they derive from simplicity and uniformity, have this also, that they are more familiar to the mind than irregular figures, and are therefore more easily conceived. Hence the influence which order in place hath upon the memory. If any person questions this influence, let him but reflect, how much easier it is to remember a considerable number of persons, whom one hath seen ranged on benches or chairs, round a hall, than the same number seen standing promiscuously in a crowd; and how natural it is for assisting the memory in recollecting the persons, to recur to the order wherein they were placed.
(I, pp. 197-8)",2013-07-02 21:00:13 UTC,"""Causation considered as an associating principle, is, in his theory, no more than the contiguous succession of two ideas, which is more deeply imprinted on the mind by its experience of a similar contiguity and succession of the impressions from which they are copied.""",2013-07-02 21:00:13 UTC,"","",,Impressions,"",C-H Lion,21454,5476
"My third observation is, that pain of every kind generally makes a deeper impression on the imagination than pleasure does, and is longer retained by the memory. It is a common remark of every people and of every age, and consequently hath some foundation in human nature, that benefits are sooner forgotten than injuries, and favours than affronts. Those who are accustomed to attend the theatre will be sensible, that the plots of the best tragedies which they have witnessed, are better remembered by them, than those of the most celebrated comedies. And indeed every body that reflects may be satisfied, that no story takes a firmer hold of the memory than a tale of woe. In civil history, as well as in biography, it is the disastrous and not the joyous events, which are oftenest recollected and retailed.
(I, p. 319)",2013-07-02 21:05:05 UTC,"""My third observation is, that pain of every kind generally makes a deeper impression on the imagination than pleasure does, and is longer retained by the memory.""",2013-07-02 21:05:05 UTC,"","",,Impressions,"",C-H Lion,21458,5476
"Often, indeed, the affectation of conciseness, often the rapidity of thought natural to some writers, will give rise to still more material defects in the expression. Of these I shall produce a few examples:""He is inspired,"" says an eminent writer,""with a true sense of that function, when chosen from a regard to the interests of piety and virtue."" Sense in this passage denotes an inward feeling, or the impression which some sentiment makes upon the mind. Now a function cannot be a sentiment impressed or felt. The expression is therefore defective, and ought to have been,---""He is inspired with a true sense of the dignity, or of the importance of that function.""---""You ought to contemn all the wit in the world against you""---As the writer doth not intend to signify that all the wit in the world is actually exerted against the person whom he addresses, there is a defect in the expression, though perhaps it will be thought chargeable with redundancy at the same time. More plainly thus,""You ought to contemn all the wit that can be employed against you.""""He talks all the way up stairs to a visit."" There is here also a faulty omission, which, if it cannot be said to obscure the sense, doth at least withhold that light whereof it is susceptible. If the word visit ever meant person or people, there would be an ambiguity in the sentence, and we should imagine this the object talked to; but as that cannot be the case, the expression is rather to be accounted lame, there being no verb in it with which the words to a visit can be construed. [...]
(pp. 9-11)",2013-07-02 21:07:19 UTC,"""Sense in this passage denotes an inward feeling, or the impression which some sentiment makes upon the mind.""",2013-07-02 21:07:19 UTC,"","",,Impressions,"",C-H Lion,21460,5476
"A fourth way in which tropes may promote vivacity, is when things sensitive are presented to the fancy instead of things lifeless; or, which is nearly the same, when life, perception, activity, design, passion, or any property of sentient beings, is by means of the trope attributed to things inanimate. It is not more evident that the imagination is more strongly affected by things sensible than by things intelligible, than it is evident that things animate awaken greater attention, and make a stronger impression on the mind than things senseless. It is for this reason that the quality of which I am treating, hath come to be termed vivacity, or liveliness of style.
(II, pp. 204-5)",2013-07-02 21:11:21 UTC,"""It is not more evident that the imagination is more strongly affected by things sensible than by things intelligible, than it is evident that things animate awaken greater attention, and make a stronger impression on the mind than things senseless.""",2013-07-02 21:11:21 UTC,"","",,Impressions,"",C-H Lion,21463,5476
"But if you should take the other method, and connect with accuracy where there is relation; and with the help of conjunctions and relatives, deduce with care effects from their causes, and allow nothing of the kind to pass unnoticed in the description, in lieu of a picture, you will present us with a piece of reasoning or declamation. Would you, on the contrary, give to reasoning itself the force and vivacity of painting, follow the method first prescribed, and that even when you represent the energy of spiritual causes, which were never subjected to the scrutiny of sense. You will thus convert a piece of abstruse reflexion, which, however just, makes but a slender impression upon the mind, into the most affecting and instructive imagery.
(II, pp. 335-6)",2013-07-02 21:13:46 UTC,"""You will thus convert a piece of abstruse reflexion, which, however just, makes but a slender impression upon the mind, into the most affecting and instructive imagery.""",2013-07-02 21:13:46 UTC,"","",,Impressions,"",C-H Lion,21466,5476
"I WILL not go so far as to say that the improvement of taste and of virtue is the same; or that they may always be expected to coexist in an equal degree. More powerful correctives than taste can apply, are necessary for reforming the corrupt propensities which too frequently prevail among mankind. Elegant speculations are sometimes found to float on the surface of the mind, while bad passions possess the interior regions of the heart. At the same time this cannot but be admitted, that the exercise of taste is, in its native tendency, moral and purifying. From reading the most admired productions of genius, whether in poetry or prose, almost every one rises with some good impressions left on his mind; and though these may not always be durable, they are at least to be ranked among the means of disposing the heart to virtue. One thing is certain, and I shall hereafter have occasion to illustrate it more fully, that without possessing the virtuous affections in a strong degree, no man can attain eminence in the sublime parts of eloquence. He must feel what a good man feels, if he expects greatly to move or to interest mankind. They are the ardent sentiments of honour, virtue, magnanimity, and publick spirit, that only can kindle that fire of genius, and call up into the mind those high ideas, which attract the admiration of ages; and if this spirit be necessary to produce the most distinguished efforts of eloquence, it must be necessary also to our relishing them with proper taste and feeling.
(Vol. I, Lecture I, pp. 15-16)",2013-11-18 19:24:19 UTC,"""From reading the most admired productions of genius, whether in poetry or prose, almost every one rises with some good impressions left on his mind; and though these may not always be durable, they are at least to be ranked among the means of disposing the heart to virtue.""",2013-11-18 19:24:19 UTC,"","",,Impressions,"",ECCO-TCP,23259,5583
"IN the feeble attempts, which human art can make towards producing grand objects (feeble, I mean, in comparison with the powers of nature), greatness of dimensions always constitutes a principal part. No pile of building can convey any idea of Sublimity, unless it be ample and lofty. There is, too, in architecture, what is called Greatness of manner; which seems chiefly to arise, from presenting the object to us in one full point of view; so that it shall make its impression whole, entire, and undivided, upon the mind. A Gothic cathedral raises ideas of grandeur in our minds, by its size, its height, its awful obscurity, its strength, its antiquity, and its durability.
(Vol. I, Lecture III, p. 62)",2013-11-18 19:29:28 UTC,"""There is, too, in architecture, what is called Greatness of manner; which seems chiefly to arise, from presenting the object to us in one full point of view; so that it shall make its impression whole, entire, and undivided, upon the mind.""",2013-11-18 19:29:28 UTC,"","",,Impressions,"",ECCO-TCP,23263,5583