text,updated_at,metaphor,created_at,context,theme,reviewed_on,dictionary,comments,provenance,id,work_id
"For, though he that contemplates the Operations of his Mind, cannot but have plain and clear Ideas of them; yet unless he turn his Thoughts that way, and considers them attentively, he will no more have clear and distinct Ideas of all the Operations of his Mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular Ideas of any Landscape, or of Parts and Motions of a Clock, who will not turn his Eyes to it, and with attention heed all the Parts of it. The Picture, or Clock may be so placed, that they may come in his way every day; but yet he will have but a confused Idea of all the Parts they are made up of, till he applies himself with attention, to consider them each in particular.
(II.i.7)",2013-09-07 20:48:14 UTC,"""For, though he that contemplates the Operations of his Mind, cannot but have plain and clear Ideas of them; yet unless he turn his Thoughts that way, and considers them attentively, he will no more have clear and distinct Ideas of all the Operations of his Mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular Ideas of any Landscape, or of Parts and Motions of a Clock, who will not turn his Eyes to it, and with attention heed all the Parts of it.""",2003-09-06 00:00:00 UTC,II.i.7,"",2003-10-23,"","•In the next ¶ Locke writes ""though they pass there continually; yet like floating Visions, they make not deep Impressions enough, to leave in the Mind clear distinct lasting Ideas"" (II.i.8)
•REVISIT and create two separate entries (10/23/2003)",Reading,9944,3866
"In all that great Extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote Speculations, it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those Ideas, which Sense or Reflection have offered for its Contemplation.
(II.i.24)",2011-05-26 03:45:14 UTC,"""In all that great Extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote Speculations, it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those Ideas, which Sense or Reflection have offered for its Contemplation.""",2003-09-06 00:00:00 UTC,II.i.24,"",,"","",Reading,9948,3866
"When the Mind turns its view inwards upon its self, and contemplates its own Actions, Thinking is the first that occurrs; wherein it observes a great variety of Modifications, and thereof frames to it self distinct Ideas. Thus the Perception, or Thought, which actually accompany, and is annexed to any impression on the Body, made by an external Object, it frames a distinct Idea of, which we call Sensation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any Idea into the Understanding by the Senses. The same Idea, when it again recurrs without the operation of the like Object on the eternal Sensory, is Remembrance. If it be sought after by the Mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, 'tis Recollection: If it be held there long under attentive Consideration, 'tis Contemplation. When Ideas float in our Mind, without any reflection or regard of the Understanding, it is that which the French call Resvery; our Language has scarce a name for it. When the Ideas that offer themselves, (for as I have observed in another place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a train of Ideas succeeding one another in our Minds,) are taken notice of, and, as it were, registred in the Memory, it is Attention. When the Mind with great earnestness, and of a choice, fixes its view on any Idea, considers it on all sides, and will not be called off by the ordinary sollicitation of other Ideas, it is that we call Intention, or Study. Sleep, without dreaming, is rest from all these; and Dreaming it self, is the perception of Ideas (whilst the outward Senses are stopp'd, so that they receive not outward Objects with their usual quickness,) in the Mind, not suggested by any external Objects, or known occasion; nor under any Choice or Conduct of the Understanding at all; and whether that which we call Extasie, be not dreaming with the Eyes open, I leave to be examined.
(II.xix.1)",2018-06-18 14:51:00 UTC,"""When Ideas float in our Mind, without any reflection or regard of the Understanding, it is that which the French call 'Resvery' [Reverie]; our Language has scarce a name for it.""",2005-03-21 00:00:00 UTC,II.xix.1,Reverie,,"","","Reading S. H. Clark's ""Locke and Metaphor Reconsidered"" in JHI 59:2 (1998): 254. Text from ECCO-TCP.",9985,3866
GOD I own cannot be denied to enlighten the Understanding by a Ray darted into the Mind immediately from the Fountain of Light,2009-09-14 19:34:38 UTC,"""GOD I own cannot be denied to enlighten the Understanding by a Ray darted into the Mind immediately from the Fountain of Light""",2005-03-21 00:00:00 UTC,IV.xix.5,"",,"","","Reading Clark's ""Locke and Metaphor Reconsidered"" in JHI 59:2 (1998) p. 262",9993,3866
"He that thinks he has a positive idea of infinite space, will, when he considers it, find that he can no more have a positive idea of the greatest, than he has of the least space. For in this latter, which seems the easier of the two, and more within our comprehension, we are capable only of a comparative idea of smallness, which will always be less than any one whereof we have the positive idea. All our positive ideas of any quantity, whether great or little, have always bounds; though our comparative idea, whereby we can always add to the one, and take from the other, hath no bounds: For that which remains either great or little, not being comprehended in that positive idea which we have, lies in obscurity; and we have no other idea of it, but of the power of enlarging the one, and diminishing the other, without ceasing. A pestle and mortar will as soon bring any particle of matter to indivisibility, as the acutest thought of a mathematician; and a surveyor may as soon with his chain measure out infinite space, as a philosopher by the quickest flight of mind reach it, or by thinking comprehend it; which is to have a positive idea of it. He that thinks on a cube of an inch diameter, has a clear and positive idea of it in his mind, and so can frame one of 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, and so on till he has the idea in his thoughts of some thing very little: But yet reaches not the idea of that incomprehensible littleness which division can produce. What remains of smallness, is as far from his thoughts as when he first began; and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and positive idea of that smallness, which is consequent to infinite divisibility.
