work_id,theme,provenance,created_at,text,reviewed_on,id,comments,metaphor,dictionary,updated_at,context
3275,"","Reading S. H. Clark's ""Locke and Metaphor Reconsidered"" in JHI 59:2 (1998) p. 247",2005-03-21 00:00:00 UTC,Without the help and assistance of the senses [the mind] can achieve nothing more than a labourer working in darkness behind shuttered windows
(p. 139),,8536,•I've include twice: Labourer and Windows.,"""Without the help and assistance of the senses [the mind] can achieve nothing more than a labourer working in darkness behind shuttered windows""",Inhabitants,2009-09-14 19:33:37 UTC,""
3684,"","Reading Knud Haakonssen's ""Natural Law According to Cumberland"" in English Philosophy in the Age of Locke, ed. M.A. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 39.",2005-05-10 00:00:00 UTC,"First then I am to observe, ""That natural Obligation is not discover'd by Man in the same Order, in which it is founded and establish'd in Nature by the Author thereof."" We are under the necessity of first using the Analytical Method, by rising from those Effects which immediately affect us, to various and very complicated second Causes, 'till at length we arrive at the First. But we are by no means injurious to him, if at the End of our inquiries we acknowledge, ""That all those necessary Effects which we had before observ'd, ow'd their Original to his Will; and, if we refer to him all that Perfection, which we had taken notice of in them."" So, with respect to our present Subject, we have first ""some Knowledge of our own Nature, and of the Necessity of some things to its Happiness, and of some plainly natural Propensions and Endeavours to obtain such Necessaries."" We then observe, ""That some free Actions of ours are, whether we will or no, naturally oppos'd and restrain'd, as far as in them lies, by those with whom we have to do; while others of our Actions (such as are beneficial to others) are chearfully recompens'd with reciprocal Affection""; we further perceive ""ourselves so fram'd by Nature, that we incline, with out deliberation, to repel Force with Force, and, to return Like for Like""; nor does the most consummate Reason dictate otherwise. From innumerable and perpetual Observations of this kind, and others that I have before suggested, the Mind of Man becomes persuaded, ""That the Benevolence of each towards all paves the way to the Rewards and Happiness of all other Men alike; and that so much the more, by how much it is the more diffusive."" When afterwards the Mind considers, ""That this is all effected by the most provident Author of Nature,"" it cannot doubt, ""But that he would have this regarded by Men, as it really is, to be a sufficient Argument afforded by the supreme Governor of the World, to incline them to the exercise of Universal Benevolence"": That is, (as I have shewn,) as a Proof of our Obligation, and a certain Mark of the Law enjoining it. Altho', therefore, this be last discover'd, yet here the Obligation of the Laws of Nature takes its first Rise, namely, from the Discovery of the Will of God, whom, from his Works, we had learn'd to be a most perfect Being, the Cause of all Things, upon whose Pleasure depends the whole Happiness of All, and consequently our own, concerning which we are naturally most solicitous. The Obligation arises no otherwise from the Love of our own Happiness, than the Truth of Propositions concerning the Existence of Things natural, and of their First Cause, which is thence discover'd, arises from the Credit given to the Testimony of our Senses. Yet no-one would say, ""That we, therefore, preferred our Senses to the whole World, and to God himself""; since we readily acknowledge, ""That their very Existence, and all their Use, depends upon God as their First Cause, and upon the System of the World, as upon Causes subordinate to him."" That is first in Nature, at which we arrive last in this inverted Method of Reasoning. Therefore, altho' this Method of coming at Knowledge, be evidently natural and very common; altho' our Passions also, and several Appetites, are excited according to the discoveries we make of Good and Evil; yet we may not, therefore, thence affirm, what is most worthy to be known, or amiable above all other things. But, as by the help of our Senses, we learn some very general Principles, (as for Example, the most universal Theorems of Arithmetick and Geometry,) whereby we may successfully correct those Errors, which the generality are wont to imbibe from misapprehended Sensations; in like manner, from the Love of our own Happiness, under the conduct of Prudence, all who are truly Rational attain such a Knowledge of Natural Things and of God himself, and such Affections towards his Honour, and the Common Happiness of all, as either prevent or root out all perverse Self-Love: Those, (or at least some of those,) first Natural and Necessary Appetites, which we suppose in Men, of procuring their own Preservation and Happiness, are confin'd within a very narrow compass, and are perfectly free from Fault; as our simple Sensations, with respect to the proper objects of our Senses, under proper Regulations, are free from Error. Which were it otherwise, there would be no hope left, either of knowing Nature, or of conforming our Actions to the Laws of Nature; but a fruitless and perpetual Scepticism would be necessarily introduc'd into the place of Science, and a casual Determination of our Actions into that of Prudence, and the regular Conduct of our Passions; and there would be no difference between the Wise Man and the Fool.
