id,dictionary,theme,reviewed_on,metaphor,created_at,provenance,comments,work_id,text,context,updated_at
10553,Empire,"",,"""I fansy I pretty well guess what it is that some Men find mischievous in your 'Essay': 'Tis opening the Eyes of the Ignorant, and rectifying the Methods of Reasoning, which perhaps may undermine some received Errors, and so abridge the Empire of Darkness; wherein, though the Subject wander deplorably, yet the Rulers have their Profit and Advantage.""",2005-05-03 00:00:00 UTC,Searching in Past Masters ,•Pastmasters draws from 1823 12th edition of the Works of John Locke (vol. 8). Locke: FLBF Vol 8 Fm: Molyneux [96-7] p 402
,4100,"I fansy I pretty well guess what it is that some Men find mischievous in your Essay: 'Tis opening the Eyes of the Ignorant, and rectifying the Methods of Reasoning, which perhaps may undermine some received Errors, and so abridge the Empire of Darkness; wherein, though the Subject wander deplorably, yet the Rulers have their Profit and Advantage. But 'tis ridiculous in any Man to say, in general, your Book is dangerous: Let any fair Contender for Truth sit down and shew wherein 'tis erroneous. Dangerous is a Word of an uncertain Signification, every one uses it in his own Sense. A Papist shall say 'tis dangerous, because, perhaps, it agrees not so well with Transubstantiation; and a Lutheran, because his Consubstantiation is in hazard; but neither confider, whether Transubstantiation or Consubstantiation be true or false, but taking it for granted that they are true, or at least gainful, whatever hits not with it, or is against it, must be dangerous.
(p. 146; cf. Past Masters, VIII, p. 402)","",2013-10-13 16:13:09 UTC
12131,Rooms,"",2003-10-23,"""I shall therefore observe, that as the mind is endowed with a power of exciting any idea it pleases; whenever it despatches the spirits into that region of the brain, in which the idea is placed; these spirits always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper traces, and rummage that cell, which belongs to the idea.""",2003-09-18 00:00:00 UTC,Searching in Past Masters,"•Great! ""Imaginary dissection""
•It's hard to say if this is literal or figurative! INTEREST",4610,"When I received the relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation, as principles of union among ideas, without examining into their causes, it was more in prosecution of my first maxim, that we must in the end rest contented with experience, than for want of something specious and plausible, which I might have displayed on that subject. It would have been easy to have made an imaginary dissection of the brain, and have shewn, why, upon our conception of any idea, the animal spirits run into all the contiguous traces, and rouze up the other ideas that are related to it. But though I have neglected any advantage, which I might have drawn from this topic in explaining the relations of ideas, I am afraid I must here have recourse to it, in order to account for the mistakes that arise from these relations. I shall therefore observe, that as the mind is endowed with a power of exciting any idea it pleases; whenever it despatches the spirits into that region of the brain, in which the idea is placed; these spirits always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper traces, and rummage that cell, which belongs to the idea. But as their motion is seldom direct, and naturally turns a little to the one side or the other; for this reason the animal spirits, falling into the contiguous traces, present other related ideas, in lieu of that which the mind desired at first to survey. This change we are not always sensible of; but continuing still the same train of thought, make use of the related idea, which is presented to us, and employ it in our reasoning, as if it were the same with what we demanded. This is the cause of many mistakes and sophisms in philosophy; as will naturally be imagined, and as it would be easy to shew, if there was occasion.
(I.ii.5) ",I.ii.5,2010-09-27 01:26:40 UTC
12132,"","",2010-09-26,"""An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: and this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness.""",2003-09-18 00:00:00 UTC,Searching in Past Masters,"•Hume, David tries to avoid figuration in talking about belief. He is aware that his terms seem ""unphilosophical."" Note how he fails and has recourse to notions borrowed from dynamics (force, weight, solidity, firmness). INTEREST.",4610,"This operation of the mind , which forms the belief of any matter of fact, seems hitherto to have been one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy; though no one has so much as suspected, that there was any difficulty in explaining it. For my part, I must own, that I find a considerable difficulty in the case; and that even when I think I understand the subject perfectly, I am at a loss for terms to express my meaning. I conclude, by an induction which seems to me very evident, that an opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from a fiction, not in the nature, or the order of its parts, but in the manner of its being conceived. But when I would explain this manner, I scarce find any word that fully answers the case, but am obliged to have recourse to every one's feeling, in order to give him a perfect notion of this operation of the mind . An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: and this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness.This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind , which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute about the terms. The imagination has the command over all its ideas, and can join, and mix, and vary them in all the ways possible. It may conceive objects with all the circumstances of place and time. It may set them, in a manner, before our eyes in their true colours, just as they might have existed. But as it is impossible that that faculty can ever of itself reach belief, it is evident, that belief consists not in the nature and order of our ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in their feeling to the mind . I confess, that it is impossible to explain perfectly this feeling or manner of conception. We may make use of words that express something near it. But its true and proper name is belief, which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy, we can go no further than assert, that it is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more force and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; infixes them in the mind; and renders them the governing principles of all our actions.
