work_id,theme,provenance,created_at,text,reviewed_on,id,comments,metaphor,dictionary,updated_at,context
7856,"",Reading,2014-03-14 20:04:00 UTC,"To measure rightly our intellectual strength, and to apply it properly, in order neither to impose, nor be imposed upon, is our point of view. I shall not, therefore, say any thing further about the nature of mind in general, that secret spring of thought, unknown and unknowable, but shall content myself to observe, in Mr. Locke's method and with his assistance, something about the phænomena of the human mind, by which we may judge surely of the nature, extent, and reality of human knowledge. I say, we may judge surely of them; because our ideas are the foundations, or the materials, call them which you please, of all our knowledge; because without entering into an enquiry concerning the origin of them, we may know so certainly as to exclude all doubt, what ideas we have; and because, when we know this, we know with the same certainty what kinds, and degrees of knowledge we have, and are capable of having.
(Essay I, §2; vol. iii, pp. 361-2)",,23704,"","""I shall not, therefore, say any thing further about the nature of mind in general, that secret spring of thought, unknown and unknowable, but shall content myself to observe, in Mr. Locke's method and with his assistance, something about the phænomena of the human mind, by which we may judge surely of the nature, extent, and reality of human knowledge.""","",2014-03-14 20:04:00 UTC,""
7856,"",Reading,2014-03-14 20:07:09 UTC,"But however this may be, concerning which it becomes men little to be as dogmatical as they are on one side of this question at least, and whatever strength and vigor, independent on the body, may be ascribed to the soul, the soul exerts none till it is roused into activity by sense. A jog, a knock, a thrust from without is not knowledge*, No. But, if we did not perceive these jogs, knocks, and thrusts from without, we should remain just as we came into the world, void even of the first elements of knowledge. Not, only the inward, active powers of the mind would be unemployed, but we may say, that they would be non-existent. The human soul is so far from being furnished with forms and ideas to perceive all things by, or from being impregnated, I would rather say than printed over, with the seeds of universal knowledge, that we have no ideas till we receive passively the ideas of sensible qualities from without. Then indeed the activity of the soul, or mind commences, and another source of original ideas is opened: for then we acquire ideas from, and by the operations of our minds. Sensation would be of little use to form the understanding, if we had no other faculty than mere passive perception; but without sensation these other faculties would have nothing to operate upon, reflection would have by consequence nothing to reflect upon, and it is by reflection that we multiply our stock of ideas, and fill that magazine, which is to furnish all the materials of future knowledge. In this manner, and in no other we may say, that ""all our ideas arise from our senses, and that there is nothing in the mind which was not previously in sense."" But these propositions should not be advanced, perhaps, as generally as they are sometimes by logicians, lest they should lead into error, as maxims are apt to do very often. Sensation is the greater, reflection the smaller source of ideas. But these latter are as clear, and distinct, and convey knowledge that may be said to be more real than the former. Sense gave occasion to them, but they never were in sense properly speaking. They are, if I may say so, of the mind's own growth, the elements of knowledge, more immediate, less relative, and less dependent than sensitive knowledge, as any man will be apt to think, who compares his ideas of remembering, recollecting, bare thought, and intenseness of thought, with those of warm and hot, of cool and cold. Des Cartes might have said, ""I see, I hear, I feel, I taste, I smell; therefore I am."" But surely he might say too, ""I think, I reflect, I will; therefore I am."" Let us observe, however, that it belongs only to a great philosopher to frame an argument to prove to himself that he exists, which is an object of intuitive knowledge, and concerning which it is impossible he should have any doubt. In the mouth of any other person, ""I think, therefore I am,"" would be very near akin to I am, therefore I am*.