(II.xvii.18)",2011-07-21 15:16:33 UTC,"""A pestle and mortar will as soon bring any particle of matter to indivisibility, as the acutest thought of a mathematician; and a surveyor may as soon with his chain measure out infinite space, as a philosopher by the quickest flight of mind reach it, or by thinking comprehend it; which is to have a positive idea of it.""",2011-07-21 15:16:33 UTC,"Book II, Chap. xvii","",,"","",Searching in Past Masters,18957,3866
"11. I would not be thought here to lessen the credit and use of history: It is all the light we have, in many cases, and we receive from it a great part of the useful truths we have, with a convincing evidence. I think nothing more valuable than the records of antiquity: I wish we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But this, truth itself forces me to say, that no probability can arise higher than its first original. What has no other evidence than the single testimony of one only witness, must stand or fall by his only testimony, whether good, bad or indifferent; and though cited afterwards by hundreds of others, one after another, is so far from receiving any strength thereby, that it is only the weaker. Passion, interest, inadvertency, mistake of his meaning, and a thousand odd reasons, or capricio's, men's minds are acted by (impossible to be discovered) may make one man quote another man's words or meaning wrong. He that has but ever so little examined the citations of writers, cannot doubt how little credit the quotations deserve, where the originals are wanting; and consequently how much less quotations of quotations can be relied on. This is certain, that what in one age was affirmed upon slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future ages, by being often repeated. But the farther still it is from the original, the less valid it is, and has always less force in the mouth or writing of him that last made use of it, than in his from whom he received it.
(IV.xvi.11)",2013-04-14 21:01:07 UTC,"""Passion, interest, inadvertency, mistake of his meaning, and a thousand odd reasons, or capricio's, men's minds are acted by (impossible to be discovered) may make one man quote another man's words or meaning wrong.""",2013-04-14 21:00:31 UTC,"Book IV, Chapter xvi","",,"","Note. Sterne pulls out the keyword ""capricios"" and uses it in Tristram Shandy (in Momus Glass setpiece).","Reading Marjorie Garber, """""" (Quotation Marks),"" Critical Inquiry 25:4 (Summer 1999): 666.",20097,3866
"§. 7. If therefore we will warily attend to the Motions of the Mind, and observe what Course it usually takes in its way to Knowledge, we shall, I think, find that the Mind having got any Idea, which it thinks it may have use of, either in Contemplation or Discourse; the first Thing it does, is to abstract it, and then get a Name to it; and so lay it up in its Store-house, the Memory, as containing the Essence of a sort of Things, of which that Name is always to be the Mark. Hence it is, that we may often observe, that when any one sees a new Thing of a kind that he knows not, he presently asks what it is, meaning by that Enquiry nothing but the Name. As if the Name carried with it the Knowledge of the Species, or the Essence of it; whereof it is indeed used as the Mark, and is generally supposed annexed to it.
(II.xxxii.7, p. 178 in 1690 ed.)",2014-06-22 18:18:24 UTC,"""If therefore we will warily attend to the Motions of the Mind, and observe what Course it usually takes in its way to Knowledge, we shall, I think, find that the Mind having got any Idea, which it thinks it may have use of, either in Contemplation or Discourse; the first Thing it does, is to abstract it, and then get a Name to it; and so lay it up in its Store-house, the Memory, as containing the Essence of a sort of Things, of which that Name is always to be the Mark.""",2013-09-17 16:52:20 UTC,"Book II, chapter xxxii","",,Rooms,"",Reading; text from ECCO-TCP,22773,3866
"§. 10. These, if they are not all, are at least (as I think) the most considerable of those simple Ideas which the Mind has, and out of which are made all its other knowledge; all which it receives only by the two forementioned ways of Sensation and Reflection. Nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for the capacious Mind of Man to expatiate in, which takes its flight farther than the Stars, and cannot be confined by the limits of the World; that extends its thoughts often even beyond the utmost expansion of Matter, and makes excursions into that incomprehensible Inane. I grant all this, but desire any one to assign any simple Idea, which it received not from one of those Inlets before-mentioned, or any complex Idea not made out of those simple ones. Nor will it be so strange, to think these few simple Ideas sufficient to employ the quickest Thought, or largest Capacity; and to furnish the Materials of all that various Knowledge, and more various Phansies and Opinions of all Mankind, if we consider how many Words may be made out of the various composition of 24 Letters; or if going one step farther, we will but reflect on the variety of combinations may be made, with barely one of these Ideas, viz. Number, whose stock is inexhaustible, and truly infinite. And what a large and immense field, doth Excursion alone afford the Mathematicians?