(V.xlv, pp. 606-8)",2012-06-13,9548,•Not clear to me which translation Haakonssen is using. ,"""The Obligation arises no otherwise from the Love of our Happiness, than the Truth of Propositions concerning the Existence of Things natural, and of their First Cause, which is thence discover'd, arises from the Credit given to the Testimony of our Senses.""",Court,2012-06-13 20:33:56 UTC,"Chapter V, §xlv"
3866,"",Reading Nidditch's edition of Locke's Essay,2003-09-04 00:00:00 UTC,"Reader,
I here put into thy Hands, what has been the diversion of some of my idle and heavy Hours: If it has the good luck to prove so of any of thine, and thou hast half so much Pleasure in reading, as I had in writing it, thou wilt as little think thy Money, as I do my Pains, ill bestowed. Mistake not this, for Commendation of my Work; nor conclude, because I was pleased with the doing of it, that therefore I am fondly taken with it now it is done. He that hawks at larks and Sparrows, has no less Sport, though a much less considerable Quarry, than he that flies at nobler Game: And he is little acquainted with the Subject of this Treatise, the UNDERSTANDING, who does not know that as it is the most elevated Faculty of the Soul, so it is employed with a greater, and more constant Delight than any of the other. Its searches after Truth, are a sort of Hawking and Hunting, wherein the very pursuit makes a great part of the Pleasure. Every step the Mind takes in its Progress towards Knowledge, makes some Discovery, which is not only new, but the best too, for the time at least.
(Epistle to the Reader, p. 6)",,9920,"•Note the Lockean qualification: ""a sort of."" Is this a personification? (A kind of ""as it were."")","The Understanding's ""searches after Truth, are a sort of Hawking and Hunting, wherein the very pursuit makes a great part of the Pleasure""",Beasts,2009-09-14 19:34:34 UTC,The Epistle to the Reader (Opening Epistle)
3866,Mind's Eye,"Reading; found again, Joanna Picciotto, Labors of Innocence in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2010), 262.",2003-09-04 00:00:00 UTC,"For the Understanding, like the Eye, judging of Objects, only by its own Sight, cannot but be pleased with what it discovers, having less regret for what has scaped it, because it is unknown. Thus he who has raised himself above the Alms-Basket, and not content to live lazily on scraps of begg'd Opinions, sets his own Thoughts on work, to find and follow Truth, will (whatever he lights on) not miss the Hunter's Satisfaction; every moment of his Pursuit, will reward his Pains with some Delight; and he will have Reason to think his time not ill spent, even when he cannot much boast of any great Acquisition.
(Epistle to the Reader, p. 6)",,9921,"","""For the Understanding, like the Eye, judging of Objects, only by its own Sight, cannot but be pleased with what it discovers, having less regret for what has scaped it, because it is unknown.""",Eye,2014-07-28 14:41:10 UTC,The Epistle to the Reader
3866,Taste,Reading,2003-09-04 00:00:00 UTC,"There are few, I believe, who have not observed in themselves or others, That what in one way of proposing was very obscure, another way of expressing it, has made very clear and intelligible: Though afterward the Mind found little difference in the Phrases, and wondered why one failed to be understood more than the other. But everything does not hit alike upon every Man's Imagination. We have our Understandings no less different than our Palates; and he that thinks the same Truth shall be equally relished by every one in the same dress, may as well hope to feast every one with the same sort of Cookery: The Meat may be the same, and the Nourishment good, yet every one not be able to receive it with that Seasoning; and it must be dressed another way, if you will have it go down with some, even of strong Constitutions.
(Epistle to the Reader, p. 8)",,9922,•The truth is meat digested by the mind. It nourishes!,"""We have our Understandings no less different than our Palates; and he that thinks the same Truth shall be equally relished by every one in the same dress, may as well hope to feast every one with the same sort of Cookery: The Meat may be the same, and the Nourishment good, yet every one not be able to receive it with that Seasoning; and it must be dressed another way, if you will have it go down with some, even of strong Constitutions""","",2009-09-14 19:34:34 UTC,The Epistle to the Reader
3939,"",Past Masters ,2004-12-06 00:00:00 UTC,"But though this be a State of Liberty, yet it is not a state of Licence, though Man in that State have an uncontrolable Liberty, to dispose of his Person or Possessions, yet he has not Liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any Creature in his Possession, but where some nobler use, than its bare preservation calls for it. The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions; For Men being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the Servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order and about his business. They are his Property, whose Workmanship they are made to last during his, not another's Pleasure. And being Furnished with like Faculties, sharing all in one Community of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such Subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of Creatures are for ours. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own Preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind, and may not, unless it be to do Kustice to an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the Preservation of life, the Liberty, Health, Limb or Goods of another.