(I.iii.7) ",I.iii.7,2010-09-27 01:31:53 UTC
22959,"","",,"""I have but one Child in the World, who is now nigh four Years old, and promises well; his Mother left him to me very young, and my Affections (I must confess) are strongly placed on him. It has pleased God, by the liberal Provisions of our Ancestors, to free me from the toiling Cares of providing a Fortune for him; so that my whole Study shall be to lay up a Treasure of Knowledge in his Mind, for his Happiness both in this Life and the next.""",2013-10-13 16:15:45 UTC,Searching in Google Books,"",7705,"I am fully convinced by the Arguments you give me for not turning your Book into the scholastick Form of Logick and Metaphysicks, and I had no other Reason to advise the other, but merely to get it promoted the easier in our University; one of the Businesses of which Places is to learn according to the old Forms. And this minds me to let you know the great Joy and Satisfaction of Mind I conceiv'd on your Promise of the Method of Learning; there could nothing be more acceptable to me than the Hopes thereof, and that on this Account: I have but one Child in the World, who is now nigh four Years old, and promises well; his Mother left him to me very young, and my Affections (I must confess) are strongly placed on him. It has pleased God, by the liberal Provisions of our Ancestors, to free me from the toiling Cares of providing a Fortune for him; so that my whole Study shall be to lay up a Treasure of Knowledge in his Mind, for his Happiness both in this Life and the next. And I have been often thinking of some Method for his Instruction, that may best obtain the End I propose. And now, to my great Joy, I hope to be abundantly supply'd by your Method. [...]
(p. 29)","",2013-10-13 16:15:45 UTC
22960,"","",,"""He is now five Years old, of a most towardly and promising Disposition bred exactly, as far as his Age permits, to the Rules you prescribe, I mean as to forming his Mind, and mastering his Passions.""",2013-10-13 16:17:33 UTC,Searching in Google Books,"",7706,"I have formerly told you what Care I proposed to take in the Education of my only Child. I must now beg your Pardon If I trouble you in a Matter, wherein I shall be at a Loss without your Assistance. He is now five Years old, of a most towardly and promising Disposition bred exactly, as far as his Age permits, to the Rules you prescribe, I mean as to forming his Mind, and mastering his Passions. He reads very well, and I think it Time now to put him forward to some other Learning. In order to this, I shall want a Tutor for him, and indeed this Place can hardly afford me one to my Mind. If therefore you know any ingenious Man that may be proper for my Purpose, you would highly oblige me, by procuring him for me. I confess the Encouragement I can propose to such a one is but moderate, yet perhaps there may be some found that may not despise it. [...]
(p. 64)","",2013-10-13 16:17:33 UTC
22967,"","",,"""I'm much concerned to hear you have your Health no better and, on this Occasion, cannot but deplore the great Losses the intellectual World, in all Ages, has suffer'd by, the strongest and soundest Minds possessing the most infirm and sickly Bodies. Certainly there must be some very powerful Cause for this in Nature, or else we could not have so many Instances, where the Knife cuts the Sheath, as the French materially express it.""",2013-10-13 18:30:34 UTC,Searching in Google Books,"INTEREST: ""materially express it"" -- a META-METAPHORICAL observation.",7712,"I'm much concerned to hear you have your Health no better and, on this Occasion, cannot but deplore the great Losses the intellectual World, in all Ages, has suffer'd by, the strongest and soundest Minds possessing the most infirm and sickly Bodies. Certainly there must be some very powerful Cause for this in Nature, or else we could not have so many Instances, where the Knife cuts the Sheath, as the French materially express it: And if so, this must be reckon'd among the many other infeparable Miseries that attend human Affairs.