(II.vii.10, p. 54)",2014-07-28 15:18:49 UTC,"""Nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for the capacious Mind of Man to expatiate in, which takes its flight farther than the Stars, and cannot be confined by the limits of the World; that extends its thoughts often even beyond the utmost expansion of Matter, and makes excursions into that incomprehensible Inane.""",2014-07-28 15:18:49 UTC,"","",,"","",Searching in EEBO-TCP,24316,3866
"§. 30. Thirdly, Where we have adequate Ideas, and where there is a certain and discoverable connexion between them, yet we are often ignorant, for want of tracing those Ideas we have, or may have, and finding out those intermediate Ideas, which may shew us what habitude of agreement or disagreement they have one with another. And thus many are ignorant of mathematical Truths, not out of any imperfection of their Faculties, or uncertainty in the Things themselves; but for want of application in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing those Ideas. That which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our Ideas, and finding out their Relations, and Agreements or Disagreements one with another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of Words. It is impossible that Men should ever truly seek, or certainly discover the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas themselves, whilst their Thoughts flutter about, or stick only in Sounds of doubtful and uncertain significations Mathematicians abstracting their Thoughts from Names, and accustoming themselves to set before their Minds the Ideas themselves, that they would consider, and not Sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity, puddering, and confusion, which has so much hindred Mens progress in other parts of Knowledge; who sticking in Words of undetermined and uncertain signification, were unable to distinguish True from False, Certain from Probable, Consistent from Inconsistent, in their own Opinions: Whereby the increase brought into the Stock of real Knowledge has been very little, in proportion to the Schools, Disputes, and Writings, the World has been fill'd with; whilst Men, being lost in the great Wood of Words, knew not whereabout they were, how far their Discoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in their own, or the general Stock of Knowledge. Had Men, in their discoveries of the material, done, as they have in those of the intellectual World, involved all in the obscurity of uncertain and doubtful terms and ways of talking, Volumes writ of Navigation and Voyages, Theories and Stories of Zones and Tydes multiplied and disputed; nay, Ships built, and Fleets set out, would never have taught us the way beyond the Line; and the Antipodes would be still as much unknown, as when it was declared Heresie to hold there were any. But having spoken sufficiently of Words, and the ill or careless use, that is commonly made of them, I shall not say any thing more of it here.
(IV.iii.30, pp. 280-281)",2014-07-28 15:25:46 UTC,"""It is impossible that Men should ever truly seek, or certainly discover the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas themselves, whilst their Thoughts flutter about, or stick only in Sounds of doubtful and uncertain significations Mathematicians abstracting their Thoughts from Names, and accustoming themselves to set before their Minds the Ideas themselves, that they would consider, and not Sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity, puddering, and confusion, which has so much hindred Mens progress in other parts of Knowledge; who sticking in Words of undetermined and uncertain signification, were unable to distinguish True from False, Certain from Probable, Consistent from Inconsistent, in their own Opinions.""",2014-07-28 15:25:46 UTC,"","",,Sounds like our belimed birds? CROSS-REFERENCE Hobbes. USE IN ENTRY?,"",Searching in EEBO-TCP,24319,3866
"When the Mind turns its view inwards upon its self, and contemplates its own Actions, Thinking is the first that occurrs; wherein it observes a great variety of Modifications, and thereof frames to it self distinct Ideas. Thus the Perception, or Thought, which actually accompany, and is annexed to any impression on the Body, made by an external Object, it frames a distinct Idea of, which we call Sensation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any Idea into the Understanding by the Senses. The same Idea, when it again recurrs without the operation of the like Object on the eternal Sensory, is Remembrance. If it be sought after by the Mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, 'tis Recollection: If it be held there long under attentive Consideration, 'tis Contemplation. When Ideas float in our Mind, without any reflection or regard of the Understanding, it is that which the French call Resvery; our Language has scarce a name for it. When the Ideas that offer themselves, (for as I have observed in another place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a train of Ideas succeeding one another in our Minds,) are taken notice of, and, as it were, registred in the Memory, it is Attention. When the Mind with great earnestness, and of a choice, fixes its view on any Idea, considers it on all sides, and will not be called off by the ordinary sollicitation of other Ideas, it is that we call Intention, or Study. Sleep, without dreaming, is rest from all these; and Dreaming it self, is the perception of Ideas (whilst the outward Senses are stopp'd, so that they receive not outward Objects with their usual quickness,) in the Mind, not suggested by any external Objects, or known occasion; nor under any Choice or Conduct of the Understanding at all; and whether that which we call Extasie, be not dreaming with the Eyes open, I leave to be examined.
(II.xix.1)",2018-06-18 14:50:31 UTC,"""When the Ideas that offer themselves, (for as I have observed in another place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a train of Ideas succeeding one another in our Minds,) are taken notice of, and, as it were, registred in the Memory, it is Attention.""",2018-06-18 14:50:31 UTC,II.xix.1,"",,"","",Reading,25217,3866