(Essay I, §2; vol. iii, pp. 364-5)",,23707,"","""Sensation would be of little use to form the understanding, if we had no other faculty than mere passive perception; but without sensation these other faculties would have nothing to operate upon, reflection would have by consequence nothing to reflect upon, and it is by reflection that we multiply our stock of ideas, and fill that magazine, which is to furnish all the materials of future knowledge.""","",2014-03-14 20:07:09 UTC,""
7856,"",Reading,2014-03-14 20:10:46 UTC,"Thus it will appear when we contemplate our understanding in the first steps towards knowledge, that corporeal, animal sense, which some philosophers hold in great contempt, and which does not deserve much esteem, communicates to us our first ideas, sets the mind first to work, and becomes, in conjunction with internal sense, by which we perceive what passes within, as by the other what passes without us, the foundation of all our knowledge. This is so evidently true, that even those ideas* about which our reason is employed in the most abstract meditations, may be traced back to this original by a very easy analyse. Since these simple ideas therefore are the foundations of human knowledge, this knowledge can neither be extended wider, nor elevated higher than in a certain proportion to them. If we consider these ideas like foundations, they are extremely narrow, and shallow, neither reaching to many things, nor laid deep in the nature of any. If we consider them like materials, for so they may be considered likewise, employed to raise the fabric of our intellectual system, they will appear like mud, and straw, and lath, materials fit to erect some frail, and homely cottage, but not of substance, nor value sufficient for the construction of those enormous piles, from whose lofty towers philosophers would persuade us that they discover all nature subject to their inspection, that they pry into the source of all being, and into the inmost recesses of all wisdom. But it fares with them, as it did with the builders in the plains of Senaar, they fall into a confusion of languages, and neither understand one another, nor are understood by the rest of mankind.
(Essay I, §2; vol. iii, pp. 365-6)",,23710,"","""If we consider them like materials, for so they may be considered likewise, employed to raise the fabric of our intellectual system, they will appear like mud, and straw, and lath, materials fit to erect some frail, and homely cottage, but not of substance, nor value sufficient for the construction of those enormous piles, from whose lofty towers philosophers would persuade us that they discover all nature subject to their inspection, that they pry into the source of all being, and into the inmost recesses of all wisdom.""",Rooms,2014-03-14 20:10:46 UTC,""
7856,"",Reading,2014-03-14 20:11:37 UTC,"Having taken this view of our first, and simple ideas, it is necessary, in order to make a true estimate of human knowledge, that we take such a view likewise of those faculties by the exercise of which our minds proceed in acquiring knowledge. I have mentioned perception; and retention or memory ought to follow: for as we should have no ideas without perception, so we would lose them, as fast as we get them, without retention. When it was objected to Des Cartes that, if thought was the essence of the soul, the soul of the child must think in the mother's womb; and when he was asked, how then it came to pass that we remember none of those thoughts? He maintained, according to his usual method, one hypothesis by another, and assumed that memory consists in certain traces made on the brain by the thoughts that pass through it, and that as long as they last we remember, but that the brain of the child in the womb being too moist, and too soft to preserve these traces, it is impossible he would remember out of the womb what he thought in it. Thus memory seems to be made purely corporeal by the same philosopher, who makes it on some occasions purely intellectual. He might distinguish two memories by the same hypothetical power, by which he distinguished two substances, that he might employ one or the other as his system required. If you consult other philosophers on the same subject, you will receive no more satisfaction: and the only reasonable method we can take, is to be content to know intuitively, and by inward observation, not the cause, but the effects of memory, and the use of it in the intellectual system.
