work_id,theme,provenance,created_at,text,reviewed_on,id,comments,metaphor,dictionary,updated_at,context
3187,"","Reading Paul S. MacDonald. History of the Concept of Mind: Speculations About Soul, Mind and Spirit from Homer to Hume. Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2003. p. 327.",2003-10-10 00:00:00 UTC,"""Epicurus had likened the soul to its body as a scent to a flower.""
(p. 327)",2007-05-14,8406,"""The analogy of a scent to a flower with a soul-breath to an animal body was also a common Greek figure speech"" (MacDonald p. 83).",The soul is to the body as a scent is to the flower.,"",2009-09-14 19:33:33 UTC,""
3414,"",Reading,2004-01-14 00:00:00 UTC,"What then does Chrysippus teach us? The reply is, to know that these things are not false, from which happiness comes and tranquillity arises. Take my books, and you will learn how true and conformable to nature are the things which make me free from perturbations. O great good fortune! O the great benefactor who points out the way! To Triptolemus all men have erected temples and altars, because he gave us food by cultivation; but to him who discovered truth and brought it to light and communicated it to all, not the truth which shows us how to live, but how to live well, who of you for this reason has built an altar, or a temple, or has dedicated a statue, or who worships God for this? Because the gods have given the vine, or wheat, we sacrifice to them: but because they have produced in the human mind that fruit by which they designed to show us the truth which relates to happiness, shall we not thank God for this?
(I.4)",2011-06-06,8706,Updated from MIT e-text to Perseus. Corrected second O (appeared as 0 in original text at Perseus).,"""Because the gods have given the vine, or wheat, we sacrifice to them: but because they have produced in the human mind that fruit by which they designed to show us the truth which relates to happiness, shall we not thank God for this?""","",2011-06-06 19:40:23 UTC,"Book I, Chapter iv"
3414,"",Reading,2004-01-14 00:00:00 UTC,"When the man, who was consulting him, said, ""I seek to know this -- how, even if my brother is not reconciled to me, shall I maintain myself in a state conformable to nature?"" Nothing great, said Epictetus, is produced suddenly, since not even the grape or the fig is. If you say to me now that you want a fig, I will answer to you that it requires time: let it flower first, then put forth fruit, and then ripen. Is, then, the fruit of a fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in one hour, and would you possess the fruit of a man's mind in so short a time and so easily? Do not expect it, even if I tell you.
(I.xv)",2009-12-12,8708,"","""Is, then, the fruit of a fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in one hour, and would you possess the fruit of a man's mind in so short a time and so easily?""","",2011-06-06 19:21:29 UTC,"Book I, Chapter xv"
3436,Blank Slate,Browsing in EEBO. Checking an earlier translation of Guazzo.,2006-10-18 00:00:00 UTC,"To this Christian admonition agreeth that which the diuine Philosopher Plato saith, where he [...] against fathers, which shew them solues ignorant what theyr ought to do, trotting vp & downe this way and that way, casting all their care to heape vp much wealth, & taking so litle care for the children who must possesse it, that they exercise them neither in the vertue of iustice, nor of liberalitie, wherby they may be able to distribute, [...]se, & bestow their goods as they ought to doe. Which doing, it may be sayde, that they prouide for thinges superfluous, and neglecte thinges necessarie. Whiche the Persians knewe well, who though they were ignoraunt of the true worship of God, yet they [end page 27] were carefull aboue al things to haue their children instructed in iustice and vertue. I would then haue parentes take care both for the minde, and the body of their children: But for that the minde is more excellent, it is reason to cast our chiefest care vpon it. And for that the minde in infantes is like a payre of tables, wherein nothing is written, and like & tender twig which may be bowed euery way, it is cleare, that vertue or vice may easily be planted in it. And for that it is knowen by proofe, that those things are kept best in memorie which are learned in youth, fathers ought to instruct their children in the best thinges, that is, in the feare and loue of God: Holding it for a generall rule, that he whiche knoweth euery thing, and knoweth not God, knoweth nothing.",,8747,•I've included twice: Table and Twig,"""And for that the minde in infantes is like a payre of tables, wherein nothing is written, and like & tender twig which may be bowed euery way, it is cleare, that vertue or vice may easily be planted in it.""",Writing,2009-09-14 19:33:45 UTC,Book III
3476,"",Reading,2003-10-23 00:00:00 UTC,"But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on ought to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the same method wherein it was invented: and so is it possible of knowledge induced. But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge, no man knoweth how he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained. But yet, nevertheless, secundum majus et minus, a man may revisit and descend unto the foundations of his knowledge and consent; and so transplant it into another, as it grew in his own mind. For it is in knowledges as it is in plants: if you mean to use the plant, it is no matter for the roots — but if you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips: so the delivery of knowledges (as it is now used) is as of fair bodies of trees without the roots; good for the carpenter, but not for the planter. But if you will have sciences grow, it is less matter for the shaft or body of the tree, so you look well to the taking up of the roots. Of which kind of delivery the method of the mathematics, in that subject, hath some shadow: but generally I see it neither put in use nor put in inquisition, and therefore note it for deficient.