(p. 270)",2011-09-13,10215,REVISED AER to match the EEBO-TCP,"""The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.""",Court,2014-04-16 22:58:39 UTC,II.ii.6
3939,"",Searching in Past Masters; text from ECCO-TCP.,2004-12-06 00:00:00 UTC,"11. From these two distinct Rights, the one of Punishing the Crime for restraint, and preventing the like Offence, which right of punishing is in every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party, comes it to pass that the Magistrate, who by being Magistrate, hath the common right of punishing put into his hands, can often where the public good demands not the Execution of the Law, remit the punishment of Criminal Offences by his own Authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any Private Man, for the damage he has received. That, he who has suffered the damage has a Right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit; The damnified Person has this Power of appropriating to himself, the Goods or Service of the Offender, by Right of self Preservation, as every Man has a Power to punish the Crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the Right he has of Preserving all Mankind, and doing all reasonable things, he can in order to that end: And thus it is, that every Man in the State of Nature, has a Power to kill a muderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the Example of the punishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure Men from the attempts of a Criminal, who having renounced reason, the common Rule and Measure God hath given to Mankind, hath by the unjust violence and slaughter, he hath committed upon one, declared War against all Mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a Lion or a Tiger, one of those wild Savage Beasts, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security: And upon this is grounded that great Law of Nature, who so sheddeth Mans Blood, by Man shall his Blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that every one had a Right to destroy such a Criminal, that after the Murther of his Brother, he cries out, every one that findeth me, shall slay me, so plain was it writ in the Hearts of all Mankind.
(II.ii.11, pp. 227-9)",,10216,"","""And Cain was so fully convinced, that every one had a Right to destroy such a Criminal, that after the Murther of his Brother, he cries out, 'every one that findeth me, shall slay me', so plain was it writ in the Hearts of all Mankind.""",Court,2014-10-05 20:38:10 UTC,II.ii.11
3939,"",Past Masters ,2004-12-06 00:00:00 UTC,"To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but to heaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great reason of men's putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature. For where there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded, and the controversy is decided by that power. Had there been any such court, any superior jurisdiction on earth, to determine the right between Jephthah and the Ammonites, they had never come to a state of war: But we see he was forced to appeal to heaven. ""The Lord the Judge,"" says he, ""be judge this day, between the children of Israel and the children of Ammon,"" Judg. xi. 27, and then prosecuting, and relying on his appeal, he leads out his army to battle: and therefore in such controversies, where the question is put, who shall be judge? it cannot be meant, who shall decide the controversy; every one knows what Jephthah here tells us, that ""the Lord the Judge"" shall judge. Where there is no judge on earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven. That question then cannot mean, who shall judge? whether another hath put himself in a state of war with me, and whether I may, as Jephthah did, appeal to heaven in it? of that I myself can only be judge in my own conscience, as I will answer it, at the great day, to the supreme judge of all men.",,10217,"","Of certain questions ""I myself can only be judge in my own conscience, as I will answer it""",Court,2009-09-14 19:34:48 UTC,II.iii.21
3939,"",Past Masters ,2004-12-06 00:00:00 UTC,"Children, I confess, are not born in this state of equality, though they are born to it. Their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them, when they come into the world, and for some time after, but it is but a temporary one. The bonds of this subjection are like the swaddling clothes they are wrapt up in, and supported by, in the weakness of their infancy: Age and reason, as they grow up, loosen them, till at length they drop quite off, and leave a man at his own free disposal.
(p. 304)",2008-12-03,10218,"•Cross-reference: like Kant's ""go-cart"" in the essay on Enlightenment and self-imposed minority.","Children's ""bonds of subjection"" are like the ""swaddling clothes they are wrapt up in, and supported by, in the weakness of their infancy""and will only be loosened by age and reason","",2009-09-14 19:34:48 UTC,II.vi.55
3939,"","Searching ""mind"" and ""empire"" in Past Masters ",2004-12-06 00:00:00 UTC,"Thus we are born free, as we are born rational; not that we have actually the exercise of either: age, that brings one, brings with it the other too. And thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may consist together, and are both founded on the same principle. A child is free by his father's title, by his father's understanding, which is to govern him till he hath it of his own. The freedom of a man at years of discretion, and the subjection of a child to his parents, whilst yet short of that age, are so consistent, and so distinguishable, that the most blinded contenders for monarchy, by right of fatherhood, cannot miss this difference; the most obstinate cannot but allow their consistency. For were their doctrine all true, were the right heir of Adam now known, and by that title settled a monarch in his throne, invested with all the absolute unlimited power, Sir Robert Filmer talks of; if he should die as soon as his heir were born, must not the child, notwithstanding he were never so free, never so much sovereign, be in subjection to his mother and nurse, to tutors and governors, till age and education brought him reason and ability to govern himself and others? The necessities of his life, the health of his body, and the information of his mind, would require him to be directed by the will of others, and not his own; and yet will any one think, that this restraint and subjection were inconsistent with, or spoiled him of, that liberty or sovereignty he had a right to, or gave away his empire to those who had the government of his nonage? This government over him only prepared him the better and sooner for it. If any body should ask me when my son is of age to be free? I shall answer, just when his monarch is of age to govern. ""But at what time,"" says the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. Lib. I. Sect. 6 ""a man may be said to have attained so far forth the use of reason, as sufficeth to make him capable of those laws whereby he is then bound to guide his actions: this is a great deal more easy for sense to discern, than for any one by skill and learning to determine.""
(p. 309)
",,10221,•INTEREST. Cross-reference: Kant on nonage and Enlightenment.,"""[Y]et will any one think, that this restraint and subjection were inconsistent with, or spoiled him of, that liberty or sovereignty he had a right to, or gave away his empire to those who had the government of his nonage""","",2009-09-14 19:34:48 UTC,II.vi.62