work_id,theme,provenance,created_at,text,reviewed_on,id,comments,metaphor,dictionary,updated_at,context
3986,Interiority; Augustine,"Searching ""interiority"" in OED and ECCO.",2006-05-31 00:00:00 UTC,"15. We may the conclude, that whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive is true, and that as long as we have Light before us, and assent to nothing but what we have a clear view and perception of, 'tis impossible we should err, or judge amiss. And consequently that we may then judge securely, and safely acquiesce and repose our selves in such Judgments, as true and certain, and as it were the undeceiving answers of Truth it self, even that interior Truth, whose School and Oracle is within our Breast, whose Instructions are faithful and unerring, and who seldom fails to answer us by them if we consult her aright. And indeed after all, we have no other reason to think any Proposition true in any of the Sciences, but only becuase we clearly perceive that it is so, and it shines out upon our Minds with and unquestionable and irresistable Light, and if that Reason be not a good one, then we are not sure of our knowing any Thing, but must quit all pretences to Science, and after the [End Page 170] Efforts of Contemplation sink down into a sceptical uncertainty. But if this Supposition be too absurd to be granted (as all Philosophy and Religion too is concern'd to maintain) then we must say, that whatever we clearly percieve is undoubtedly so as we perceive it. Evidence then is the Mark and distinguishing Character of Truth, she dwells in Light, and we may know her Divinity among a thousand probable Appearances, by the Glory that surrounds her.",,10352,"","""We may the conclude, that whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive is true, and that as long as we have Light before us, and assent to nothing but what we have a clear view and perception of, 'tis impossible we should err, or judge amiss""","",2009-09-14 19:34:55 UTC,Vol 2 of 2. Part II. ... Section VI
3986,Interiority; Augustine,"Searching ""interiority"" in OED and ECCO.",2006-05-31 00:00:00 UTC,"15. We may the conclude, that whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive is true, and that as long as we have Light before us, and assent to nothing but what we have a clear view and perception of, 'tis impossible we should err, or judge amiss. And consequently that we may then judge securely, and safely acquiesce and repose our selves in such Judgments, as true and certain, and as it were the undeceiving answers of Truth it self, even that interior Truth, whose School and Oracle is within our Breast, whose Instructions are faithful and unerring, and who seldom fails to answer us by them if we consult her aright. And indeed after all, we have no other reason to think any Proposition true in any of the Sciences, but only becuase we clearly perceive that it is so, and it shines out upon our Minds with and unquestionable and irresistable Light, and if that Reason be not a good one, then we are not sure of our knowing any Thing, but must quit all pretences to Science, and after the [End Page 170] Efforts of Contemplation sink down into a sceptical uncertainty. But if this Supposition be too absurd to be granted (as all Philosophy and Religion too is concern'd to maintain) then we must say, that whatever we clearly percieve is undoubtedly so as we perceive it. Evidence then is the Mark and distinguishing Character of Truth, she dwells in Light, and we may know her Divinity among a thousand probable Appearances, by the Glory that surrounds her.",,10353,•I've included twice: School and Oracle,"And consequently that we may then judge securely, and safely acquiesce and repose our selves in such Judgments, as true and certain, and as it were the undeceiving answers of Truth it self, even that interior Truth, whose School and Oracle is within our Breast, whose Instructions are faithful and unerring, and who seldom fails to answer us by them if we consult her aright.""","",2014-10-13 16:52:50 UTC,Vol 2 of 2. Part II. ... Section VI
3986,Interiority; Augustine,"Searching ""interiority"" in OED and ECCO.",2006-05-31 00:00:00 UTC,"15. We may the conclude, that whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive is true, and that as long as we have Light before us, and assent to nothing but what we have a clear view and perception of, 'tis impossible we should err, or judge amiss. And consequently that we may then judge securely, and safely acquiesce and repose our selves in such Judgments, as true and certain, and as it were the undeceiving answers of Truth it self, even that interior Truth, whose School and Oracle is within our Breast, whose Instructions are faithful and unerring, and who seldom fails to answer us by them if we consult her aright. And indeed after all, we have no other reason to think any Proposition true in any of the Sciences, but only because we clearly perceive that it is so, and it shines out upon our Minds with and unquestionable and irresistable Light, and if that Reason be not a good one, then we are not sure of our knowing any Thing, but must quit all pretences to Science, and after the [End Page 170] Efforts of Contemplation sink down into a sceptical uncertainty. But if this Supposition be too absurd to be granted (as all Philosophy and Religion too is concern'd to maintain) then we must say, that whatever we clearly perceive is undoubtedly so as we perceive it. Evidence then is the Mark and distinguishing Character of Truth, she dwells in Light, and we may know her Divinity among a thousand probable Appearances, by the Glory that surrounds her.",,10355,"","""And indeed after all, we have no other reason to think any Proposition true in any of the Sciences, but only because we clearly perceive that it is so, and it shines out upon our Minds with and unquestionable and irresistable Light.""","",2009-09-14 19:34:55 UTC,Vol 2 of 2. Part II. ... Section VI