(II.xvii.4, p. 304 in Modern Library edition)
",2012-05-11,8931,"•This metaphor was in here twice. Deleted duplicate (number 8390) on 5/11/2012
•The extended metaphor includes a discussion of roots and ""Slippes"". I've included the following entry.
• Replaced text with that from Adelaide:
But knowledge, that is deliuered as a threade to bee spunne on, ought to bee deliuered and intimated, if it were possible, In the same Methode wherein it was invented; and so is it possible of knowledge induced. But in this same anticipated and preuented knowledge; no man knoweth howe hee came to the knowledge which hee hath obtayned. But yet neuerthelesse Secundum maius & minus, a man may reuisite, and descend unto the foundations of his Knowledge and Consent: and so transplant it into another, as it grewe in his owne Minde. For it is in Knowledges, as it is in Plantes; if you meane to vse the Plant, then it is no matter for the Rootes: But if you meane to remooue it to growe, then it is more assured to rest vppon rootes, than Slippes: So the deliuerie of Knowledges (as it is nowe vsed) is as of faire bodies of Trees without the Rootes: good for the Carpenter, but not for the Planter: But if you will haue Sciences growe; it is lesse matter for the shafte, or bodie of the Tree, so you looke well to the takinge vp of the Rootes. Of which kinde of deliuerie the Methode of the Mathematiques, in that Subiect, hath some shadowe; but generally I see it neither put in vre, nor put in Inquisition: and therefore note it for deficient.
(Book II, p. 123)","""But yet, nevertheless, secundum majus et minus, a man may revisit and descend unto the foundations of his knowledge and consent; and so transplant it into another, as it grew in his own mind.""","",2012-05-11 15:08:09 UTC,Book II
3476,"",Reading,2003-10-23 00:00:00 UTC,"But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on ought to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the same method wherein it was invented: and so is it possible of knowledge induced. But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge, no man knoweth how he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained. But yet, nevertheless, secundum majus et minus, a man may revisit and descend unto the foundations of his knowledge and consent; and so transplant it into another, as it grew in his own mind. For it is in knowledges as it is in plants: if you mean to use the plant, it is no matter for the roots--but if you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips: so the delivery of knowledges (as it is now used) is as of fair bodies of trees without the roots; good for the carpenter, but not for the planter. But if you will have sciences grow, it is less matter for the shaft or body of the tree, so you look well to the taking up of the roots. Of which kind of delivery the method of the mathematics, in that subject, hath some shadow: but generally I see it neither put in use nor put in inquisition, and therefore note it for deficient.
