text,updated_at,metaphor,created_at,context,theme,reviewed_on,dictionary,comments,provenance,id,work_id
"The senses at first let in particular Ideas, and furnish the yet empty Cabinet: And the Mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the Memory, and Names got to them. Afterwards the Mind proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by Degrees learns the use of general Names. In this manner the Mind comes to be furnish'd with Ideas and Language, that Materials about which to exercise its discursive Faculty: And the use of Reason becomes daily more visible, as these Materials, that give it Employment, increase. But though the having of general Ideas, and the use of general Words and Reason usually grow together: yet, I see not, how this any way proves them innate. The Knowledge of some Truths, I confess, is very early in the Mind; but in a way that shews them not to be innate, but acquired: It being about those first, which are imprinted by external Things, with which Infants have earliest to do, and which make the most frequent Impressions on their Senses. In Ideas thus got, the Mind discovers, that some agree, and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of Memory; as soon as it is able, to retain and receive distinct Ideas.
(I.ii.15)",2016-03-11 18:21:18 UTC,"""The senses at first let in particular Ideas, and furnish the yet empty Cabinet: And the Mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the Memory, and Names got to them.""",2003-09-04 00:00:00 UTC,I.ii.15.,"",,Rooms,"•The mind is furnished with ""Materials"" and can exercise and employ itself. Reminiscent of the servant in the previous entry? Is the mind the cabinet or the person in the cabinet. A typical Lockean ambiguity. I have not included the weak personification in this passage in the database.","Reading. -- An important metaphor for Sean Silver in The Mind is a Collection: Case Studies in Eighteenth-Century Thought (Philadelphia: Penn Press, 2015), 23-5, 56, 58.",9928,3866
"Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas; How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, From Experience: In that, all our Knowledge is founded: and from that it ultimately derives it self. Our Observation employ'd either about external, sensible Objects; or about the internal Operations of our Minds, perceived and reflected on by our selves, is that, which supplies our Understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the Fountains of Knowledge, from whence the Ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.
(II.i.2)",2013-09-06 13:39:13 UTC,"""Whence comes that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety?""",2003-09-06 00:00:00 UTC,II.i.2,"",2005-10-10,"",•I am not (but perhaps I should) including the metaphor of the fountain. Did so (10/10/2005),Reading,9943,3866
"The other way of Retention is the Power to revive again in our Minds those Ideas, which after imprinting have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of Sight: And thus we do, when we conceive Heat or Light, Yellow or Sweet, the Object being removed. This is Memory, which is as it were the Store-house of our Ideas. For the narrow Mind of Man, not being capable of having many Ideas under View and Consideration at once, it was necessary to have a Repository, to lay up those Ideas, which at another time it might have use of. But our Ideas being nothing, but actual Perceptions in the Mind, which cease to be any thing, when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our Ideas in the Repository of the Memory, signifies no more but this, that the Mind has a Power, in many cases to revive Perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional Perception annexed to them, that is has had them before. And in this Sense it is, that our Ideas are said to be in our Memories, when indeed, they are actually no where, but only there is an ability in the Mind, when it will, to revive them again; and as it were paint them anew on it self, though some with more, some with less difficulty, some more obscurely. And thus it is, by the Assistance of this Faculty, that we are said to have all those Ideas in our Understandings, which though we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in sight, and make appear again, and be the Objects of our Thoughts, without the help of those sensible Qualities, which first imprinted them there.
(II.x.2)",2011-06-14 04:18:04 UTC,"""This is Memory, which is as it were the Store-house of our Ideas.""",2003-09-15 00:00:00 UTC,II.x.2. The retention of ideas,"",,"","•Locke's qualification:""as it were."" Notice how he takes the metaphor back.
•Westbury and Dennett point to this as ""the standard representative theory of memory"" (Memory, Brain, and Belief, 16). Theories of memory which treat a memory as an accurate picture of a perception reduce the problem of memory to the problem of perception: ""In remembering x, we know that it is x for the same reason (whatever that might be!) that we were able to recognize x when we first sensed it"" (16). Memory is only another viewing.
•In a footnote Westbury and Dennett admit Locke is ""more subtle"" than the quotation would suggest. The full passage ""suggests that Locke did not think of the memory simply as a static storehouse of images, but rather as a dynamic ability to evoke or reconstruct an image, a metaphor more closely in keeping with modern scientific views of memory"" (31n.1)",Reading,9958,3866
"The other way of Retention is the Power to revive again in our Minds those Ideas, which after imprinting have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of Sight: And thus we do, when we conceive Heat or Light, Yellow or Sweet, the Object being removed. This is Memory, which is as it were the Store-house of our Ideas. For the narrow Mind of Man, not being capable of having many Ideas under View and Consideration at once, it was necessary to have a Repository, to lay up those Ideas, which at another time it might have use of. But our Ideas being nothing, but actual Perceptions in the Mind, which cease to be any thing, when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our Ideas in the Repository of the Memory, signifies no more but this, that the Mind has a Power, in many cases to revive Perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional Perception annexed to them, that is has had them before. And in this Sense it is, that our Ideas are said to be in our Memories, when indeed, they are actually no where, but only there is an ability in the Mind, when it will, to revive them again; and as it were paint them anew on it self, though some with more, some with less difficulty, some more lively and others more obscurely. And thus it is, by the Assistance of this Faculty, that we are said to have all those Ideas in our Understandings, which though we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in sight, and make appear again, and be the Objects of our Thoughts, without the help of those sensible Qualities, which first imprinted them there.