3986,Interiority; Augustine,"Searching ""interiority"" in OED and ECCO.",2006-05-31 00:00:00 UTC,"... By the Manner of Study here as a distinct Head of Division from the rest, I understand those Means and Ways which are to be used in this Application: Which in general are these two, Reading (under which I comprehend also Conversation with the Learned, there being a reading of Men as well as Books) and Thinking, or private Meditation; But chiefly the latter of these: For since, according to the Principles of this Theory, Ideas and Ideal Truths (the true objects of our Study) are within our selves, by reason of that Union which we naturally have with the Divine Word or Wisdom, the universal Reason of all Spirits; it follows that the most direct and natural Way for the discovery of Truth, is, instead of going abroad for Intelligence, to retire into our selves, and there with humble and silent Attention, both to consult and receive the Answers of interior Truth, even that Divine Master which teaches in the School of the Breast. According to that Admonition of St. Austin, who advises that we should not go abroad, but rather enter into our [End Page 572] selves, and that for this very reason, because Truth has her Habitant in the inner Man. Nolie foras ire, in te ipsum redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas. ",,10356,I've included twice: Master and School,"""[I]t follows that the most direct and natural Way for the discovery of Truth, is, instead of going abroad for Intelligence, to retire into our selves, and there with humble and silent Attention, both to consult and receive the Answers of interior Truth, even that Divine Master which teaches in the School of the Breast""","",2009-09-14 19:34:55 UTC,Vol 2 of 2. Part II
4475,Self-Mastery,"Reading Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 165.",2005-07-07 00:00:00 UTC,"Having hitherto shewed that Sense or Passion from Corporeal Things existent without the Soul, is not Intellection or Knowledge, so that Bodies themselves are not known or understood by Sense; It must needs follow from hence, that Knowledge is an Inward and Active Energy of the Mind it self, and the displaying of its own Innate Vigour from within, whereby it doth Conquer, a Master and Command its Objects, and so begets a Clear, Serene, Victorious, and Satisfactory Sense within it self.
(IV.i, p. 126)",2012-01-18,11773,"Taylor quotes from Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality . London, 1731. Book IV, chap. 1, p. 126.","""It must needs follow from hence, that Knowledge is an Inward and Active Energy of the Mind it self, and the displaying of its own Innate Vigour from within, whereby it doth Conquer, Master and Command its Objects, and so begets a Clear, Serene, Victorious, and Satisfactory Sense within it self.""","",2012-01-18 21:54:54 UTC,"Book IV, Chapter i"
4475,Blank Slate; Negated Metaphor,"Reading Taylor's Sources of the Self (165); Found again searching in Past Masters; found again searching ""tabula rasa"" in ECCO; found again searching in Google Books. Cited in John Ellis's Knowledge of Divine Things from Revelation (London: 1747), 102.",2005-07-07 00:00:00 UTC,"4. But I have not taken all this Pains only to Confute Scepticism or Phantasticism, or meerly to defend and corroborate our Argument for the Immutable Natures of Just and Unjust; but also for some other Weighty Purposes that are very much conducing to the Business that we have in hand. And first of all, that the Soul is not a meer Rasa Tabula, a Naked and Passive Thing, which has no innate Furniture or Activity of its own, nor any thing at all in it, but what was impressed upon it without; for if it were so, then there could not possibly be any such Thing as Moral Good and Evil, Just and Unjust; Forasmuch as these Differences do not arise meerly from the outward Objects, or from the Impresses which they make upon us by Sense, there being no such Thing in them; in which Sense it is truly affirmed by the Author of the Leviathan, Page 24. That there is no common Rule of Good and Evil. to be taken from the Nature of the Objects themselves, that is, either considered absolutely in themselves, or Relatively to external Sense only, but according to some other interior Analogy which Things have to a certain inward Determination in the Soul it self, from whence the Foundation of all this Difference must needs arise, as I shall shew afterwards; Not that the Anticipations of Morality spring meerly from intellectual Forms and notional Idea's of the Mind, or from certain Rules or Propositions, arbitrarily printed upon the Soul as upon a Book, but from some other other more inward, and vital Principle, in intellectual Beings, as such, whereby they have a natural Determination in them to do some Things, and to avoid others, which could not be, if they were meer naked Passive Things. Wherefore since the Nature of Morality cannot be understood, without some Knowledge of the Nature of the Soul, I thought it seasonable and requisite here to take this Occasion offered, and to prepare the Way to our following Discourse, by shewing in general, that the Soul is not a meer Passive and Receptive Thing, which hath no innate active Principle of its own, Because upon this Hypothesis there could be no such Thing as Morality.