(II.xvii.4, p. 304 in Modern Library edition)",2010-10-09,8932,•This metaphor is an extension of the previous,"""For it is in knowledges as it is in plants: if you mean to use the plant, it is no matter for the roots--but if you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips: so the delivery of knowledges (as it is now used) is as of fair bodies of trees without the roots; good for the carpenter, but not for the planter.""","",2012-05-11 15:05:41 UTC,Book II
6415,"",Reading,2003-06-20 00:00:00 UTC,"I will explain, he said. Every seeker after wisdom knows that up to the time when philosophy takes it over his soul is a helpless prisoner, chained hand and foot in the body, compelled to view reality not directly but only through its prison bars, and wallowing in utter ignorance. And philosophy can see that the imprisonment is ingeniously effected by the prisoner's own active desire, which makes him first accessory to his own confinement. Well, philosophy takes over the soul in this condition and by gentle persuasion tries to set it free. She points out that observation by means of the eyes and ears and all the other senses is entirely deceptive, and she urges the soul to refrain from using them unless it is necessary to do so, and encourages it to collect and concetrate itself by itself, trusting nothing but its own independent upon objects considered in themselves, and attributing no truth to anything which it view indirectly as being subject to variation, because such objects are sensible and visible but what the soul itself sees is intelligible and invisible. Now the soul of the true philosopher feels that it must not reject this opportunity for release, and so it abstains as far as possible from pleasures and desires and griefs, because it reflects that the result of giving way to pleasure or fear or desire is not as might be supposed the trivial misfortune of becoming ill or wasting money through self-indulgence, but the last and worst calamity of all, which the sufferer does not recognize.
What is that, Socrates? asked Cebes.
When anyone's soul feels a keen pleasure or pain it cannot help supposing that whatever causes the most violent emotion is the plainest and the truest reality, which it is not. It is chiefly visible things that have this effect, isn't it?
Quite so.
Is it not on this sort of occasion that soul passes most completely into the bondage of the body?
How do you make that out?
Because every pleasure or pain has a sort of rivet with which it fastens the soul to the body and pins it down and makes it corporeal, accepting as true whatever the body certifies. The result of agreeing with the body and finding pleasure in the same things is, I imagine, that it cannot help becoming like it in character and training, so that it can never get entirely away to the unseen world, but it is always saturated with the body when it sets out, and so soon falls back again into another body, where it takes root and grows. Consequently it is excluded from all fellowship with the pure and uniform and divine.
(82d-83e, p. 66)",2009-03-20,16929,•See two previous entries.,"""The result of agreeing with the body and finding pleasure in the same things is, I imagine, that [the soul] cannot help becoming like it in character and training, so that it can never get entirely away to the unseen world, but it is always saturated with the body when it sets out, and so soon falls back again into another body, where it takes root and grows.""","",2010-10-02 21:07:48 UTC,""
6421,"",Reading,2011-09-16 21:11:34 UTC,"IX. ""But,"" says our adversary, ""you yourself only practise virtue because you hope to obtain some pleasure from it."" In the first place, even though virtue may afford us pleasure, still we do not seek after her on that account: for she does not bestow this, but bestows this to boot, nor is this the end for which she labours, but her labour wins this also, although it be directed to another end. As in a tilled-field, when ploughed for corn, some flowers are found amongst it, and yet, though these posies may charm the eye, all this labour was not spent in order to produce them--the man who sowed the field had another object in view he gained this over and above it--so pleasure is not [the?] reward or the cause of virtue, but comes in addition to: nor do we choose virtue because she gives us pleasure, but she gives us pleasure also if we choose her. The highest good lies in the act of choosing her, and in the attitude of the noblest minds, which when once it has fulfilled its function and established itself within its own limits has attained to the highest good, and needs nothing more: for there is nothing outside of the whole, any more than there is anything beyond the end. You are mistaken, therefore, when you ask me what it is on account of which I seek after virtue: for you are seeking for something above the highest. Do you ask what I seek from virtue? I answer, Herself: for she has nothing better; she is her own reward. Does this not appear great enough, when I tell you that the highest good is an unyielding strength of mind, wisdom, magnanimity, sound judgment, freedom, harmony, beauty? Do you still ask me for something greater, of which these may be regarded as the attributes? Why do you talk of pleasures to me? I am seeking to find what is good for man, not for his belly; why, cattle and whales have larger ones than he.
(Book VII, Chapter ix, pp. 214-5)",,19184,"","""As in a tilled-field, when ploughed for corn, some flowers are found amongst it, and yet, though these posies may charm the eye, all this labour was not spent in order to produce them--the man who sowed the field had another object in view he gained this over and above it--so pleasure is not [the?] reward or the cause of virtue, but comes in addition to: nor do we choose virtue because she gives us pleasure, but she gives us pleasure also if we choose her.""","",2011-09-16 21:11:34 UTC,""
7195,"",Reading,2012-02-29 19:22:00 UTC,"Soc. Is there not another kind of word or speech far better than this, and having far greater power--a son of the same family, but lawfully begotten?