(II.x.2)",2011-06-14 04:19:50 UTC,"""For the narrow Mind of Man, not being capable of having many Ideas under View and Consideration at once, it was necessary to have a Repository, to lay up those Ideas, which at another time it might have use of.""",2003-09-15 00:00:00 UTC,II.x.2. ,"",,"","The retention of ideas
•Locke explains his own ""metaphorical"" meaning
•See also previous entry",Reading,9959,3866
"The cause of our judging amiss, when we compare our present pleasure or pain with future, seems to me to be the weak and narrow constitution of our minds. We cannot well enjoy two pleasures at once, much less any pleasure almost, whilst pain possesses us. The present pleasure, if it be not very languid, and almost none at all, fills our narrow souls, and so takes up the whole mind, that it scarce leaves any thought of things absent: Or if among our pleasures, there are some which are not strong enough to exclude the consideration of things at a distance; yet we have so great an abhorrence of pain, that a little of it extinguishes all our pleasures: A little bitter mingled in our cup, leaves no relish of the sweet. Hence it comes, that at any rate we desire to be rid of the present evil, which we are apt to think nothing absent can equal; because, under the present pain, we find not ourselves capable of any the least degree of happiness. Men's daily complaints are a loud proof of this: The pain that any one actually feels is still of all other the worst; and it is with anguish they cry out, ""Any rather than this: Nothing can be so intolerable as what I now suffer."" And therefore our whole endeavours and thoughts are intent to get rid of the present evil before all things, as the first necessary condition to our happiness, let what will follow. Nothing, as we passionately think, can exceed, or almost equal, the uneasiness that sits so heavy upon us. And because the abstinence from a present pleasure that offers itself, is a pain, nay oftentimes a very great one, the desire being inflamed by a near and tempting object; it is no wonder that that operates after the same manner pain does, and lessens in our thoughts what is future; and so forces us, as it were, blindfold into its embraces.
(II.xii.64)",2012-08-15 19:56:03 UTC,"""The present pleasure, if it be not very languid, and almost none at all, fills our narrow souls, and so takes up the whole mind, that it scarce leaves any thought of things absent.""",2012-08-15 19:56:03 UTC,"Book II, Chapter xxi","",,"","",Reading,19921,3866
"§. 7. If therefore we will warily attend to the Motions of the Mind, and observe what Course it usually takes in its way to Knowledge, we shall, I think, find that the Mind having got any Idea, which it thinks it may have use of, either in Contemplation or Discourse; the first Thing it does, is to abstract it, and then get a Name to it; and so lay it up in its Store-house, the Memory, as containing the Essence of a sort of Things, of which that Name is always to be the Mark. Hence it is, that we may often observe, that when any one sees a new Thing of a kind that he knows not, he presently asks what it is, meaning by that Enquiry nothing but the Name. As if the Name carried with it the Knowledge of the Species, or the Essence of it; whereof it is indeed used as the Mark, and is generally supposed annexed to it.
(II.xxxii.7, p. 178 in 1690 ed.)",2014-06-22 18:18:24 UTC,"""If therefore we will warily attend to the Motions of the Mind, and observe what Course it usually takes in its way to Knowledge, we shall, I think, find that the Mind having got any Idea, which it thinks it may have use of, either in Contemplation or Discourse; the first Thing it does, is to abstract it, and then get a Name to it; and so lay it up in its Store-house, the Memory, as containing the Essence of a sort of Things, of which that Name is always to be the Mark.""",2013-09-17 16:52:20 UTC,"Book II, chapter xxxii","",,Rooms,"",Reading; text from ECCO-TCP,22773,3866
"§. 5. The Understanding seems to me, not to have the least glimmering of any Ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two: Eternal Objects furnish the Mind with the Ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produced in us: And the Mind furnishes the Understanding with Ideas of its own Operations. These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, and the Compositions made out of them, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of Ideas; and that we have nothing in our Minds, which did not come in, one of these two ways. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and throughly search into his Understanding, and then let him tell me, Whether all the original Ideas he has there, are any other than of the Objects of his Senses, or of the Operations of his Mind, considered as Objects of his Reflection: and how great a mass of Knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any Idea in his Mind, but what one of those two have imprinted; though, perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged, by the Understanding, as we shall see hereafter.