(Essay I, §2; vol. iii, pp. 366-7)",,23711,"","""He maintained, according to his usual method, one hypothesis by another, and assumed that memory consists in certain traces made on the brain by the thoughts that pass through it, and that as long as they last we remember, but that the brain of the child in the womb being too moist, and too soft to preserve these traces, it is impossible he would remember out of the womb what he thought in it.""","",2014-03-14 20:11:37 UTC,""
7856,"",Reading,2014-03-14 20:14:05 UTC,"By this faculty then, whatever it be, our simple ideas, which have been spoken of already, are preserved with greater, and our complex ideas, which remain to be spoken of, with less facility. Both one and the other require to be frequently raised in the mind, and frequently recalled to it. I say, with the rest of the world, to be raised, and to be recalled; but surely these words come very short of expressing the wonderful phænomena of memory, the images that are lodged in it present themselves often to the mind without any fresh sensation, and so spontaneously, that the mind seems as passive in these secondary perceptions, as it was in receiving the first impressions. Our simple ideas, and even our complex ideas, and notions return sometimes of themselves, we know not why, nor how, mechanically, as it were, uncalled by the mind, and often to the disturbance of it in the pursuit of other ideas, to which these intruders are foreign. On the other hand, we are able, at our will and with design, to put a sort of force on memory, to seize, as it were, the end of some particular line, and to draw back into the mind, a whole set of ideas that seem to be strung to it, or linked one with the other. In general; when images, essences, ideas, notions, that existed in my mind, are gone out of it, and have no longer any existence there, the mind is often able to will them into existence again, by an act of which we are conscious, but of which we know nothing more, than that the mind performs it. These phænomena are more surprizing, and less to be accounted for than the action of external objects on the organs of sense in the first production of ideas, which is an observation that deserves the notice of those philosophers who deny such action because they cannot comprehend it.
(Essay I, §2; vol. iii, pp. 367-8).",,23713,"","""On the other hand, we are able, at our will and with design, to put a sort of force on memory, to seize, as it were, the end of some particular line, and to draw back into the mind, a whole set of ideas that seem to be strung to it, or linked one with the other.""","",2014-03-14 20:14:05 UTC,""
7856,"",Reading,2014-03-14 20:16:36 UTC,"The faculties, necessary for my purpose to be mentioned next, are those of compounding simple into complex ideas, and of comparing our ideas, which implies the just and nice discernment of them, in order to perceive the innumerable relations which they bear to one another. These are some of the steps by which the mind attempts to rise from particular to general knowledge. They have been called arts of the mind, but improperly, in some respects; for though the mind is forced to employ several arts, and to call in sense to the aid of intellect, even after it has full possession of its ideas, to help out its imperfect manner of knowing, and to lengthen a little its short tether; yet the composition, and comparison of ideas is plainly a lesson of nature: this lesson is taught us by the very first sensations we have. As the mind does not act till it is rouzed into action by external objects; so when it does act, it acts conformably to the suggestions it receives from these impressions, and takes with its first ideas the hints how to multiply, and improve them. If nature makes us lame, she gives crutches to lean upon. She helps us to walk where we cannot run, and to hobble where we cannot walk. She takes us by the hand, and leads us by experience to art.
(Essay I, §2; vol. iii, pp. 369-70)",,23717,"","""They have been called arts of the mind, but improperly, in some respects; for though the mind is forced to employ several arts, and to call in sense to the aid of intellect, even after it has full possession of its ideas, to help out its imperfect manner of knowing, and to lengthen a little its short tether; yet the composition, and comparison of ideas is plainly a lesson of nature: this lesson is taught us by the very first sensations we have.""","",2014-03-14 20:16:36 UTC,""
7856,"",Reading,2014-03-14 20:18:03 UTC,"But to proceed, or rather to return; I understand by mode, in this place something else, something that carries our knowledge further than the complex ideas of substances. I understand in short what Mr. Locke understands by simple and mixed modes. The various combinations that our minds make of the same simple ideas, and the various compositions that they make of simple ideas of different kinds. These ideas added to those of substances, and the whole stock compleated by such as the mind acquires of the relations of its ideas, in comparing them as far as it is able to compare them, make up the entire system of human knowledge: and in the process of it from first to last, we are assisted directly or indirectly by the lessons of nature that have been, or that are to be mentioned.
(Essay I, §2; vol. iii, pp. 371-2)",,23719,"","""These ideas added to those of substances, and the whole stock compleated by such as the mind acquires of the relations of its ideas, in comparing them as far as it is able to compare them, make up the entire system of human knowledge.""","",2014-03-14 20:18:03 UTC,""
7856,"",Reading,2014-03-14 20:29:14 UTC,"Our complex ideas being assemblages of simple ideas, that have often no other connection except that which the mind gives them, we might be easily led to conceive the difficulty of this task by a base reflection on the weakness of memory, and if I may say so, on the seeming caprice of this faculty, before we were made sensible of it by repeated experiences. The ideas that are lodged there begin to fade almost as soon as they are framed. They are continually slipping from us, or shifting their forms; and if the objects that excited some did not often renew them, and if we had not a power to recall others before they are gone too far out of the mind, we should lose our simple, and much more our complex ideas, and all our notions would become confused and obscure. The mind would be little more than a channel through which ideas and notions glided from entity into nonentity. But our case is not so bad. They are often renewed, and we can recall them as often as we please. There is, however, a difference between the renewing of them, and the recalling of them. When ideas are renewed by the same objects that excited them first in the mind, they are renewed such as they were [...]