(IV.vi.4, pp. 287-8)",2012-01-22,11774,"•I've included twice: Tabula Rasa and Furniture
•Taylor writes, ""Cudworth's book, although it was only published in 1731, well after his death in 1688, was actually written before Locke's Essay appeared, with its famous description of the Mind as originally ""white Paper, void of all Characters"" (2.1.2). He is not responding directly to Locke here, nor did Locke to him. But the opposition could not have been clearer if they had been in direct polemic with each other"" (542, n. 11).
•Cited in John Ellis's Knowledge of Divine Things from Revelation (1747). p. 102. See ECCO.
• Reassigned to main title for Cudworth's Treatise
•Taylor quotes from Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality. London, 1731. p. 242.
","""And first of all, that the Soul is not a meer Rasa Tabula, a naked and Passive Thing, which has no innate Furniture or Activity its own, nor any thing at all in it, but what was impressed on it from without.""",Writing,2013-10-02 19:37:32 UTC,"Book IV, Chapter vi"
4475,"",Searching in Google Books,2012-01-20 22:30:18 UTC,"Neither is this Passion of the Soul in Sensation a meer naked Passion or Suffering; because it is a Cogitation or Perception which hath something; of Active Vigour in it. For those Ideas of Heat, Light, and Colours, and other Sensible things, being not Qualities really existing in the Bodies without us, as the Atomical Philosophy instructs us, and therefore not passively stamped or imprinted upon the Soul from without in the same manner that a Signature is upon a piece of Wax, must needs arise partly from some Inward Vital Energy of the Soul it self, being Phantasms of the Soul, or several Modes of Cogitation or Perception in it. For which Cause some of the Platonists would not allow Sensations to be Passions in the Soul, but only Active Knowledges of the Passions of the Body.
(III.i.3, p. 79)",,19466,"","""For those Ideas of Heat, Light, and Colours, and other Sensible things, being not Qualities really existing in the Bodies without us, as the Atomical Philosophy instructs us, and therefore not passively stamped or imprinted upon the Soul from without in the same manner that a Signature is upon a piece of Wax, must needs arise partly from some Inward Vital Energy of the Soul it self, being Phantasms of the Soul, or several Modes of Cogitation or Perception in it.""",Impressions,2012-01-20 22:30:31 UTC,"Book III, Chapter i"
3986,"","Text from Google. Reading John W. Yolton, ""As in a Looking-Glass: Perceptual Acquaintance in Eighteenth-Century Britain,"" Journal of the History of Ideas 40:2 (Apr.-Jun. 1979): 207-34, 211.