(II.i.5, p. 38)",2014-07-28 15:14:13 UTC,"""These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, and the Compositions made out of them, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of Ideas; and that we have nothing in our Minds, which did not come in, one of these two ways.""",2014-07-28 15:14:13 UTC,"","",,"","","Searching ""stock"" in EEBO-TCP",24313,3866
"§. 5. The Understanding seems to me, not to have the least glimmering of any Ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two: Eternal Objects furnish the Mind with the Ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produced in us: And the Mind furnishes the Vnderstanding with Ideas of its own Operations. These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, and the Compositions made out of them, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of Ideas; and that we have nothing in our Minds, which did not come in, one of these two ways. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and throughly search into his Understanding, and then let him tell me, Whether all the original Ideas he has there, are any other than of the Objects of his Senses, or of the Operations of his Mind, considered as Objects of his Reflection: and how great a mass of Knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any Idea in his Mind, but what one of those two have imprinted; though, perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged, by the Understanding, as we shall see hereafter.
(II.i.5, p. 38)",2014-07-28 15:15:54 UTC,"""Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and throughly search into his Understanding, and then let him tell me, Whether all the original Ideas he has there, are any other than of the Objects of his Senses, or of the Operations of his Mind, considered as Objects of his Reflection: and how great a mass of Knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any Idea in his Mind, but what one of those two have imprinted; though, perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged, by the Understanding, as we shall see hereafter.""",2014-07-28 15:15:41 UTC,"","",,Impressions,"",Searching in EEBO-TCP,24314,3866
"§. 20. I see no Reason therefore to believe, that the Soul thinks before the Senses have furnished it with Ideas to think on; and as those are increased, and retained; so it comes, by Exercise, to improve its Faculty of thinking in the several parts of it, as well as afterwards, by compounding those Ideas, and reflecting on its own Operations, it increases its Stock as well as Facility, in remembring, imagining, reasoning, and other modes of thinking.
(II.i.20, pp. 44)",2014-07-28 15:16:57 UTC,"""I see no Reason therefore to believe, that the Soul thinks before the Senses have furnished it with Ideas to think on; and as those are increased, and retained; so it comes, by Exercise, to improve its Faculty of thinking in the several parts of it, as well as afterwards, by compounding those Ideas, and reflecting on its own Operations, it increases its Stock as well as Facility, in remembring, imagining, reasoning, and other modes of thinking.""",2014-07-28 15:16:42 UTC,"","",,"","",Searching in EEBO-TCP,24315,3866
"§. 30. Thirdly, Where we have adequate Ideas, and where there is a certain and discoverable connexion between them, yet we are often ignorant, for want of tracing those Ideas we have, or may have, and finding out those intermediate Ideas, which may shew us what habitude of agreement or disagreement they have one with another. And thus many are ignorant of mathematical Truths, not out of any imperfection of their Faculties, or uncertainty in the Things themselves; but for want of application in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing those Ideas. That which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our Ideas, and finding out their Relations, and Agreements or Disagreements one with another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of Words. It is impossible that Men should ever truly seek, or certainly discover the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas themselves, whilst their Thoughts flutter about, or stick only in Sounds of doubtful and uncertain significations Mathematicians abstracting their Thoughts from Names, and accustoming themselves to set before their Minds the Ideas themselves, that they would consider, and not Sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity, puddering, and confusion, which has so much hindred Mens progress in other parts of Knowledge; who sticking in Words of undetermined and uncertain signification, were unable to distinguish True from False, Certain from Probable, Consistent from Inconsistent, in their own Opinions: Whereby the increase brought into the Stock of real Knowledge has been very little, in proportion to the Schools, Disputes, and Writings, the World has been fill'd with; whilst Men, being lost in the great Wood of Words, knew not whereabout they were, how far their Discoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in their own, or the general Stock of Knowledge. Had Men, in their discoveries of the material, done, as they have in those of the intellectual World, involved all in the obscurity of uncertain and doubtful terms and ways of talking, Volumes writ of Navigation and Voyages, Theories and Stories of Zones and Tydes multiplied and disputed; nay, Ships built, and Fleets set out, would never have taught us the way beyond the Line; and the Antipodes would be still as much unknown, as when it was declared Heresie to hold there were any. But having spoken sufficiently of Words, and the ill or careless use, that is commonly made of them, I shall not say any thing more of it here.
(IV.iii.30, pp. 280-281)",2014-07-28 15:27:06 UTC,"""Whereby the increase brought into the Stock of real Knowledge has been very little, in proportion to the Schools, Disputes, and Writings, the World has been fill'd with; whilst Men, being lost in the great Wood of Words, knew not whereabout they were, how far their Discoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in their own, or the general Stock of Knowledge.""",2014-07-28 15:27:06 UTC,"","",,"","","Searching ""stock"" in EEBO-TCP",24320,3866