(Essay I, §4; vol. iii, p. 418)",,23725,"","""The mind would be little more than a channel through which ideas and notions glided from entity into nonentity.""","",2014-03-14 20:29:14 UTC,""
7856,"",Reading,2014-03-14 20:30:20 UTC,"Just so any operation or affection of the mind, which has been long unperceived, will appear the same it used to appear to our inward sense, when it is perceived a-new by reflection. But when we are forced to recall our complex ideas, the case is not the same, at least when they are such as are not in common use. Those of mixed modes and relations, for instance, that philosophers sometimes employ, and to which the mind scarce ever adverts on other occasions, may well receive some alteration even when they are recalled readily, though this alteration is the less perceptible, perhaps, on account of that very readiness with which they are recalled. But when they are recalled with difficulty, and dragged back slowly, as it were, and by pieces and parcels into the mind, it is no wonder if they receive much greater alteration. They are then in some sort recompounded, and though this may be for the better as well as for the worse, yet still they vary, and every variation of them begets some uncertainty and confusion in our reasoning. Thus it must be, when besides our simple ideas, such numberless collections of simple and complex ideas, and such numberless combinations of all these into notions, are to be held together and to be preserved in their order by so weak a mental faculty as that of retention.
(Essay I, §4; vol. iii, p. 419)",,23726,"","""But when they are recalled with difficulty, and dragged back slowly, as it were, and by pieces and parcels into the mind, it is no wonder if they receive much greater alteration.""","",2014-03-14 20:30:20 UTC,""
7856,"",Reading,2014-03-14 20:31:23 UTC,"Names indeed are given to signify all our ideas and all our notions to ourselves and to others, and to help the memory in meditation as well as in discourse. When they are assigned to complex ideas, they are meant as knots according to the very proper image Mr. Locke gives of them, to tie each specific bundle of ideas together: and in these respects they are not only useful, but necessary. It happens, however, that names, far from having these effects, have such very often as are quite contrary to these. Whilst we retain the names of complex ideas and notions, we imagine that we retain the ideas and notions; but the ideas and notions shift and vary, whilst the names remain the same. The scene of the mind, like a moving picture, must be governed with attention, that it may bring into our view the images we want, and as we want them. Otherwise ideas that are foreign to our actual train of thinking will frequently rush into our thoughts, and become objects of them whether we will or no. But there is another and a greater mischief which will flow from this constitution of the mind, unless the utmost attention be employed, and often when it is. The former is a sort of violence, which cannot be offered unperceived, and may be therefore resisted. This that I am going to mention steals so silently upon us, that we do not perceive it very often even when it has worked its effect. When we recall our ideas and notions, whether this be done with ease or difficulty, we review them in some sort: and if they are more liable to have been altered, we have a better chance for perceiving any alteration that may have been made in the determination of them. But when the ideas and notions we want present themselves, as it were of themselves, to the mind, under their usual names and appearances, we are apt to employ them without examination, and perhaps we advert very often to nothing more than the word by which we are used to signify them. In this manner our ideas and notions become unsteady imperceptibly, and I would not answer that something may not happen to me of this kind, even in writing this essay, though I am on my guard against it. How much more must it happen to those who are not thus on their guard?
(Essay I, §4; vol. iii, pp. 419-20)",,23727,"","""When they are assigned to complex ideas, they are meant as knots according to the very proper image Mr. Locke gives of them, to tie each specific bundle of ideas together: and in these respects they are not only useful, but necessary.""","",2014-03-14 20:31:23 UTC,""