(pp. 220-221)","",2013-10-13 18:30:34 UTC
22968,"","",,"""As for his General Theory of them, I esteem it, as all others of this kind, a sort of mere waking Dream, that Men are strangely apt to fall into, when they think long of a Subject, beginning quite at the wrong End; for by framing such Conceits in their Fancies, they vainly think to give their Understandings Light, whilst the Things themselves are still, and perhaps ever must remain, in Darkness.""",2013-10-13 18:33:40 UTC,Searching in Google Books,"",7712,"I could wish the Physicians Art were so powerful and perfect, as in some measure to prevent so great an Evil; but we find where once Nature, or the Ĺ’conomia Animalis of the Body is so depraved as not to co-operate with Medicine, all Remedies, and the Courses of them, prove wholly ineffectual, or to very little Purpose. But still the more imperfect Physick is, so much the more is owing to those who the least improve so difficult a Province, which certainly has been, considerably advanced by some late English Authors. And that puts me in mind to desire of you your Thoughts, or what other learned Physicians you converse with say, concerning Dr. Morton, and his late Exercitations on Fevers. As for his General Theory of them, I esteem it, as all others of this kind, a sort of mere waking Dream, that Men are strangely apt to fall into, when they think long of a Subject, beginning quite at the wrong End; for by framing such Conceits in their Fancies, they vainly think to give their Understandings Light, whilst the Things themselves are still, and perhaps ever must remain, in Darkness.
(p. 221)","",2013-10-13 18:33:40 UTC
24105,Fetters and Metal,"",,"""I know that the fear of the civil magistrate is as strong a restraint as any of iron, and that I am in as perfect safety as if he were chain'd or imprison'd.""",2014-06-22 16:09:47 UTC,Reading,"",4610,"'TIS evident the error of distinguishing power from its exercise proceeds not entirely from the scholastic doctrine of free-will, which, indeed, enters very little into common life, and has but small influence on our vulgar and popular ways of thinking. According to that doctrine, motives deprive us not of free-will, nor take away our power of performing or forbearing any action. But according to common notions a man has no power, where very considerable motives lie betwixt him and the satisfaction of his desires, and determine him to forbear what he wishes to perform. I do not think I have fallen into my enemies power, when I see him pass me in the streets with a sword by his side, while I am unprovided of any weapon. I know that the fear of the civil magistrate is as strong a restraint as any of iron, and that I am in as perfect safety as if he were chain'd or imprison'd. But when a person acquires such an authority over me, that not only there is no external obstacle to his actions; but also that he may punish or reward me as he pleases, without any dread of punishment in his turn, I then attribute a full power to him, and consider myself as his subject or vassal.
(pp. 65-6)","",2014-06-22 16:09:47 UTC
24106,Mirror,"",,"""In general we may remark, that the minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect each others emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay away by insensible degrees.""",2014-06-22 16:11:23 UTC,Reading; text from ECCO-TCP,"",4610,"In general we may remark, that the minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect each others emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay away by insensible degrees. Thus the pleasure, which a rich man receives from his possessions, being thrown upon the beholder, causes a pleasure and esteem; which sentiments again, being perceiv'd and sympathiz'd with, encrease the pleasure of the possessor; and being once more reflected, become a new foundation for pleasure and esteem in the beholder. There is certainly an original satisfaction in riches deriv'd from that power, which they bestow, of enjoying all the pleasures of life; and as this is their very nature and essence, it must be the first source of all the passions, which arise from them. One of the most considerable of these passions is that of love or esteem in others, which therefore proceeds from a sympathy with the pleasure of the possessor. But the possessor has also a secondary satisfaction in riches arising from the love and esteem he acquires by them, and this satisfaction is nothing but a second reflexion of that original pleasure, which proceeded from himself. This secondary satisfaction or vanity becomes one of the principal recommendations of riches, and is the chief reason, why we either desire them for ourselves, or esteem them in others. Here then is a third rebound of the original pleasure; after which 'tis difficult to distinguish the images and reflexions, by reason of their faintness and confusion.
(II.ii.5, pp. 157-8)",II.ii.5,2014-06-22 16:11:23 UTC
24107,"","",,"""In that case resemblance converts the idea into an impression, not only by means of the relation, and by transfusing the original vivacity into the related idea; but also by presenting such materials as take fire from the least spark.""",2014-06-22 16:12:26 UTC,Reading; text from ECCO-TCP.,"",4610,"The idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us, and conveys a sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object, to which we are related. This lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression; these two kinds of perception being in a great measure the same, and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity. But this change must be produc'd with the greater ease, that our natural temper gives us a propensity to the same impression, which we observe in others, and makes it arise upon any slight occasion. In that case resemblance converts the idea into an impression, not only by means of the relation, and by transfusing the original vivacity into the related idea; but also by presenting such materials as take fire from the least spark. And as in both cases a love or affection arises from the resemblance, we may learn that a sympathy with others is agreeable only by giving an emotion to the spirits, since an easy sympathy and correspondent emotions are alone common to relation, acquaintance, and resemblance.
(pp. 138-9)","",2014-06-22 16:12:26 UTC