",2014-07-30 14:49:39 UTC,"24. To our School-Divine, I shall only join for a companion a certain School-Metaphysitian, one of those good Authors which by a natural Prejudice some perhaps may be tempted the less to regard, because they formerly, convers'd with him in the institution of their younger Studies, tho' I think he deserves to be Read (as well as some others) with more Consideration than we commonly use at that time. It is honest Christopher Scheibler who in his Metaphysics professedly considers this very Question, An Deus Cognoscat res Creatas in Seipso solum, an vero Cognoscat eas juxta proprias earum Essentias? Which indeed is not so exactly Worded as should be, there not being a due opposition between the two parts of the Question, and that because supposing God to know things in Seipso, he does also in a true Sense know them juxta proprias earum essentias, one of these being very Consistent with the other. But however his meaning is right enough, and he expresses it better afterwards when he gives this for the Sense of the Question, Whether Created things are the Object of the Divine Understanding in their own Beings, or only as they are Eminently, Ideally or Vertually contain'd in God ? To which his direct Answer is, in se Cognoscit Deus res Creatas, that God knows the Creatures in himself. Which he farther explains and reconciles with his knowing them also juxta esse proprium according to their own proper Beings, by saying that the Divine Essence has the same reason or proportion in that knowledge whereby God knows, as the Species has in Humane knowledge. And that both of them are immediately that that Reason or Form whereby the knowledge becomes Actual. As therefore upon the Union of the Species with the Cognoscitive Power the things is apprehended which in its Being is out of the understanding, and that according to that its proper Being which it really has in the Word out of the Mind. Even so says he it is when God understands his own Essence, in which as in a Species representing the Essences of Creatures, the Creatures are understood by God according to their proper Natures. As in a Looking-glass, in which he that looks does indeed immediately behold the Species in the Glass, but does also at the same time actually behold Peter or Paul whose Image it is. In Sum he tells us, That God does understand the Creatures both in their own, and in his own Being. In their own as to the Quod, meaning I suppose the thing that may ultimately be said to be understood, and in his own as to the Quo, meaning I suppose the immediate Object or Form of his Understanding. So that according to this Author, tho' God may be truly said to know the Creatures according to their proper Nature, because he sees that which truly represents them, (more truly indeed by infinite degrees than the Image in the Glass does him whose Image it is, which is but a faint Illustration of the Divine Ideality) yet that which is the immediate Object that terminates, or intelligible Form that truly Specifies his knowledge, is his own Divine Essence, which serves him as a Species for the understanding all things out of himself, which very well agrees with our foregoing Account concerning God's knowledge of things, which you see wants neither Reason nor Authority for its Establishment.
(I, pp. 164-167)",,24370,"","""As in a Looking-glass, in which he that looks does indeed immediately behold the Species in the Glass, but does also at the same time actually behold Peter or Paul whose Image it is.""",Mirror,2014-07-30 14:49:39 UTC,""
3986,"",Reading in Google Books,2014-07-30 14:58:56 UTC,"5. Another Reason may be the exceeding great Difficulty of the Argument, there being not any one Subject perhaps of a more refined and elevated Nature, or that will carry a Writer through a larger Sea of matter of the most Abstract, Sublime and Metaphysical Considederation. The application of our Thoughts to other Subjects is like looking upon the Rays of the Sun as it shines to us from a Wall, or upon the Image of it as it returns from a Watry Mirrour, but this is looking up directly against the Fons veri lucidus, the bright Source of Intellectual Light and Truth, and staring, with a full-levell'd Eye, the great Luminary of Spirits in the very Face. And tho' Truth be the Food of the Soul, and the relish of it be very Delicious and Savoury to its Tast, and tho' even in this Sense also Light be sweet,and a pleasant thing it is to the Eye to behold the Sun, yet it is painful and troublesom to behold it So, and Men Love Shade and Darkness, rather than so strong and so high a Tide of Light.
(I, pp. 5-6)",,24371,"","""The application of our Thoughts to other Subjects is like looking upon the Rays of the Sun as it shines to us from a Wall, or upon the Image of it as it returns from a Watry Mirrour, but this is looking up directly against the Fons veri lucidus, the bright Source of Intellectual Light and Truth, and staring, with a full-levell'd Eye, the great Luminary of Spirits in the very Face.""",Mirror,2014-07-30 14:58:56 UTC,""
3986,"",Reading in Google Books,2014-07-30 15:01:05 UTC,"5. Another Reason may be the exceeding great Difficulty of the Argument, there being not any one Subject perhaps of a more refined and elevated Nature, or that will carry a Writer through a larger Sea of matter of the most Abstract, Sublime and Metaphysical Considederation. The application of our Thoughts to other Subjects is like looking upon the Rays of the Sun as it shines to us from a Wall, or upon the Image of it as it returns from a Watry Mirrour, but this is looking up directly against the Fons veri lucidus, the bright Source of Intellectual Light and Truth, and staring, with a full-levell'd Eye, the great Luminary of Spirits in the very Face. And tho' Truth be the Food of the Soul, and the relish of it be very Delicious and Savoury to its Tast, and tho' even in this Sense also Light be sweet,and a pleasant thing it is to the Eye to behold the Sun, yet it is painful and troublesom to behold it So, and Men Love Shade and Darkness, rather than so strong and so high a Tide of Light.
(I, pp. 5-6)",,24372,"","""And tho' Truth be the Food of the Soul, and the relish of it be very Delicious and Savoury to its Tast, and tho' even in this Sense also 'Light be sweet,and a pleasant thing it is to the Eye to behold the Sun', yet it is painful and troublesom to behold it So, and Men Love Shade and Darkness, rather than so strong and so high a Tide of Light.""","",2014-07-30 15:01:05 UTC,""