Phaedr. Whom do you mean, and what is his origin?
Soc. I mean an intelligent word graven in the soul of the learner, which can defend itself, and knows with whom to speak and with whom to be silent.
Phaedr. You mean the living word of knowledge which has a soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than an image?
Soc. Yes, of course that is what I mean. And now may I be allowed to ask you a question?: Would a husbandman, who is a man of sense, take seeds which he values and which he wishes to bear fruit, and in sober seriousness plant them during the heat of summer, in some garden of Adonis, that he may rejoice when he sees them in eight days appearing in beauty? At least he would do so, if at all, only for the sake of amusement and for show. But when he is in earnest he employs his art of husbandry and sows in fitting soil, and is satisfied if in eight months the seeds which he has sown arrive at perfection?
Phaedr. Yes, Socrates, that will be his way when he is in earnest; he might act otherwise for the reasons which you give.
Soc. And can we suppose that he who knows the just and good and honourable has less understanding than the husbandman about his own seeds?
Phaedr. Certainly not.
Soc. Then he will not seriously incline to 'write' his thoughts 'in water' with pen and ink, sowing words which can neither speak for themselves nor teach the truth adequately to others?
Phaedr. No, that is not likely.
Soc. No, that is not likely—in the garden of letters he will sow and plant, but only for the sake of recreation and amusement; he will write them down as memorials to be treasured against the forgetfulness of old age, by himself, or by any other man who is treading the same path. He will rejoice in beholding their tender growth; and while others are refreshing their souls with banqueting and the like, this will be the pastime in which his days are spent.
Phaedr. A pastime, Socrates, as noble as the other is ignoble, the pastime of a man who can be amused by serious talk, and can discourse merrily about justice and the like.
Soc. True, Phaedrus. But nobler far is the serious pursuit of the dialectician, who, finding a congenial soul, by the help of science sows and plants therein words which are able to defend themselves and him who planted them, and are not unfruitful, but have in them a seed which others brought up in different soils render immortal, making the possessors of it happy to the utmost extent of human happiness.
(276a-277a)",,19612,"","""True, Phaedrus. But nobler far is the serious pursuit of the dialectician, who, finding a congenial soul, by the help of science sows and plants therein words which are able to defend themselves and him who planted them, and are not unfruitful, but have in them a seed which others brought up in different soils render immortal, making the possessors of it happy to the utmost extent of human happiness.""","",2012-02-29 19:22:00 UTC,""
7195,"",Reading,2012-02-29 19:25:12 UTC,"Soc. But he who thinks that in the written word, whatever its subject, there is necessarily much which is not serious, and that no discourse worthy of study has ever yet been written in poetry or prose, and that spoken ones are no better if, like the recitations of rhapsodes, they are delivered for the sake of persuasion, and not with any view to criticism or instruction; and who thinks that even the best of writings are but a memorandum for those who know, and that only in principles of justice and goodness and nobility taught and communicated orally for the sake of instruction and graven in the soul, which is the true way of writing, is there clearness and perfection and seriousness, and that such principles should be deemed a man's own and his legitimate offspring;--being, in the first place, the word which he finds in his own bosom; secondly, the brethren and descendants and relations of his idea which have been duly implanted by him in the souls of others;--and who cares for them and no others--this is the right sort of man; and you and I, Phaedrus, would pray that we may become like him.
(278b-278b) ",,19613,"","He ""who thinks that even the best of writings are but a memorandum for those who know, and that only in principles of justice and goodness and nobility taught and communicated orally for the sake of instruction and graven in the soul, which is the true way of writing, is there clearness and perfection and seriousness, and that such principles should be deemed a man's own and his legitimate offspring;--being, in the first place, the word which he finds in his own bosom; secondly, the brethren and descendants and relations of his idea which have been duly implanted by him in the souls of others;--and who cares for them and no others--this is the right sort of man; and you and I, Phaedrus, would pray that we may become like him.""","",2012-02-29 19:25:12 UTC,""